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Abstract 
Hong Kong contributes to poor corporate governance on the Mainland. Could regulatory reform 
in Hong Kong help improve corporate governance standards/practices (and thus firm value) on 
the Mainland? In this paper, we discuss ways to incentivize Mainland firms to improve their 
corporate governance by adopting numerous market-value increasing reforms in Hong Kong. 
These include the limited extra-territorial application of corporate governance provisions, 
changes to the Listing Rules to ‘contract’ for better corporate governance, and incentives to 
collect better corporate governance data. Other reforms include increasing financial transparency 
(particularly about corporate ownership and control), reducing financial firms’ incentives to trade 
in shell corporations, regulating relationships with tax havens, and encouraging the redrafting of 
China’s 2002 Code of Corporate Governance. We provide 31 recommendations and estimate that 
these recommendations can increase market values on the Mainland by 7% (or in value of 
roughly $330 billion), while improving the value-added of Hong Kong’s own 
incorporation/corporate services companies.  
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Recommendations at a Glance 
 
Recommendation 1:  Add extra-territoriality to the Companies Ordinance (in a new sec. 2(7)) 
and Securities & Futures Ordinance (in a new 3(5)), if even as signal of intent, covering key 
corporate governance provisions from the Listing Rules. 
 
Recommendation 2: Add requirements in section 68.1(g) and a new article 70.1(c) of the 
Companies Ordinance to require the dissemination of a corporate governance code with 
incorporation documents as well as require senior company officials sign a declaration noting that 
they have read the code and agree to follow the code.  
 
Recommendation 3: Ditch comply-or-explain as well as add specific administrative, civil and 
criminal sanctions to the Securities and Futures Ordinance (if the SFC does not already have 
related rulemaking power) for violations of corporate governance provisions, as suggested in 
figure 37 of this paper.  
 
Recommendation 4: Make the implicit agreement to accept extra-territorial investigations and 
punishment explicit by amending the legislatively adopted Code of Corporate Governance to 
require Listed Companies to contractually agree to the terms and conditions of Hong Kong’s 
corporate governance rules.   
 
Recommendation 5: Add a phrase Chapter 2 article 2.07 and in the first section of Appendix 14 
clearly signalling the intent to apply extra-territorially corporate governance related Listing Rules.  
 
Recommendation 6: The Financial Services Development Council should recommend an 
organisation to organise and set up procedures for corporate governance peer review between 
governments in the region (and especially the Mainland) based on the OECD’s Guidelines or 
possibly under the aegis of the OECD’s cooperation with non-member countries.  
 
Recommendation 7: Add to the Listing Rules the requirement to publish enough information in 
corporate governance reports to allow for third-party assessment of corporate governance using 
the OECD Guidelines. 
 
Recommendation 8: Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) to start talks with Asian Corporate 
Governance Association (ACGA) and its funder CSLA , and allocate budgetary resources out of 
profits for, funding the publications their assessment criteria, data and work with 
business/academic community to ensure rigorous, comparable data.  
 
Recommendation 9: Hong Kong Stock Exchange should provide HK$1 million as part of its 
cooperation with the ACGA and CSLA (until financial independent) to conduct corporate 
governance monitoring contingent on modifying its assessment methodology to reflect OECD 
standards and an internal audit to ensure the integrity of its scoring process.  
 
Recommendation 10: The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (or other suitable body) 
should endorse the right to information as a core value in companies’ mission statements.  
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Recommendation 11: The SFC implements its ratification the IOSCO Principles of Disclosure 
perhaps through a Guidance document), continue implementing the Financial Stability Board’s 
recommendations on disclosure and report publicly about the quality of firms’ disclosure 
practices.  
  
Recommendation 12: Mandate the SFC’s Corporate Disclosure Team to advise those looking 
for information (or complaining about a lack of information) as well as companies looking for 
information on disclosure.  
 
Recommendation 13: The Securities and Futures Commission should produce a booklet 
advising persons harmed by a lack of disclosure/transparency and/or relying on such disclosures 
to recoup damages and complain about un-transparent practices.  
 
Recommendation 14: Unilaterally require the provisions of the Open SOE Information Bill (or 
the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises as relevant) for 
state-owned Mainland corporates listed in Hong Kong. 
 
Recommendation 15: Include the need to have an SOE disclosure and transparency policy as 
part of the disclosure rules for SOEs, and provide best practice guidance from the OECD or other 
qualified body.  
 
Recommendation 16: Financial Services and Treasury Bureau conducts and publishes a money 
laundering risk assessment in line with those conducted by the US, UK and Japan in order to 
identify and quantify the risks from beneficial ownership fraud.   
 
Recommendation 17: Financial Secretary’s Office to work with the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, the Securities and Futures Commission, and the Financial Services and the Treasury 
Bureau to adopt rules for collecting and sharing beneficial ownership information, with the UK 
as a possible model (or at least a published road map for adopting such legislation).  
 
Recommendation 18: Put a beta version of such a beneficial ownership register online.  
 
Recommendation 19: Eventually adjust the Solicitors Practice Ordinance, Professional 
Accountants Ordinance and the Companies Ordinance to reflect the obligation/right for 
professional services firms and company boards to adopt a risk-management perspective as way 
of dealing with compliance and risk – as well as scrutinize high-risk clients by extra monitoring. 
 
Recommendation 20: The Law Society, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries to adopt professional rules to 
include a presumption of transparency which discourages the supply and demand for 
legal/regulatory avoidance.  
 
Recommendation 21: Introduce an explicit “legitimate economic purpose test” in article 61/61a 
into the Inland Revenue Ordinance (during the next major legal revision), in offshore listings, and 
in risk profiling clients/partners.  
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Recommendation 22: Add a provision to the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance 
requiring companies to confirm that the jurisdiction they have incorporated in matches the firm’s 
economic purpose, or explain why not.  
 
Recommendation 23: Introduce rules in the Listing Rules companies from jurisdictions (or 
companies which transact with them) which require additional due diligence and a classification 
as a high risk entity if that company’s jurisdiction allows or encourages: a) mailbox company 
colonies, b) foreign-only operation and c) directors and shareholder meetings with individuals 
having little knowledge of the companies they affiliate with, and d) sale and operation of shelf 
companies.  
 
Recommendation 24: Introduce a provision in the Code of Corporate Governance to require 
companies conducting any transactions with a shell company, offshore company from the BVI, 
Cayman Islands, Bahamas, or other jurisdictions decided by the HKEx to disclose such business 
and the nature of that business.  
 
Recommendation 25: Require SPV at end of company name (like Limited) to designate that the 
entity is a special purpose vehicle. 
 
Recommendation 26: Require offshore, shell/shelf, special purpose vehicles, and “hollow” 
holding companies to issue corporate governance reports outlining their operations in the same 
way that normal companies do.   
 
Recommendation 27: The FSDC should consolidate the numerous CSRC, Company Law and 
other rules into unified rulebook (as a goodwill gesture).  
 
Recommendation 28: The FSDC should provide non-authoritative Guidance from the Hong 
Kong perspective for principles outlined in the Mainland’s 2002 Code of Corporate Governance.  
 
Recommendation 29: The FSDC should encourage the CSRC to adopt relevant provisions from 
the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance to the Mainland’s.  
 
Recommendation 30: Implement the recommendations of our last assessment of Hong Kong’s 
corporate governance to tackle concentrated ownership, institutional activism, self-dealing, and 
Board development in Hong Kong itself.  
 
Recommendation 31: The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries to conduct workshops 
preparing small incorporation agents and intermediaries to move up the value chain or exit the 
market.  
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The Role of Hong Kong’s Financial Law in Improving Corporate Governance Standards in 
China: Lessons from the Panama Papers for Hong Kong 
Bryane Michael, University of Hong Kong and  
Say Goo, University of Hong Kong 
 
The regulators may explore additional ways to expand Hong Kong’s “regulatory reach” by 
means of reciprocal enforcement or cooperation arrangements with key territories.1 
                                                     - Hong Kong Financial Services Development Council  
 
Introduction 
 
What sane investor would place money in Mainland securities? The investor-blogger circuit has 
compiled lists of literally hundreds of recent Chinese stock scams.2 Most of these frauds involve 
three elements. First, poor corporate governance (often despite a foreign listing in the US or 
Hong Kong). Second, incorporation in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction (with the Cayman Islands, 
Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands being some of the most popular). Third, inaction by 
Mainland securities regulators and law enforcement. Examples range from Ming Zhao of Puda 
Coal, ZTE’s circumvention of export restrictions to Iran, and the Bank of China’s refusal to turn 
over customer information in a counterfeiting case.3 Academics have quantified the harm such 
fraud reeks on share prices and demand for Chinese shares.4 What if the Mainland could import 
some of the confidence that Hong Kong’s investors place in their publicly traded securities?  
 
In this paper, we explore ways that Hong Kong law could contribute toward improving corporate 
governance on the Mainland. Making Mainland companies’ CEOs fear enforcement action by the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) and the Securities and Futures Commission (directly or 
through Mainland counterparts) represents one way to improve Mainland corporate governance.5 
Yet, as shown by the Panama Papers scandal and other scandals, Hong Kong’s financial 
regulations are not blameless in Chinese stock fraud scandals.6 Hong Kong contributes to some 
                                                 
1 Hong Kong Financial Services Development Council, Positioning Hong Kong as an International IPO Centre of 
Choice, FSDC Paper 9, 2014, at 4.3.2, available online.  
2 We cite these sites not to suggest that they provide completely reliable information. Yet, the presence of these lists, 
their popularity and the extent that investors see and believe these lists, point to likely harms in investors’ confidence. 
See Kreuzroads, Global List of Chinese Stock Frauds, 2013, available online. See also Chinastockfraud.com, 
Chinese Stock Fraud, Beware of Chinese Stock Scams -They Are Real: Understand Chinese Stock Frauds, 2014, 
available online. 
3 See Harris, Dan, Buying Stock in China’s Publicly Traded Companies: Good Luck With That, China Law Blog, 
2016, available online.  
4 These harms range from quite a lot to none. For an example of the first perspective, see Darrough, Masako, The 
Spillover Effect of Fraud Allegations Against Chinese Reverse Mergers, 2015, available online. For an example of 
the second perspective, see also Lee, Charles, Kevin  Li and Ran Zhang, Shell Games: The Long Term Performance 
of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms, The Accounting Review 90(4), 2015, available online.  
5 Readers will see HKEx and SEHK alternatively in much of the literature. The SEHK represents the stock exchange 
“proper,” while the HKEx represents a holding company with several exchanges as subsidiaries. Following usual 
convention in Hong Kong, we will use HKEx to the exchange (as the other exchanges clearly do not touch on our 
research topic). For more information, see HKEx, History of HKEX and its Market, 2016, available online. 
6 We refer to the Panama Papers data in this paper as data from the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists’ (ICIJ) Offshore Leaks Database. The database includes information from the Panama Papers, the 
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of the poor corporate governance on the Mainland – given Mainland companies’ use of Hong 
Kong and offshore incorporation centres to mislead investors at home and abroad. The Panama 
Papers leak showed all too clearly the importance of cleaning up Hong Kong’s participation in 
the schemes allowing Chinese companies’ insiders to dup investors. Once cleaned up, Hong 
Kong’s regulators can join as a key member of the international community’s push for more 
extra-territorial application of securities law and enforcement.7  
  
In this paper, we argue for a combination of more aggressive extra-territorial application of Hong 
Kong’s corporate governance-related securities regulations and exercising more bargaining 
power over foreign companies listed and/or working in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s leadership on 
world securities markets – and on securities/law enforcement “markets” – can help improve 
corporate governance on the Mainland and increase valuations on the Mainland while solidifying 
Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre. Section I provides an overview of the 
corporate governance problems on the Mainland. We show how such problems stem partly from 
tax evasion and insider dealing. We also show the need for cross-border (or extra-territorial) 
action – as change will unlikely come from within the Mainland itself. Section II shows the 
evidence on the cross-border enforcement of corporate governance provisions. We describe 
current law (and lack of extra-territoriality) as well as limited work with foreign regulators. We 
discuss how the HKEx might serve as a party in righting corporate governance wrongs on the 
Mainland. Section III shows how Hong Kong might achieve such over-the-border enforcement of 
its value-enhancing corporate governance principles for Hong Kong listed (or otherwise financed) 
Mainland companies.8 We describe changes to Hong Kong’s listing rules and other rules which 
would impact on Mainland corporations’ corporate governance practices. Hong Kong can lead-
by-example by requiring the declaration of beneficial owners and greater transparency. We show 
how our reforms could lead to a 7% uptick in Mainland companies’ valuation as well as describe 
how to compensate Hong Kong’s incorporation and company secretarial services companies who 
lose as a result of these generally market-improving reforms.  
 
We should start this paper with a few caveats. First, we describe reforms often mentioned in 
academic and policy circles regardless of their feasibility or political desirability in Hong Kong 
and the Mainland.9 Second, we must sacrifice some rigour to make our exposition understandable 
to a wider audience. We refer to the HKEx (instead of the SEHK), the Panama Papers data 
(which includes data from Offshore Leaks and Bahamas Leaks) and do not fully report on our 
own statistical analyses in other keep the reader away from long-winded sentences. Third, 
different authors contributed different parts of this paper. Building consensus among the authors 
on all the recommendations would cause us to remove and water-down many of them. Thus, we 
                                                                                                                                                              
Offshore Leaks and the Bahamas Leaks. Yet, we refer to Panama Papers only as a short-hand for these combined 
search results to make our paper easier to read.  
7 Calls for increased extra-territorial enforcement of corporate governance has increased in recent years. Maybe 
someday, jurisdictions will apply corporate governance rules’ extra-territorially as ubiquitously as such application 
in anti-trust and anti-corruption law. See Kirshner, Jodie, A Call for the EU to Assume Jurisdiction over 
Extraterritorial Corporate Human Rights Abuses, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 13(1), 2015, 
available online.  
8 Such a tentative phrasing of this sentence allows for greater regulation and enforcement of corporate governance 
rules in debt finance and private placements (someday).  
9 Readers should consult Leng for a discussion of how China’s politics of gradual reform make our proposals harder 
than we make them seem. See Leng, Jing, Corporate Governance and Financial Reform in China's Transition 
Economy, HKU Press, 2009.  
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try to present recommendations resulting from the broader literature without necessarily fully 
buying them personally. Readers should use information they find help, and ignore the rest.  
 
Understanding China’s Corporate Governance and its Effects on Investors  
 
An Overview of the Corporate Governance of China’s Companies 
 
The data show that the Chinese Mainland’s companies have a lot to learn from other jurisdictions 
like Hong Kong about improving their corporate governance.10 Figure 1 shows the gap between 
standard indices of the quality of China’s and Hong Kong’s corporate governance.11 The quality 
of the Mainland’s corporate governance remains low – despite significant reform over the last 
15+ years.12 Both the rules themselves, as well as their enforcement, lag behind jurisdictions like 
Hong Kong and/or Singapore. Figure 2 shows China’s companies’ corporate governance scores 
by each of the dimensions identified in the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles.13 The 
worst companies score lowly on giving the firms’ stakeholders and the supervisory board a say in 
corporate governance. Even the worst of the batch score reasonably well on information 
disclosure and transparency. Chinese corporate governance seems to focus on shareholders – with 
companies earning the highest scores among the set for fairness to shareholders. China’s 
corporate governance laws and policies have focused on shareholders rights to the likely 
detriment of other groups, like the empowerment of boards, supervisors and other 
stakeholders needed to make the Mainland’s corporate governance reflect in share price 
valuations.  
 
                                                 
10 Throughout this paper, we try to refer to China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) as the Mainland. We follow 
this Hong Kong convention, as most of our comparisons deal with Hong Kong versus the Mainland. Inadvertent slips, 
calling the Mainland “China” or referring to Hong Kong as a country rather than a jurisdiction, reflect our haste 
rather than some deep-seated political views.  
11 The Asian Corporate Governance Association could serve a far more useful role in promoting corporate 
governance across the region by releasing its data to the public. For now, though, we must find data when rarely 
presented to the public. See Allen, Jamie, CG Watch 2014 – Market Rankings, Asian Corporate Governance 
Association Presentation, 2015, available online. 
12 The summary statistics we show here can not compare with the deep insights that in-depth scholarly analysis of 
Chinese corporate governance provides. See Kang, Yong, Lu Shi, and Elizabeth Brown, Chinese Corporate 
Governance: History and Institutional Framework, Rand Corporation Technical Report 618, 2008, available online. 
13 For the description of the questions used to assess each area, see OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 2015, available online. For the data, see Protiviti, Corporate Governance Assessment Summary Report 
on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012, 2013, available online. For a summary of the OECD’s questions 
(put into convenient tabular Q&A form), see Tong, Lu, Ji-yin Zhong, and Jie Kong, Corporate Governance 
Assessment on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies, 2006, available online. 
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Figure 1: The Mainland Could Learn Alot from Hong Kong 
about Improving Its Corporate Governance
The f igure show s corporate governance scores for the Mainland, compared w ith other peers in the Asian region for 2014 (the 
latest year available). The upper scale show s the quality of corporate governance rules (compared w ith a global 100 best 
companies). The low er score show s the quality of corporate governance enforcement. Very signif icant dif ferences in the quality 
of corporate governance mean that corporate governance w ould improve quickly if  China could "import" better regulations and 
enforcement from abroad. See original for variable definitions and methods of compilation. 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association (2015). 
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Figure 2: Chinese Corporate Governance Only at 37% of the World's Highest Standards 
The figure show s the corporate governance scores among the largest 100 listed Chinese companies for the areas of 
corporate governance mentioned in the f igure. The red line show s the average across categories. The black bars show
the low est score (for stakeholder participation for example, the low est scoring company only earned 7 out of 100 
points). 
Source: Protiviti (2013).  
 
 
The variation in corporate governance scores among Chinese firms represents a far more 
disconcerting trend than the low average scores earned by these companies. Chinese companies 
score badly on each dimension of corporate governance – with an average corporate governance 
score of around 37% out of the 100% earned by companies completely implementing the OECD 
Principles (as shown above in Figure 2). Yet, Figure 3 shows the very large variation in corporate 
governance practices and performances among Chinese firms. Corporate governance scores for 
various companies in a range of industries can vary from 30% to 80% of best practice. The trend 
shows a general improvement in corporate governance practices in recent years. Yet, the large 
variation in these scores, both across time and across firms, indicates that China’s corporate 
governance policies are “out of control” (in the statistical sense of the word).14 In other words, 
because of the large variation in corporate governance practices among Chinese firms, 
policymakers can not adopt policies focused on improving such governance until senior 
managers bring these companies’ governance practices “under control.” 
 
                                                 
14 Out of control processes refer to processes which exhibit wide variation, making predicting them (and thus 
regulating them) more difficult. See Harp, Nancy, Mark Myring, and Rebecca Shortridge, Do Variations in the 
Strength of Corporate Governance Still Matter? A Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Regulation Environment, 
Journal of Business Ethics 122(3), 2014, available online. See also Fan, Steve and Linda Yu, Variation in Corporate 
Governance and Firm Valuation – an International Study, International Review of Finance (Early View), 2016, 
available online. 
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Figure 3: Not Enough Done to Deal with Laggards to Bring 
Corporate Governance "Under Control" 
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The f igure show s the w ay that the low est, average and highest corporate governance scores have changed over time 
for the top 100 Chinese listed companies. Despite improvement in average corporate governance scores over time, 
low est scores have remained relatively unchanged. The huge difference in scores betw een f irms suggests that 
policy needs to do better at controlling the variances betw een companies in corporate governance quality.
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
Variation in corporate governance practices across industries also points to the need for more 
coordinated corporate governance-related rulemaking. As shown in Figure 4, financial services 
firms score a reasonably good 72% out of 100%. Companies in the mining, manufacturing and 
other sectors however, only score between 60% and 65% out of 100%. The government’s post-
2008 extra corporate governance related regulations clearly explain why the financial sector 
scores best.15 The financial sectors experience suggests that increased government 
regulation and enforcement of corporate governance rules can bring these scores “under 
control” and raise standards across the board.   
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Figure 4: China's Corporate Governance Scorecard at a Glance
level of 
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ow nership
The f igure show s specif ic measures of Chinese f irms' corporate governance for 2012 (the latest year for w hich 
data is available). Chinese f irms seem to share information w ell. Low  shareholder concentration correlates w ith 
better corporate governance scores. Financial services f irms have the best corporate governance -- no doubt due 
to the increased regulation and scrutiny over the f inancial sector. 
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
                                                 
15 In China, as in other jurisdictions, regulators passed a number of corporate governance and other regulations aimed 
at responding to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, as well as strengthening financial institutions in the future. 
Interestingly, Erkens and co-authors find that good corporate governance practices exacerbated the effect of the 
financial crisis on financial firms around the world (including China). As such, policymakers can not rely on simply 
improving corporate governance as a means of promoting financial stability. They will need to draft rules that reduce 
risk-taking behaviour approved of by institutional investors and independent board members. See Erkens, David, 
Ming-Yi Hung, and Pedro Matos, Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial 
institutions worldwide, Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 2012, available online. 
 10
Even a rudimentary glance at various Chinese companies’ corporate practices show reasons for 
these firms’ low corporate governance scores. Figure 4 (already shown above) shows three 
summary statistics about governance practices among Chinese companies – the extent of 
information disclosure, the extent of internal control and the extent of concentration among 
shareholders. While information disclosure ranks highly, lower internal control scores – 
combined with very concentrated shareholdings -- point to the large role that concentrated 
shareholders (rather than rules and regulations) play in governing Chinese business. Companies 
with high shareholder concentration have corporate governance scores of around 60%. 
Companies with low shareholding concentration have corporate governance scores of around 
75%. Government policies which discourage dispersed ownership of Mainland companies 
account for some of poor governance practices among Chinese firms.   
 
The link between corporate governance and investor returns 
 
How do we know that better corporate governance practices among Chinese firms contribute to 
higher corporate returns? Figure 5 shows the results of simplistic (and wrong) analysis showing 
the simple correlation between corporate governance scores and corporate returns. Foreign 
companies with the highest corporate governance scores have rates of return just as low as low-
scoring Chinese state owed enterprises. Such work supports other findings from academics like 
Cheung and co-authors’ early econometric work.16 Their econometric analysis finds no 
relationship between corporate governance index scores and market valuation. Sector-specific 
work – such as studies looking at corporate governance and the performance of Chinese real-
estate companies – similarly find little relationship.17  
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Figure 5: Foreign Companies Lower Governance Standards
when in the Middle Kingdom  
The figure show s corporate governance scores pf Chinese companies by type of enterprise. While having the highest 
scores, foreign companies' corporate governance scores drop w hen in China. Foreign companies' return on equity 
show s that managers of foreign companies may sacrif ice returns for their better governance. Companies of all types 
need to f ind a w ay of governing better w ithout sacrif icing returns. 
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 We refer to their early work, as their later work recants on these initial findings. We provide that latter work in 
several paragraphs below. See Cheung, Yan-Leung, Ping Jiang, Piman Limpaphayom, and Tong Lu, Does Corporate 
Governance Matter in China, China Economic Review 19(3), 2008, available online. 
17 See Fan, Gang-Zhi, Zsuzsa Huszar, and Wei-Na Zhang, Corporate Governance in Chinese Real Estate Firms, IRES 
Working Paper Series IRES2014-006, available online. 
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Yet, more credible studies do find a relationship between Chinese firms’ corporate governance 
index values market valuations. Even before looking at these studies, Figure 6 shows an 
unmistakable relationship between the quality of Mainland companies’ corporate governance and 
their Tobins’ q.18 The line of best seems to show that a one-point increase in corporate 
governance indicators correlates with a 1 point change in Tobin’s q values. Figure 7 shows very 
similar findings – as the change in market valuations (namely Tobin’s q) corresponding to 
changes in Chinese firms’ corporate governance index values.19 As firms move from the worst to 
the best corporate governance practices, they add the extra value of the replacement cost of their 
assets. By way of illustrating the magnitude of these findings, if all Mainland listed companies 
moved from worst to best-in-class corporate governance, such a move would add about $2.7 
trillion in market capitalization to these firms (see figure for methodology used to find this 
number). Mainland firms with better corporate governance list abroad and have higher levels of 
disclosure (and accompanying levels of market value).20 Better Mainland corporate governance 
correlates to higher market valuations for Mainland companies listed in Hong Kong.21  Thus, 
Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules can help Mainland companies cash in on their 
good governance on its stock market.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Tobin’s q measures the extent to which companies’ market valuations exceed the replacement cost of their assets 
(roughly speaking). Its plural is probably Tobin’s qs (as there is only one Tobin). Yet, the text looks cleaner our way.   
19 See Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank Song, and Jun-Xi Zhang, Corporate Governance and Market 
Valuation in China, William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 564, 2004, available online.  
20 See Cheung. Yan-Leung, Ping Jiang, and Wei-Qiang Tan, A Transparency Disclosure Index Measuring 
Disclosures: Chinese Listed Companies, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29(3), 2010, available online.      
21 See Cheung, Yan-Leung, Thomas Connelly, Priman Limpaphayom and Lynda Zhou. Do Investors Really Value 
Corporate Governance? Evidence from the Hong Kong Market, Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting 18(2), 2007, available online.  
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Figure 7: Better Corporate Governance Rules for Chinese Firms  
Would Add US$2.7 Trillion To Their Market Cap 
The figure show s the estimated level of Tobin's q  corresponding to each corporate governance grade of Chinese 
companies. Moving from the low est to the highest corporate governance grade w ould increase a Chinese 
company's market capitalisation by basically one more company (as one more value of the replacement value of the 
company's assets). The World Bank reports an $8.2 trillion market cap for Chinese f irms in 2015. If the market values 
these f irms w eigh in at three times their asset replacement cost, and if good corporate governance adds another 
replacement cost-value, market values should rise by about $2.7 trillion.
Source:  Based on Bai et al . (2003) methodology and World Bank (2016) for market cap values. 
 
 
Numerous studies show the types of corporate governance relations correlating with higher 
market valuations. Figure 8 shows an example of a number of recent studies looking at the 
econometric relationship between corporate governance and firm performance.22 After 
controlling for other variables like market conditions, they find that foreign and institutional 
ownership, dispersed shareholding, effective boards and audit committees help lift firm values. 
Most studies confirm Bai et al.’s results – market valuations rise when non-controlling 
shareholders and foreigners hold a large proportion of the company’s shares.23 Market valuations 
fall with concentrated shareholdings, when the CEO also acts as the chairperson of the board, and 
when government represents the largest shareholder. Even eye-balling the relationship between 
Tobin’s q and corporate governance indices for individual firms shows the positive 
relationship.24 Other authors like Shan and IcIver find similar evidence for non-listed firms –
proving that needed reforms span the Chinese corporate sector.
 
d 
es should improve.   
                                                
25 Interestingly, Lin and co-
authors find that the business environment in which Chinese firms compete statistically 
significantly affects their corporate governance practices.26 As Chinese firms increasingly list an
compete in developed markets, corporate governance practic 27
 
 
22 See Lee, Jung-wha and Zhi-hua Zhang, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence 
from Chinese Listed Companies, Finance and Corporate Governance Conference 2011 Paper, 2011, available 
online. 
23 See Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank Song, and Junxi Zhang, Corporate Governance and Market Valuation 
in China, Journal of Comparative Economics 32(4), 2004, available online.  
24 See Cheung, Yan-Leung and Ping Jiang, Piman Limpaphayom and Tong Lu, Corporate Governance in China: A 
Step Forward, European Financial Management 16(1), 2010, available online. 
25 See Shan, Yuan and Ron McIver, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Financial Performance in China: Panel 
Data Evidence on Listed Non-Financial Companies, Asia Pacific Business Review 17(3), 2011, available online. 
26 See Lin, Chen, Yue Ma, and Dong-Wei Su, Corporate Governance and Firm Efficiency: Evidence from China's 
Publicly Listed Firms, Managerial and Decision Economics 30(3), 2009, available online.  
27 The ability to draw on different, well-heeled shareholders represents part of this benefit. Epps and Ismail show that, 
for Chinese firms, returns on assets decline with very concentrated and very dispersed shareholding. See Epps, Ruth 
and Tariq Ismail, Board of Directors' Governance Challenges and Earnings Management, Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change 5(3), 2009, available online. 
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Figure 8: Investors Clearly Pay Premiums for Good Corporate Governance in China 
The data show  the relationship betw een several indicators related to Chinese f irms'  corporate governance and their 
performance (as measured by Tobin's q or market premium over book value) and return on assets. The data show  
stronger relationships betw een share price mark-ups and corporate governance (after accounting for factors like these 
f irms' asset sizes, leverage and grow th rates) -- than for returns on assets. Yet, models of Tobin's q  generally have 
low  explanatory pow er (as represented by the tiny R-squared or variance explained).
Source: Lee and Zhang (2011)
Tobin's q  side RoA side
2.5                                .                                0.5
 
 
“Better” corporate governance (as commonly defined) has other advantages which indirectly 
promote market valuations.28 One way consists of helping to reduce the fraud and the self-
dealing which makes investors nervous about investing in Mainland shares. Yeh and co-authors 
look at the cost of poor corporate governance in Chinese firms – showing that investors needed
larger premia to buy shares in companies with poorer corporate governance 
 
 
 
gs 
f 
                                                
29 Chen and Zhang
find similarly for the 2002 Chinese Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies’ effect
on earnings manipulation.30 In their econometric study, they find that the Code curbed earnin
management by requiring independent non-executive board directors and audit committees 
staffed with accounting/financial experts. Firth and co-authors find that the quality of Chinese 
corporate governance directly affects the “occurrence and detection of financial fraud.”31 Figure 
9 shows the effect that corporate governance has on auditor choice – and thus the likelihood o
getting away with bad governance behaviour.32 As pointed out later in this paper, supervisory 
boards play a key role in ensuring proper corporate conduct. Lo and colleagues reach similar 
conclusions – conducting econometric analysis on transfer price manipulations.33 Thus, better 
Chinese corporate governance indubitably leads to higher share values.  
 
28 We do not repeat the factors that constitute such good corporate governance – like dispersed shareholding, 
independent directors, etc – to keep our narrative tight. If we must refer to each separate component each time, the 
text becomes far harder to understand and remember.  
29 See Yeh, Yin-Hua, Pei-Gi Shu, Tsun-Siou Lee, and Yu-Hui Su, Non-Tradable Share Reform and Corporate 
Governance in the Chinese Stock Market, Corporate Governance 17(4), 2009, available online. 
30 See Chen, Jean and Hai-Tao Zhang, The Impact of the Corporate Governance Code on Earnings Management – 
Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, European Financial Management 20(3), 2012, available online. 
31 See Firth, Michael, Oliver Rui and Wen-Feng Wu, Cooking the Books: Recipes and Costs of Falsified Financial 
Statements in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 17(2), 2011, available online. 
32 See Lin, Jun and Ming Liu, The Impact of Corporate Governance on Auditor Choice: Evidence from China, 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 18, 2009, available online.  
33 Lo, Agnes, Raymond Wong, and Michael Firth, Can Corporate Governance Deter Management from 
Manipulating Earnings? Evidence from Related-Party Sales Transactions in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 
16(2), 2010, available online.  
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The figure show s the various factors corresponding to Chinese companies' choice of a Big 4 auditor rather than a 
local auditor. Supervisory boards clearly breed better corporate governance and concentrated ow nership undermines
it. The authors argue that w eak corporate governance encourages the selection of less skillled auditors, allow ing 
Chinese f irms' ow ners and managers to benefit from "opaqueness gains." All factors show n signif icant at the 5% 
level of "better."
Source: Lin and Liu (2009). 
Not-significant: CEO as Chairman of the Board, Returns on Assets and Firm Risks (proxied by the 
firm's beta).
Figure 9: Certain Chinese Corporate Governance Arrangements Correspond 
with Less Self-Serving Corporate Activity
 
 
Chinese Firms, Tax Evasion and Offshore Incorporation Centres  
 
What Do We Know About Chinese Corporate Governance, Demand for Offshore Companies and 
Tax Evasion? 
 
Bad corporate governance represents a key factor in Chinese companies choosing to evade taxes, 
use the services of offshore secrecy jurisdictions’ intermediaries and the services of organisations 
like Mossack Fonseca.34 Media accounts paint a picture of Chinese companies’ ways and needs 
to use Mossack Fonseca (specifically) and offshore incorporation agents (in general). Figure 10 
shows some of the facts linked with Chinese and Hong Kong incorporations (and corporate 
governance) cited in the Mossack Fonseca case. We can, in complete confidence, say that 
trillions of dollars leave China to avoid taxes (or other controls) through Hong Kong, as a 
result of poor corporate governance at home and abroad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 At the time of this writing, a leak of the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca’s client data lead to revelations 
about the use of offshore companies. The wide-spread media attention paid to these data dubbed the circumstances 
leading to the use of Mossack Fonseca’s services as the Panama Papers scandal. For more, see the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, The Panama Papers: Politicians, Criminals and the Rogue Industry that 
Hides Their Cash, 2016, available online.     
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Figure 10: Chinese Corporates’ Participation in Mossack Fonseca’s Shell Game 
 
What is a shell company? – a non-trading corporation (or entity with tradable/transferrable 
interests) that does not conduct significant operations related to the transformation of inputs into 
marketable outputs.   
 
Why are shell companies valuable for China’s businesses? - Roughly 40% of private Chinese 
firms hide profits.35 Over $1tn originated from China from 2002 to 2012, making China the 
world’s largest illicit capital exporter.36 If Chinese firms benefitted as much as other firms, they 
can take capital gains profits of up to 50% quickly from listing.37 
 
Revenue from shell company sales - Mossack Fonseca probably collected around $8.2 million 
in fees for opening the 16,300 offshore companies incorporated in offices in China and Hong 
Kong (or roughly 30% of its “active companies worldwide”).38 
 
Companies’ management identified in the Papers – Tencent, Soho China property, Yintai, 
Leshi (web video), GOME appliances chain, Oceanwide, Tiens Group, Zendai investment group, 
Rizhao Holding, Shenzhou international, Sound global, Soundtech, Shanghai Land Holdings, and 
Country Garden Holdings. 39 
 
Mossack Fonseca in Hong Kong – much business handled by P&P Secretarial Management and 
its British Virgin Islands registered interest Harvest Sun Trading. An accountant Wai-hon Chiu, 
runs P&P.40 Roughly 1/3 of all Mossfon business in Hong Kong for Mainland customers41 Wong 
Brothers & Co. helped President Xi Jinping's brother-in-law Deng Jiagui to set up a BVI shell 
company. 42 At its apogee, the firm set up 2,428 companies (in 2012).  
 
                                                 
35 While authors like Liu and Xiao cite 2004 data (and earlier), these trends have not changed in the intervening 
decade. See Liu, Qiao and Geng Xiao, Look Who Are Disguising Profits: An Application to Chinese Industrial 
Firms, Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy Working Paper 1095, 2004, available online.  
36 Mulrenan, Stephen, Asia: Panama Papers – No News Is Good News, International Bar Association Global Insight 
June, 2016, available online.  
37 Such “listing” refers to the reverse mergers (or backdoor listing). For data, see Floros, Ioannis and Travis Sapp, 
Shell Games: On the Value of Shell Companies, Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 2011, available online. See also  
Brown, Philip, Andrew Ferguson and Peter Lam, What’s in a Shell? Analysing the Gain to Shareholders from 
Reverse Takeovers, 2010, available online. 
38 See Agence France Presse, Money and Power: China Government’s Link to Panama Papers Firm, Hong Kong 
Free Press April, 2016, available online.  
39 This list does not include the economic interests associated with the eight current or former members of China‘s 
Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee.  
See Marina Walker, Marina, Gerard Ryle, Alexa Olesen, Mar Cabra, Michael Hudson and Christoph Giesen, Leaked 
Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite, ICIJ, Jan, 2016, available online. 
40 See Kinetz, Erika and Kelvin Chan, Hong Kong Emerges As Hub for Creating Offshore Companies, Associated 
Press Big Story April, 2016, available online. 
41 Lau, Stuart, Revealed: Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca’s man in Hong Kong, South China Morning Post 
April, 2016, available online. 
42 See Kinetz, Erika and Kelvin Chan, Hong Kong emerges as hub for creating offshore companies, Associated Press 
The Big Story, 2016, available online. See also Huang, Zhe-Ping, The Panama Papers: China’s elite—including Xi 
Jinping—are linked to offshore deals that hid millions of dollars, Quartz: Obsession, 2016, available online.  
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What is the problem? – Recent estimates put 10% of all reverse merger listings of Chinese 
companies in the US as fraudulent.43 The Panama Papers implicate HSBC, a large bank with a 
significant presence in Hong Kong, in setting up roughly 2,300 accounts – contravening banking 
regulations.44 Sun Hung Kai Properties (another large Hong Kong company) could spirit away 
large amounts of money, even though intermediaries know the director had been convicted of 
corruption.45 Money laundering remains rampant in Hong Kong – fragilizing the entire financial 
system.46 Roughly 60% of all investment – some the result of crime or contravening foreign 
exchange controls -- passes through Hong Kong on its way out from China.47 In general, 
Chinese firms incorporating in offshore havens participate in more fraud and earn 
shareholders less in the longer-run.48 
 
Source: see footnotes for sources.  
 
To what extent have Hong Kong-based intermediaries participated in the creation of offshore 
corporate vehicles for Mainland companies (and those at home)?  Figure 11 shows, using data 
from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), the time line highlighting 
the height of the popularity of different locations for the intermediaries who create offshore 
companies.49 Panamanian intermediaries saw their heyday in the early 1990s for Hong Kong and 
Mainland clients. The Bahamas opened more offshore companies a few years later than 
subsequently in the 2000s and 2010s. The unheard-of Niue (a microscopic island in the South 
Pacific) also saw a brief rise in these incorporations.50 The British Virgin Islands (or BVIs) saw 
their heyday as a key incorporator of offshore companies around 2003. While BVI continues to 
handle most of Hong Kong and the Mainland’s offshore incorporations, other jurisdictions 
(notably Samoa, Seychelles and British Anguilla in recent years) have succeeded in gaining more 
market share than in the past.  
 
                                                 
43 Tax Justice Network, 1 in 10 reverse mergers of Chinese firms on US stock exchanges "fraudulent", Tax Justice 
Network Website, 2011, available online.  
44 David Floyd, Panama Papers: Top 10 Banks For Offshore Companies, 2016, available online. 
45 See Robertson, Joshua and Paul Farrell, How a Hong Kong corruption scandal sparked strife at Mossack Fonseca, 
Guardian, April, 2016, available online.  
46 See Holland, Tom, How Hong Kong makes it easy for wealthy Chinese to launder billions of dollars, Hong Kong 
Free Press April, 2016, available online. 
47 See Garcia-Herrero, Alicia, Le Xia and Carlos Casanova, Chinese outbound foreign direct investment: How much 
goes where after round-tripping and offshoring? BBVA Working Paper, 15/17, 2015, available online. See also Kar, 
Dev and Sarah Freitas, Illicit Financial Flows from China and the Role of Trade Mis-invoicing, Global Financial 
Integrity, 2012, available online.   
48 As if the belabour the point, Siegel and Wang show how incorporation in an offshore haven like Nevada correlates 
with fraud more often for Chinese companies engaging in backdoor listings in the US. See Siegel, Jordan and Yan-
Bo Wang, Cross-Border Reverse Mergers: Causes and Consequences, Harvard Business School Publication 12-089, 
2014, available online. 
49 For data source, see ICIJ, Offshore Leaks Database, 2016, at search jurisdictions for China and Hong Kong, 
available online. 
50 Van Fossen talks about the brief rise and fall of Niue as an offshore financial centre. Clearly, Hong Kong and 
Mainland clients shared in that rise and fall. See Van Fossen, Anthony, Tax Havens, at Chapter 2, 2012.  
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Such offshore incorporations have benefitted a wide range of China’s cities (and the 
businesses/businesspersons in them). Figure 12 shows the location of offshore intermediaries’ 
Mainland clients. Unsurprisingly, most demanders of offshore companies hailed from Beijing 
and Shanghai. Yet, even companies and individuals in Foshan and Nanchang participated in the 
offshore incorporation market. As this geography shows, demand for offshore companies spread 
around China as a way of evading taxes, bypassing capital controls, and safeguarding 
personal/company assets from seizure by law enforcement. Other sources provide data about 
China’s high net worth individuals, supporting the conclusion of increasing geographical 
dispersion in the use of offshore companies and wealth.51 Figure 13 provides a simple illustration 
of the link between offshore incorporations and wealth on the Mainland. Random chance can not 
explain the very tight fit between the number of offshore incorporations in selected Chinese cities 
and the number of millionaires in those cities.52  We can not know for sure which factor 
represents the chicken...and which the egg. Yet, these data strongly suggest that millionaires 
(and their wannabes) have few incentives to improve corporate governance in their 
companies.  
 
 
                                                 
51 See Hurun Research Institute, Hurun Wealth Report 2014, 2014, available online.  
52 In other words, the probability that no correlation exists between these variables do not significantly differ from 
zero. We do not show the exact statistics related to testing whether the correlation is zero – as this unnecessarily 
complicates our paper.  
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Figure 13: Offshore Incorporations as Cause and Effect of the Rise in Chinese 
Millionnaires around the Country 
The figure show s the correlation betw een the number of clients of offshore incorporation services and
the number of millionnaires in 24 key Chinese cities. Fitting a line betw een these tw o variables helps explain roughly 
96% of the variation in the data. Source: ICIJ (2016) and Hurun Research (2016). 
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How much money do Chinese companies hide? As early as 2004, authors like Liu and Xiao, 
found significant tax avoidance among Chinese companies of up to 16% of profits.53 Private 
firms report profits rates of around 8%. Other types of firms reporting profits of only 4% 
probably mis-represent their profits. If only ownership types differ between these companies, we 
can deduce that, on average, these other (non-private) firms must be hiding 4% of their profits.54 
Such under-payment defies the received wisdom about SOEs’ tax payments – as they may indeed, 
seek to pay taxes, given these taxes’ effect on SOE managers’ promotion potential 55 Namely, the 
Communist Party taps high tax-paying SOE-managers for promotion and other benefits more 
frequently. In their summary of the literature, Jansky and Prats find that ties to a tax haven often 
provide enough of a predictor of tax avoidance/evasion.56 They do not have data for China. But if 
countries like India serve as a possible comparator, firms with linkages to tax havens pay 30% 
less tax than companies without these links. Fisman et al., specifically for their part of this story, 
find that traders use “offshore” Hong Kong as a way to avoid paying Chinese taxes and tariffs.57 
Thus, Hong Kong serves as a key channel for spiriting away evaded tax proceeds.  
 
What effect does corporate governance have on reducing such tax evasion? Figure 14 shows the 
effects of putting more financial experts and independent directors on corporate boards in 
general.58 If these results apply to China in the same way as the US, corporate governance 
reforms like these probably encourage tax paying behaviour for companies not already heavily 
engaged in tax evasion. Yet, for those companies which evade large shares of tax, more 
comprehensive corporate governance reform seems to correspond to more tax cheating. Desai 
                                                 
53 See Liu, Qiao and Geng Xiao, Look Who Are Disguising Profits: An Application to Chinese Industrial Firms, 
2004, available online. 
54 Id. at Figure 1. 
55 See Zhang, Huai, How Does State Ownership Affect Tax Avoidance? Evidence from China, Singapore 
Management University School of Accountancy Working Paper #2012/13-18, 2013, available online. 
56 See Jansky, Petr and Alex Prats, Multinational Corporations and the Profit-Shifting Lure of Tax Havens, Christian 
Aid Occasional Paper Number 9, 2013, available online.  
57 See Fisman, Raymond, Peter Moustakerski, and Shang-Jin Wei, Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation 
for Entrepot Trade, The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3), 2008, available online.  
58 See Armstrong, Christopher, Jennifer Blouin Alan Jagolinzer, and David Larcker, Corporate Governance, 
Incentives, and Tax Avoidance, Journal of Accounting and Economics 60, 2015, available online.  
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and Dharmapala find that increases in tax avoidance leads to increases in Tobin’s q of around 
2.5% only with better governed firms.59 Kim and co-authors find that stock prices become more 
resilient against crashes by around 0.2 as tax avoidance decreases (as companies pay more 
taxes).60 Figure 15 shows the counter-intuitive relationship between corporate governance and 
tax evasion found in much of the literature. Better corporate governance of course leads to less 
tax evasion. Yet, these data also show that corporate governance can – for badly govern
companies – contribute to tax evasion and other criminal behaviour. Thus, simply reforming 
Chinese corporate governance as it is may make such governance worse rather than better.  
ed 
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Figure 14: Corporate Governance Helps Big Chinese Tax-Cheats Cheat More
and Small Ones To Pay More Tax 
The figure show s the effect of tw o corporate governance interventions (introduction of f inancial experts and 
independent directors on Chinese companies' boards). Unlike normal regression, this chart show s the effect of 
corporate governance on each quantile of tax payers/cheaters. Source: Armstrong et al. (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 See Desai, Mihir and Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value, NBER Working Paper 
Series Working Paper 11241, 2005, available online.  
60 See Kim, Jeong-Bon, Ying-Hua Li, and Lian-Dong Zhang, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: 
Firm-Level Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, available online.  
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What Do the Panama Papers Data Show About China’s Corporate Governance?  
 
The Mossack Fonseca and Open Leaks data provide some indication about the relationship 
between corporate governance and the use of offshore structures in Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
Figure 16 shows the percent change in offshore account openings as corporate governance scores 
for the jurisdiction improve.61 Mainland account openings increased at a time when corporate 
governance had improved – suggesting that perhaps other factors (besides corporate governance) 
contributed to these account openings. Yet, Hong Kong based intermediaries opened fewer 
offshore accounts during the same time period. Figure 17 indeed shows that Hong Kong offshore 
account openings decreased during the time when the number of Chinese accounts rose. Figure 
18 shows that other jurisdictions had reduced their offshore incorporations during a time of 
relatively stable corporate governance. Thus, Mainland offshore incorporations thus might 
have made up for the decreases in other jurisdictions.   
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Figure 16: Better Corporate Governance in Hong Kong and China Coincided
with More Mossack Fonseca Registered Offshore Accounts 
Hong Kong
The figure show s the annual percentage change in offshore accounts opened w ith Mossack Fonseca from China and 
Hong Kong, for each of the periods show n, divided by the annual percent change in a corporate governance quality 
index derived from the World Economic Forum. In other w ords, w e show  the elasticity of offshore accounts w ith 
respect to changes in corporate governance. The corporate governance index simply adds up the elements from 
Pillar I Section B of the World Economic Forum's data. Positive numbers mean more offshore accounts opened w hile 
corporate governance scores improved. Source: ICIJ (2016) and WEF (2016). 
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Figure 17: Have Changes to Hong Kong's Corporate Governance and Money 
Laundering Regulations Caused Offshore Companies Registerations 
to Move over the Border?  
The figure show s the annual change in the number of offshore entities registered by Mossack Fonseca from Hong 
Kong and China for the years show n. Registration rates paralleled each other in Hong Kong and the Mainland until
the passage of w ide-sw eeping reforms to Hong Kong's Corporate Governance Code and the passage of several 
anti-money laundering regulations. The increase in Chinese offshore registrations coinciding w ith Hong Kong's 
decline suggest clients previously opening these accounts in Hong Kong moved to the Mainland.
Source: ICIJ (2016). 
 
                                                 
61 World Economic Forum, Competitiveness Rankings 2015-2016, 2016, available online. 
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Figure 18: Singapore and UK Had Small and Steady Improvement in 
Corporate Governance with Large Declines with Mossack Fonseca Openings
Corp Gov
change
The figure show s the annual change in corporate governance quality in Singapore and the UK along w ith the change in
offshore incorporations handled by Mossack Fonseca. The corporate governance indicator represents the sum of 
World Economic Forum indicators Pillar I, Section B. Corporate governance scores changed little (and for the better) 
w hile the number of Mossfon incorporations fell by large amounts in many recent years. 
Source: ICIJ (2016) and WEF (2016). 
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A bit more analysis shows other trends and patterns in the interactions between corporate 
governance and offshore incorporations in Hong Kong and the Mainland. Figure 19 shows the 
relationship between the rate of change of improvements in the Mainland’s corporate governance 
and its levels of offshore incorporations. Once Chinese companies go down the road of 
improving their corporate governance, they will likely continue to do so. Such improvements 
furthermore correlate with less demand for offshore incorporations. The only “viable” corporate 
governance programmes rate a 34.5 or higher. At such a take-off level (as we label in the figure), 
corporate governance leads to sustainable decreases in offshore incorporations and self-
improving corporate governance. Figure 20 shows similar data for Hong Kong – with different 
results. Hong Kong’s stable corporate governance rates hover at around 48.2 (or 14 points higher 
than their Mainland counterparts). Interesting, better corporate governance in Hong Kong seems 
to correlate with more demand for offshore incorporations. Yet, Hong Kong companies’ 
demand for offshore incorporations increases most with the relatively rapid deterioration 
of their corporate governance ratings from high levels of corporate governance to lower 
levels.  
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Figure 19: China's Corporate Governance Growth Depends on Already Existing Levels
and Offshore Incorporations Fall in China as Corporate Governance Levels Rise
Change in
corp gov
Change in
Offshore acct
openings
take-off level
The figure show s the relationship betw een the w ay that corporate governance and offshore incorporations 
change as corporate governance levels  increase. Good corporate governance breds better governance and 
few er offshore incorporations encourage further decreases in offshore incorporations. The marginal change in 
corporate governance seems to balance the change in offshore incorporations at around 34.7. Below  that point, 
corporate governance is too low  to promote change.                                              Source: data from ICIJ (2016). 
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Figure 20: Hong Kong's Changes in Corporate Governance and Offshore Incorporations
Stable For Bad as Well as Good Levels of Corporate Governance
(in other words, exhibit double equilibria)
incorps
The figure show s the extent to w hich levels
corp gov
 of corporate governance influence changes in Hong Kong's corporate 
governance and offshore incorporations. Corporate governance should remain stable-ish at levels of 47.5 and 48.5. 
Yet, better corporate governance seems to encourage more offshore incorporations. The most rapidly falling corporate 
governance unsurprisingly correlates w ith the fastest grow th in offshore incorporations. 
Source: ICIJ (2016). 
 
 
What about the relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland? What proof exists that Hong 
Kong somehow contributes (or not) to the Mainland’s corporate governance and offshore 
incorporation practices? Figure 21 shows some initial evidence for such a relationship. 
Unsurprisingly, bad corporate governance in Hong Kong correlates with bad governance on the 
Mainland – and visa-versa. Yet, a range of Hong Kong “bad boys” exists for companies scoring 
between 47.5 to 48.75. When Hong Kong companies have corporate governance in this range, 
corporate governance on the Mainland falls the fastest. Moreover, Mainland companies can 
expect a deterioration in their corporate governance to the low value of the range (namely 47.5), 
as they deal with relatively unreliable partners?  Differences-in-differences analysis shows a 3 
point improvement in the Hong Kong’s corporate governance during the time of Corporate 
Governance Listing Rules, showing that such changes do affect corporate governance.  
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Figure 21: China's Corporate Governance Reform (Change) Depends on the Quality of 
Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
The figure show s the w ay that Mainland corporate governance changed over time as the level of Hong Kong's 
corporate governance improved in the post-Listing Rules-reform era. More advanced time series estimation validates 
this relationship (and the line of best f it anyw ay explains 83% of the variation in the data). One w ay of improving 
corporate governance on the Mainland thus consists of improving it in Hong Kong.  Middling levels of Hong Kong's 
corporate governance seem w orst for Chinese governance - as low  and high levels push Chinese companies to do 
better.                                                                                                                            Source: data from ICIJ (2016). 
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Network analysis of the Panama Papers database points most strongly to the way that Hong Kong 
contributes to China’s corporate governance travails. Figure 22 shows the way that offshore 
entities incorporated by Mossack Fonseca (or other agents in the ICIJ database) link to the 
jurisdictions shown in the figure. If Chinese companies simply used Hong Kong based 
incorporation agents to spirit funds offshore, we would expect strong links mainly between these 
two jurisdictions. We see though, that both jurisdictions have many jurisdictions in common – 
with many BVI entities starting in Hong Kong and ending on the Mainland (for example). Some 
jurisdictions relate primarily to one jurisdiction or the other (like the Cook Islands and Hong 
Kong. Yet, Hong Kong and the Mainland have more links with these other jurisdictions than 
either random luck or other jurisdictions’ experiences would suggest.62 Overlapping decisions 
to use particular jurisdictions at particular times suggest that Hong Kong and China form
poles in a broader network of offshore corporate relations, which likely “layer” across 
numerous jurisdictions.
 
63  
 
Figure 22: Hong Kong and China Share Far More Business With the Same Jurisdictions 
than Coincidence Can Explain 
The figure shows the links between the offshore entities in the jurisdictions shown for Hong Kong and China. We 
downloaded the ICIJ data for Hong Kong and China, ran them through network analysis software, and looks for 
patterns. The links between China-Third Party– Hong Kong occur far more likely than random variation would allow 
(and more than we see in other pairs of jurisdictions like US/UK or Singapore/Malaysia etc.). The number of 
‘undetermined’ and ‘non-identified’ jurisdictions (even in the Mossack Fonseca data!) seem disconcerting.                    
Source: based on data from the ICIJ (2016).  
 
                                                 
62 We test this by looking at the probability distributions that govern Singapore’s, Taiwan’s, Thailand’s and the UK’s 
links with other offshore jurisdictions (and we explain why we chose these comparator jurisdictions later in this 
paper). We also look at a random probability distribution.  We find that “attraction” between China and Hong Kong 
explains the increased incidence of linking with these other jurisdictions. Jurisdictions which Hong Kong clients use 
tend to link to the Mainland more often (and visa versa).  
63 To keep our paper from being too technical, we do not report the correlations between the extent to which Hong 
Kong and Mainland firms use particular jurisdictions in particular years. As we illustrated informally above, 
jurisdictions like Niue attracted waves of incorporations which demanders of offshore corporate vehicles might have 
concurrently sought.  
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Other evidence supports the hypothesis that Hong Kong’s corporate governance influences 
corporate governance on the Mainland. Figure 23 shows the extent to which changes in corporate 
governance pass through to offshore incorporations – both at home and in the other jurisdiction. 
Changes in corporate governance (as measured by the World Economic Forum’s corporate 
governance indicators) had a much higher correlation (impact?) on offshore incorporations in 
China – about 5 times higher than in Hong Kong. Yet, Chinese firms seem to adjust their 
corporate governance more than proportionately for changes in (at the same time as?) Hong 
Kong’s corporate governance. A 1% change in Hong Kong’s corporate governance (or offshore 
incorporations) results in a 1.3% change in Mainland corporate governance and/or offshore 
incorporations. Thus, Hong Kong’s corporate governance might have a disproportionate 
large impact on the Mainland’s corporate governance.  
 
Figure 23: Comprehensive Analysis of Corporate Governance, Offshore Incorporations and 
the Interaction between Hong Kong and the Mainland 
 
Jurisdiction 
1 
(X) 
CG/ 
PP 
 Jurisdiction 
2 
(Y) 
CG/ 
PP 
Effect 
(Y/X) 
R 
squared 
Percent 
effect in 
year 2 
Percent 
effect in 
year 2.5 
Percent 
effect in 
year 
3.33 
Percent 
effect in 
year 5 
China CG --->  China PP 1% 61% 34% 9% 17% 61% 
Hong Kong CG ---> Hong Kong PP 0.02% 70% 0% 65% 73% 70% 
Hong Kong CG --->  China CG 1.3% 70% 0% 70% 36% 52% 
Hong Kong  CG ---> China PP 1.3% 33% 7% 33% 2% 4% 
The figure shows the way that changes in the wave-like patterns in Hong Kong (variable x) in the factors shown 
above correlate with the wave-like patterns on the Mainland (denoted as y). CG refers to the corporate governance 
proxy for each jurisdiction and PP represents the Panama Papers’ recorded number of offshore incorporations. 
Readers familiar with statistics will recognise these as the results of bi-variate Fourier analysis. We take the 
“coherency” between these variables as the R2 and “gain” as the coefficient of change. The ‘percent effect” shown in 
the black boxes on the far right do not add up. They represent the extent to an “impulse” in that time frame. Readers 
unfamiliar with Fourier analysis only need to read the data like a normal regression – keeping in mind that we used 
more sensitive, appropriate methods for these time series data.  
 
What is the effect of the low corporate governance and higher offshore incorporations that can 
lead to tax evasion – and thus impact on stock market values? Figure 24 informally looks at the 
way that share prices reacted when the Panama Papers publicly identified Chinese managers/ 
investors linked to these companies. The figure does not control for general market factors, 
industry or firm specific effects. These factors would likely have a much smaller impact on a two 
month study (such as ours), rather than many of the usual multi-year studies. Yet, these results 
fail to show any clear pattern. Some companies’ share prices rose before and after the disclosures 
which might have affected them. Others share prices fell before and/or after the disclosures. 
Investors obviously did not see evidence of offshore incorporation as very strong evidence of 
self-dealing and other problems at these companies. At first glance then, poor corporate 
governance and wide-spread offshore incorporation seems to pose little threat to Hong Kong’s 
and the Mainland’s market valuations.   
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Figure 24: Bowtie Share Price Response Suggests Little Real 
Chinese Corporate Reaction to Panama Papers Revelations
The figure show s the share price index for companies w hose senior management and/or investors had been identif ied
in the Panama Papers or the Offshore Leaks. Some companies' share price did better, some w orse (before removing 
the effects of f irm-specif ic and market factors). Nothing about these data suggest any pattern w orth investigating 
further. As described in detail in our paper, some companies probably did better from offshore incorporations and some 
w orse. Source: based on data from Bloomberg (2016) w ith companies' identities provided by the ICIJ (2016). 
 
 
Yet, more rigorous evidence supports a clearer link between tax evasion on the Mainland and 
share price movements. Zhang Chen and co-authors find that tax evasion/avoidance leads to 
declining market values, unless the corporate board is skilled enough to use the extra money to 
increase growth opportunities.64 Xu-Dong Chen and those co-authors find that tax evasion ends 
up decreasing firm value --- despite its positive effects on profits and growth.65 If tax avoidance 
helps increase market values by 13%, then losses from self-serving and worries about lack of 
transparency reduce market values by around 20%.66 They see the existing regulations as a 
mechanism for creating rents – which businessmen extract for reasons too complex to discuss 
here. Increasing firm transparency and revisions to the tax rules which create tax-evasion-related 
rents, thus can decrease the value lost from tax evasion. 
 
Most importantly, what do the evidence saw about policymakers’ ability to change corporate 
governance on the Mainland? If corporate governance responds to outside influences, 
policymakers might change such governance practices more than in companies choosing their 
corporate governance practices by institutional inertia. Figure 25 shows the weight of 
institutional inertia (or history) versus the effects of external shocks and innovations in leading to 
changes in corporate governance and/or offshore incorporations. Both corporate governance and 
offshore incorporations appear very heavily influenced by external factors – much more than past 
actions on corporate governance/offshore incorporations. In contrast, comparator countries like 
Taiwan, Thailand and the UK seems to have corporate governance influenced more by external 
events and offshore incorporations influenced by lethargy or pre-existing trends and relationships. 
Thus, the high reliance on China’s corporate governance on external pushes makes internal 
reform unlikely. 
 
                                                 
64 We use the author’s first name as a different Chen headed up the two papers we cite in succession. See Chen, 
Zhang, Cheong-Kee Cheok, and Rajah Rasiah, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Performance: Evidence from China’s 
Listed Companies, Institutions and Economies 8(3), 2016, available online. 
65 See Chen, Xu-Dong, Na Hu , Xue Wang , and Xiao-Fei Tang , Tax Avoidance and Firm Value: Evidence from 
China, Nankai Business Review International 5(1), 2014, available online. 
66 Id at table 8.  
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Figure 25: What Causes Changes in Corporate Governance 
and Offshore Incorporations? 
  
Jurisdiction Explanation 
History 
(p) 
External 
shocks 
(q) 
Corp Gov 
China 
Corporate governance relies on past reforms and worses with external 
events.  0.76 -0.98 
Hong Kong No dependence on past reforms and improves with external events 0 0.98 
Singapore Worsens with external events 0 -0.98 
Taiwan Nothing effects its corporate governance 0 0 
Thailand Improves with external events 0 0.98 
UK Reflects most past reforms 0.8 0 
Panama Incorporations 
China Offshore incorporations fall on external events 0 -0.98 
Hong Kong Offshore incorporations depend mostly on history/past experience  0.85 0 
Singapore ditto 0.78 0 
Taiwan ditto 0.84 0 
Thailand Offshore incorporations fall on external events 0 -0.98 
UK 
Offshore incorporations depend mostly on history/past experience and offshore 
incorporations fall on external events 0.83 -0.99 
Effects * 
China Effect of corporate governance on offshore incorporations  1% 61% 
Hong Kong Effect of corporate governance on offshore incorporations 0.02% 70% 
CN/HK 
Correlation between a change in Hong Kong’s corporate governance relative to 
China’s.   1.26% 16% 
HK/CN Correlation between a change in China’s offshore incorporations to Hong Kong’s 1.34% 32% 
* Other countries exhibited no significant effects. 
The figure shows the effects of ARIMA (or auto-regressive, integrated moving average) analysis. Such analysis 
hopes to show the way the past (as reflected in auto-regressive values) affects a variable relative to outside influences 
(the moving average part). The last part of the figure shows “effects” as simple correlations  
 
Why China’s Reform Can’t Come from the Inside 
 
Many authors implicitly argue that Chinese companies, if left to their own devices, will not 
reform their own corporate governance. Authors like Wang have outlined in detail why Chinese 
companies do not want to improve corporate governance.67 He – and authors like him – outline 
the ways that Chinese companies use profits and funds raised from investors to implement 
Communist Party and government policies, rather than maximise profits. State-owned enterprises 
particularly reflect this problem – where the Party controls hiring and other decisions far removed 
from the use of funds. Recent cases of CEO swapping at China Telecom and China Unicom as 
well as at CNOOC and PetroChina illustrate the Party’s role in SOEs most clearly.68 For Wang 
(Zhao-Feng and not Jiang-Yu cited above), as well as a large number of corporate governance 
experts on the Mainland, their concept of improving corporate governance only consists of 
figuring out how to improve SOEs’ abilities to cheaply and effectively fulfil their Party-mandated 
                                                 
67 See Wang, Jiang-Yu, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, Cornell 
International Law Journal 47(3), available online. 
68 See Kawase, Kenji, Corporate governance has a distinctly different meaning in China, Nikkei Asian Review July, 
2016, available online.  
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social objectives.69 Figure 26 shows the way that Chinese SOEs in particular have kept less 
performing corporate governance institutions (like Communist Party firm secretaries working at 
the company) alive while constraining shareholder returns.70 As the authors show, Mainland 
firms without party secretaries (as senior level persons who influence managers based on Party 
priorities), tend to do better than those that have them. Their Tobin’s q values, sales, employment, 
even valuations-to-shareholder equity vales exceed those of their party-secretary-line-totting 
brethren. In brief, such political control has led to reduced share price appreciation.71 The 
Chinese government thus has very weak incentives to improve corporate governance.     
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Figure 26: SOEs With Party Secretaries Have Lower Market Valuations
The red bars in the f igure show s, for each of the independent variables above, the difference betw een Mainland 
companies that have a party secretary versus those that do not. For example, companies w ithout a party secretary 
ean about 0.3% more in securities valuations as a percent of shareholder equity, as those w ith a secretary. The 
black bars show  the relative importance of the factor show s as compared w ith the effect of having a party 
secretary on Tobin's q. Thus, ow nership concentration affects (reduces) Tobin's q more than simply having a party 
secretary. On the other hand, a central-government SOE contributes more to Tobin's q values that having a party 
secretary takes aw ay. 
Source: Yu (2009).
 
 
Does lack of interest by the central government, or by boards themselves, explain why Chinese 
companies will not – if left to their own devices – adopt better corporate governance practices?  
Chen et al., for example, find that – using data on corporate fraud committed by Chinese firms – 
that poor corporate governance practices can increase the probability of fraud.72 Specifically, 
companies with large proportions of inside directors have an 18% probability of prosecution for 
                                                 
69 He cites an old SOE law which requires Party representatives in the SOE to support the objectives of the Party and 
state. In our own reading of the revised Law (at least the one talking about state-owned assets), these requirements 
disappeared. Yet, SOEs are not forbidden from considering these factors either. Gu argues that the long hand of 
political influence continues to work in China’s SOEs. See Zhao-Feng Wang, Corporate Governance under State 
Control: The Chinese Experience, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 13(2), 2012, available online. See also Gu, Bin, 
Corporate governance pivotal part of State-owned enterprise reforms, Global Times, 2013, available online. See also 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, Presidential Order 5, 2009, 
available online.  
70 See Yu, Wei, Party Control in China’s Listed Firms, Doctoral dissertation, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
available online. 
71 The conclusion seems relatively robust and stable across time. For an earlier study showing the same effects, see  
Chang, Eric and Sonia Wong, Corporate Governance, Political Interference, and Corporate Performance of China’s 
Listed Companies, 2002, available online.  
72 Chen, Gong-meng, Michael Firth, Daniel Gao, and Oliver Rui, Ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
fraud: Evidence from China, Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3), 2006, available online. 
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fraud for each inside director added.73 Each year the chairman stays reduces the probability of a 
fraud prosecution by 42%. Every extra board meeting decreases the probability of discovering 
fraud by 52%. The effectiveness of Chinese supervisory boards provides another excellent 
example. Jia and co-authors’ econometric analysis shows that supervisory boards engage more 
actively in company affairs when their listed companies face investigation by securities 
regulators (the exchange or The China Security Regulatory Commission).74 Larger supervisory 
boards typically attract more severe sanctions, presumably because they should have known 
better. In line with such stepped-up punishment, supervisory board meetings generally increase 
when the company faces such an investigation.75 In another example of Chinese institutions 
stymieing reforms, Wang and Campbell show econometrically that Chinese firms implementing 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have the same amount of earnings 
manipulation as non-IFES firms.76 They similarly find that earnings manipulation decreases with 
more independent directors on the board of private (non-SOE) firms. Yu and Razaee similarly 
find that good governance makes the transition to IFES standards easier.77 Yet, Mainland firms 
still do not adopt the better corporate governance practices that makes IFES and other reforms 
easier. Even if the Mainland government wanted to push better corporate governance, 
entrenched incentives prevent such reform.  
 
Worse still, institutions on the Mainland could nullify the beneficial impacts of corporate 
governance policies which have typically helped improve shareholder value in Hong Kong and 
the West. Lai has relatively recently shown how rules encouraging the appointment of 
independent directors on Chinese boards led to more earnings management as their corporate 
governance rules became institutionalized.78 Lai places the blame for the failure of these 
independent directors’ inability to restrain earnings management specifically on regulation 
designed seemingly to thwart, rather than encourage, independent directors’ independence. Ting 
and co-authors similarly find that audit committees tend to correspond with more earnings 
management, when combined with ownership concentration and the presence of government 
                                                 
73 We converted the original data (regression coefficients from probit regression into probabilities).  
74 Jia, Chun-Xin, Shu-Jun Ding, Yuan-Shun Li, and Zhen-Yu Wu, Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the Role of 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from China, Journal of Business Ethics 90(4), 2009, available online.   
75 Readers unfamiliar with Chinese boards should not confuse supervisory boards and the management board (or 
board of directors). In theory, supervisory boards should mostly look after (supervise) corporate governance matters. 
Yet, as we have previously cited, the board of directors plays a much bigger role in pushing good corporate 
governance. Authors like Cho and Rui demonstrate a positive correlation between firm performance and the 
proportion of independent board of directors members and the frequency of supervisory committee meetings. They 
also show a positive correlation between earnings informativeness and the proportions of independent directors on 
the company board and supervisory committee. See Cho, Stella, and Oliver Rui, Exploring the Effects of China's 
Two-tier Board System and Ownership Structure on Firm Performance and Earnings Informativeness, Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 16(1), 2012, available online. 
76 Wang, Ying and Michael Campbell, Corporate governance, earnings management, and IFRS: Empirical evidence 
from Chinese domestically listed companies, Advances in Accounting 28(1), 2012, available online.   
77 Yu, Chen and Zabihollah Rezaee, The role of corporate governance in convergence with IFRS: evidence from 
China", International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 20(2), 2012, available online.  
78 Lai, Liona, Monitoring of earnings management by independent directors and the impact of regulation: evidence 
from the People’s Republic of China, International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 
7(1/2), 2011, available online.  
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officials on audit committees.79 In other words, simply adopting Western/Hong Kong style 
corporate rules on the Mainland will not work without some form of deus ex machina able 
to identify and solve problems outside the existing system.  
 
Changing such institutions would require far more than simply importing rules from Hong Kong. 
Miao shows the need, using several case studies, for a complete overhaul of China’s public 
governance for corporate governance reform to succeed.80 Tomasic argues that Chinese law does 
not recognise many of the legal principles – and therefore provisions -- allowing for Western-
style corporate governance practices in the Middle Kingdom.81 Authors like Bin et al. find that 
changes – like the famous 2005 split-share structure reform -- had no impact on the way that 
corporate governance affects Chinese firm performance. In other words, corporate governance 
remains unmoved by, and indifferent to, different policies.82 Ma and Khanna find that 
independent directors’ dissent does not have the same returns as in the West.83 Tan and Wong, in 
their overview piece, lament the futility of trying to implement corporate governance reforms in 
Mainland companies.84 The only out, for them, consists of creating a Temasek-style method of 
corporate governance in SOEs reformed as state-asset management companies. In other words, 
force foreign management practices and rules on to Chinese managers. The authors had such a 
poetically beautiful description of the current problems which prevent reform-from-the-inside, we 
uncharacteristically reprint it in its full: 
 
Having seen the politico-cultural traditions of China, one can easily understand why the 
independent director and supervisory board system does not work in China at all. The 
majority of supervisory board members are cadres who occupy a secure and well-defined 
position within the Party hierarchy and ranks of officialdom. He is constrained by and 
also loathes to upset the network of relationships existing within the listed SOE and 
between the SOE and its department-in-charge. Thus he sees himself as the government’s 
apparatus to supervise the directors for violations of law or any acts that threatened the 
political interests of the Party. His loyalty is to his superior and more distantly the 
Chinese Communist Party as personified by Deng and his factions of successors such as 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. He belongs unquestionably to the side of authority. He does 
not understand that in modern China the state’s interest has become pluralistic for he 
grew up under the all-pervading influence of the powerful monolithic bureaucracy. Hence, 
he is ineffectual as a supervisory board member for the simple reason that he has not been 
taught and do [sic] not understand that there are other interests of the state to be protected 
besides its political and power interests. Put simply, he does not understand the Western 
                                                 
79 See Lin, Teng, Marion Hutchinson, and Majella Percy, The Role of the Audit Committee and Institutional 
Investors in Constraining Earnings Management : Evidence from Chinese Firms, Proceedings of Accounting and 
Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual Conference, 2009, available online.  
80 See Miao, Yin-Zhi, Overseas Listing and State-Owned-Enterprise Governance in China: The Role of the State, 
2012, available online. 
81 See Tomasic, Roman, Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies Going Global, The Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law  2(1), 2014, available online.  
82 See Leo Bin, Leo, Dar-Hsin Chen and Kun-Yan Chan, Chinese Corporate Profitability Performance Following 
The Split-Share Structure Reform, Journal of Finance and Accountancy 19(1), 2015, available online.  
83 See Ma, Juan and Tarun Khanna, Independent Directors’ Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in 
China, Harvard Business School Working Paper 13-089, 2013, available online. 
84 See Tan, Lay-Hong and Yu-Wang Jiang, Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China's Listed 
State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 
August 2007, available online. 
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dynamics of checks and balances between the supervisory board and management board 
in their bid to protect the economic interests of the shareholder as owners of capital.  
     Tan & Wang (2007) 
 
Listing in Hong Kong Simply Isn’t Good Enough  
 
What about simply listing on a foreign exchange? Should/Can the Mainland import (or bond) 
foreign corporate governance to their domestic operations? Guo and co-authors show that a 
foreign listing – specifically a Hong Kong listing – can increase the market value of Mainland 
companies by literally hundreds of percent.85 Other data from authors like Klautzer (2013), show 
that openness encourages the corporate governance reform that eventually impacts on profits and 
market valuations.86 Zhou and co-authors show that a foreign listing in Hong Kong statistically 
significantly correlates with increases in Mainland firms’ returns on assets, board control, and 
board characteristics (themselves composite indices consisting of the attributes we have already 
described).87   
 
Yet, some types of improvements in corporate governance may increase market valuations more 
than others. Figure 27 shows the way that Chinese market valuations have changed in response to 
the valuation of their American Depository Receipts (ADRs).88 As the authors show, listing in 
the US – with its stronger corporate governance standards – might improve valuations more than 
on the Asian bourses (like Hong Kong and Taiwan).89 Yet, some improvement is better than non
isn’t it? Figure 28 shows that, for certain companies -- like Northeast Electric Development, Jilin 
Chemical Industrial, and Shandong Xinhua Pharma -- the large valuation uplift for listing in 
e, 
                                                 
85 See Guo, Lin, Liang Tang, and Shia-Wee Yang, Corporate Governance and Market Segmentation: Evidence from 
the Price Difference between Chinese A and H Shares, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 41(2), 2013, 
available online.  
86 See Klautzer, Lisa, Can Economic Openness Inspire Better Corporate Governance? An Exploration of the Link 
between Openness and Corporate Governance based on the Asian Experience, RAND RGSD-310, 2013, available 
online.  
87 Specifically “board characteristics” consists of proxies for the presence of foreign directors, the Board’s 
international experience, the establishment of professional committees, board size, number of boards, proportion of 
independent directors, separation of chairman from general manager, and annual chairman changes. “Board control 
behavior” consists of attendance rates of independent directors, overall board attendance, independent directors’ 
objections, rate of independent directors, performance review of the board, stock incentive mechanisms, the number 
of shareholders at general meetings, the number of extraordinary shareholder meetings, disclosure of business goals/ 
conditions and vision, the implementation of board resolutions, professionalism of committees’ reports, number of 
institutional investors, and the equity ratio of the company’s first major shareholders. See source for more details on 
the construction of these variables. See Zhou, Jian, Ting-ting Zhang, and Sheng-chao Cui, Cross Listing, Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence of Hong Kong-Listed Chinese Companies, Nankai 
Business Review International 2(3), 2011, available online.  
88 See Pan, Lee-Hsien, Chien-Ting Lin , and K.C. Chen, ADR Characteristics and Corporate Governance in the 
Greater China Region, Review of Development Finance 2, 2012, available online.  
89 We soften our description of the results, given these authors’ low statistic of variance-explained (or R-squared). 
Other authors, like Doidge and co-authors, show econometrically that better corporate governance rules account for 
premiums from a New York listing rather than a London one. See Doidge Craig, Andrew Karolyi, and Rene Stulz, 
Has New York become less competitive than London in global markets? Evaluating foreign listing choices over time, 
2007, Journal of Financial Economics 91(3), 2009, available online. 
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Hong Kong might make even such comparably weak corporate governance standards (compared 
to the US) profitable.90   
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Figure 27: Why Might US Corporate Governance Rules Push Up Chinese Market
Valuations More than Others? 
The figure show s the w ay that Chinese companies' ADR prices changed in response to the offering of these 
depository receipts overseas (in the jurisdictions show n) -- and after controlling for confounding variables. For 
example, market prices-to-book values increased most w hen Chinese companies offered ADRs on the US NASDAQ 
and a bit less w hen offered on the AMEX. Moving the offer to Hong Kong w ould cause market valuations to fall -- 
w ith the most fall corresponding to the offer of ADRs in Taiw an. Yet, the variance explained by the authors' models 
only comes to a relatively low ly 0.22.                                                                                Source: Pan et al. (2012). 
 
 
Figure 28: Misleading Examples of Price Premia Earned by Listing in  
Hong Kong Rather than the Mainland 
 
Premium Companies  Premium Companies 
0%-50% ZTE Corp. 
Huaneng Power International 
Huadian Power 
China Southern Airlines 
 
 50%-100% Anhui Expressway 
China Shipping Development 
China Petrol & Chemical Corp.  
Anhui Conch Cement 
 
100%-200% Yanzhou Coal Mining 
Jiangxi Copper 
Shenzhen Expressway 
Tsingtao Brewery  
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochem 
 
 200%-300% Angang New Steel 
Jiangsu Expressway 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre 
 
300%-400% Manshan Iron & Steel 
China Eastern Airlines Corp. 
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings 
Guangzhou Pharma 
Guangzhou Shipyard Intl. 
 400%-500%  None 
500%-600% Jiaoda Kunji High-Tech 
Tianjin Capital Environmental 
Protection 
 600%-700% Northeast Electric Development  
Jilin Chemical Industrial  
Jingwei Textile Machinery 
Nanjing Panda Electronic  
Beiren Printing Machinery 
Dongfang Electrical Machinery 
Luoyang Glass 
700%-800% Shandong Xinhua Pharma    
                                                 
90 See Guo, Lin Liang Tang and Shia-Wee Yang, Corporate Governance and Market Segmentation: Evidence from 
the Price Difference between Chinese A and H Shares, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 41(2), 2013, 
available online.  
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The figure shows the premia for dual-listed shares (on the Hong Kong and Mainland exchanges) for the shares 
shown. The authors argue that a premium on A-shares (listed on the Mainland) represents the ability of insiders to 
extract value from investors. Thus, in Hong Kong as a better market, investors would pay a lower price and expect 
the share price appreciation shown.  
Source: Guo et al. (2007).    
 
The following table shows the industries more likely to profit – and thus import -- good corporate 
governance standards.91 If Bris et al.’s study still reflects the current situation among Chinese 
firms, roughly 11 out of 30 industries can expect to adopt market valuation increasing corporate 
governance practices.92 These eleven sectors appear relatively specific (specialised). One might 
thus hypothesize that managers can adopt profit-enhancing corporate governance reforms in 
easily managed sectors only. Yet, corporate governance looks particularly pressing for some 
sectors. The real estate, IT and retail sectors affect China’s broader macroeconomic stability and 
growth. If the current system can not provide the incentives needed to adopt profit-
enhancing corporate governance reforms in the sectors that most need them (like banking, 
real estate and so forth), then the system needs changing.   
 
Figure 29: Sectors Where Importing Corporate Governance Standards Has Affected 
Tobin’s q for Chinese Firms in the Past 
 
Effect No effect  
Construction 
Healthcare 
Steel 
Pharma and biotech 
Media 
Specialty finance 
Mobile telecom 
Tobacco 
Travel/leisure  
Diversified Industrials 
Electronics  
 
Autos 
Beverages 
Electricity, water, gas 
Engineering 
Food and drug retailers 
Food producers 
Forestry & paper 
Household goods 
 
IT 
Leisure goods 
Mining  
Oil and gas 
Personal goods 
Real estate 
Retail 
Software and computer 
Support services 
Water 
The figure shows the industries for which Tobin’s q statistically significantly changed due to differences in 
shareholder protection or accounting standards between China and another jurisdiction from which target firms hail 
during an M&A. The authors argue that importing corporate governance policies and practices causes these changes 
in market valuations.  
Source: Bris et al. (2008) at table 8.  
 
Little evidence seems to support foreign listings as “bonding” Chinese firms to stricter corporate 
governance rules. Dong and Xue test the extent of such bonding, looking at the extent to which 
corporate governance related variables (like board size, compensation and other factors) 
statistically significant differ between Chinese firms listed in Shanghai/Shenzhen, in Hong Kong 
or in New York.93 They find some factors, like the salaries of the top three board members, and 
                                                 
91 See Bris, Arturo, Neil Brisley, and Christos Cabolis, Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from 
Cross-Border Mergers, Journal of Corporate Finance 14(3), 2008, available online.  
92 The situation may not hold, as these sectors might have already adopted all the corporate governance reform they 
can.  
93 See Dong, Min-yue and Qing-mei Xue, Local versus global: Corporate governance practices in Chinese domestic 
and overseas companies, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 6(4), 2009, available online.  
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local demand conditions, and all kinds of public disclosure statistically significant differ for firms 
choosing to list on different exchanges.94 Yet, factors like board sizes or the proportion of 
independent directors do not differ – putting into doubt the extent of such bonding. Authors like 
Clarke write even more sceptically about bonding.95 He argues moreover that whether Chinese 
firms “bond” to foreign corporate governance requirements and values, such rules would not 
protect investors any more than rules at home in China. Consequently, any share price premium 
paid by investors comes from their misplaced belief in the likely success of legal action should 
these Mainland listed companies run into difficulties. Grove and Clouse might agree – citing 
Longtop Financial Technologies, China MediaExpress, Harbin Electric, China-Biotics and Deer 
Consumer Products as companies delisted in New York for fraud.96 Simply listing on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange will not provide sufficient impetus for improving (importing) better 
corporate governance practices on the Mainland.  
 
Maybe only the indirect effects of better corporate governance rules help improve market 
discipline – and thus owners’/managers’ incentives to maximise shareholder value? We have 
shown above that better corporate governance’s direct effects do not seem to improve shareholder 
value. What about corporate governance’s indirect effects – encouraging transparency and 
disclosure needed for investors to price and trade Chinese firms’ shares accurately?97 If Hong 
Kong’s corporate governance rules reduce information asymmetries between investors and 
insiders, share prices should better reflect such firm-specific information.98 Yet, Figure 30 very 
much casts doubts on the extent to which better corporate governance leads to more informative 
share prices (which reflect firm-specific, rather than general market-related, news).99 Hong Kong 
share turn-over of Mainland companies does increase, relative to Mainland share turnover for 
cross-listed shares, in response to firm-specific events (news). Yet, adoption of the practices 
usually considered as part of good corporate governance fail to make share prices in Hong Kong 
more responsive to firm-specific news. Such irrelevant factors include institutional ownership, 
independent directors, and even lack of shareholder concentration. Simply listing in Hong Kong 
does not guarantee that Mainland companies receive the benefits of (or discipline from) better 
corporate governance.   
 
 
                                                 
94 Id at Table 3.  
95 See Clarke, Donald, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is it Real?, GWU Law School 
Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-55, 2015, available online.  
96 See Grove, Hugh and Maclyn Clouse, Corporate Governance Standards in Cross-Border Investing: Lessons 
Learned from Chinese Companies Listed in the United States, 2013, available online. Lee and colleagues dispute 
these claims, particularly in relation to Chinese reverse mergers (backdoor listings) into the US. They note that even 
after accounting for fraudulent firms, these companies do better as a group than their US peers. See Lee, Charles, 
Kevin Li, and Ran Zhang, Shell Games: The Long Term Performance of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms, Stanford 
School of Business Working Paper, 2014, available online.  
97 In this context, “accurately” refers to investors’ ability to observe information signalling likely mismanagement, 
self-dealing, and other problems.  
98 As in the previous sentence, we do not explicitly define our terms (in this case “information asymmetry”) as 
managers and owners knowing about their own self-serving, neglect, fraud or even excessive risks which investors 
can not properly value. Without abandoning our scientific precision, we can not accurately describe every concept in 
several sentence. Otherwise, readers would be unable to read such dense and long-winded writing.   
99 See Li, Shan, Paul Brockman and Ralf Zurbruegg, Cross-listing, firm-specific information, and corporate 
governance: Evidence from Chinese A-shares and H-shares, Journal of Corporate Finance 32, 2015, available online. 
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Quadratic share concentration*
Return vo latility
Share concentration
Debt to  assets*
Duality
Total assets
H to  A turnover
Extent of firm-specific information in price movements (larger is "better")
Figure 30: Does the Increased Transparency from Supposedly Better Corporate Governance
Really Make Hong Kong Share Price Movements of Mainland Companies More 
Informative?  
Not significant variables: Percent of shares held by domestic funds, the ratio of H-shares to A-shares, the number 
of QFII investors among the top 10 shareholders, the number of board-level directors, percent of independent non-
executive directors, the number of members of supervisory boards, CEO pay, use of shares to incentivise CEOs, 
Tobin's q , and the number of foreign subsidiaries. 
The f igure show s the extent to w hich each of the factors show n affects the extent to w hich share price changes 
reflect company-specif ic information (commonly know n as a share's synchonicity). We show  the inverse of the 
authors' regression parameter estimates in order to make f irm-specif ic factors score higher in the f igure.  We w orry 
about the large number of factors Typically associated w ith classical corporate governance w hich turn up as 
insignif icant in this study. The authors' application of incorrect econometric techniques most likely explain these 
results. 
Source:  Li et al.  (2014). 
 
 
The recent bout of Mainland company fraud strongly suggests that foreign listings, and their 
supposedly stricter corporate governance rules, do not lead to better governed Mainland firms. 
Figure 31 shows how fraud has significantly reduced market valuations of Mainland shares listed 
abroad – as reflected in several FTSE indices.100 Shares of Chinese companies listed on the 
Mainland (A shares in particular) have yielded positive returns since 2011. Yet, a recent 
correction has shown that these previous gains did not reflect knowledge about frauds going on at 
the time.101 The prices of Mainland shares listed and traded in the US – and particularly 
Singapore -- have seen the largest declines.102 High levels of demand in Hong Kong for Chinese 
shares explain why share prices have not fallen as rapidly on the Hong Kong bourse. Fraud 
contributed to the large sell-off of securities in the US – with about 1/3 of all Chinese companies 
listed in the US had financial scandals.103 Indeed, the lower part of Figure 31 shows that the sell-
                                                 
100 See FTSE Russell, FTSE Factsheet: FTSE China Share Class Indexes, 2016, available online. See also Cogman, 
David and Gordon Orr, How they fell: The collapse of Chinese cross-border listings, McKinsey & Co., 2013, 
available online.   
101 For readers unfamiliar with these frauds, see Yu, Xie, China likely to delist more problematic companies in 2016, 
South China Morning Post, 2016, available online.  
102 S-shares receive very little analysis in the English language press and among English-language academics. Thus, 
we can not speculate about the reasons for the S-share’s price changes in Singapore. 
103 Beatty and co-authors provide a superlative account of these frauds as well as related econometric analysis. See 
Randolph Beatty, Hai Lu, Wei Luo, The Market for “Lemons”: A Study of Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism for Chinese Firms Listed in the US, 2013, available online. For the 1/3 figure, and other in-depth facts 
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off centred on small cap shares (whose companies have the weakest corporate governance) the 
heaviest. Some Mainland companies look toward listing “transfers.” These transfers entail 
Chinese companies’ delisting in the US or other foreign markets in order to relist at home in 
China.104 Some companies probably seek to cash-in on the fraud and run away before news of 
such fraud catches up with their share prices. Others seek to avoid the extra scrutiny. Yet, 
exchanges all over the world engage in the wrong policy in relation to these errant Mainland 
companies. Rather than try to block potentially fraudulent Mainland companies them 
listing, policymakers would do better to put in place monitoring and enforcement schemes 
that encourage managers to govern their corporations in the interests of outsiders as well as 
insiders.   
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Yet, enforcement of all securities rules – not just those related to corporate governance – clearly 
show the Mainland authorities can not offer a sufficient enough deterrent on poor corporate 
governance practices to change corporate governance standards at a national level. In 2010, 
Professor Clark documented almost non-existent enforcement of Mainland securities rules – 
noting less than 1% of all companies censured.105 By 2016, publicly available information from 
                                                                                                                                                              
about these frauds, see Ang, James, Zhi-Qian Jiang, and Chao-Peng Wu, Good Apples, Bad Apples: Sorting Among 
Chinese Companies Traded in the U.S., Journal of Business Ethics 134(4), 2016, available online.   
104 See Gu, Wei, Scrutiny Greets Overseas-Listed Chinese Companies Returning Home to Relist, Wall Street Journal, 
2016, available online. 
105 Clarke, Donald, Law without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions, Northwest Journal of 
International Law and Business 30(131), 2010, at p. 185, available online. 
 36
2014 showed little improvement – with only 74 cases referred to the police.106 If the CSRC 
started 488 investigations in 2014, the Commission closed only 163 cases in that same year – 
with the backlog of cases rising.107 Even having government officials sit on Mainland 
companies’ boards does not seem to improve corporate governance practices and enforcement. 
As Tin and co-authors show in their econometric study, more government officials on Mainla
boards correlate with more
nd 
 earnings management and ineffective (even if they are independence)
audit committees.
 
 
lic.   
108 Corporate governance enforcement (and thus compliance) on the 
Mainland will not occur often, unless a credible, outside actor engages in enforcement effort
with the full-backing of the government of the People’s Repub 109
 
Experts calling for the Mainland to import foreign corporate governance rules (either directly or 
through foreign listings) thus miss the point. Dai in particular illustrates the futility of making 
these kinds of recommendations.110 He argues for stronger disclosure rules in the US for Chinese 
firms (and others) listing there – specifically disclosing corruption risks. Because Chinese firms 
deal with much higher corruption risks than US and other firms, such a rule would help Chinese 
issuers disclose information they would be unable to disclose at home. Yet, recommendations 
like this ignore the enforcement issue. Why should Mainland companies comply? In contrast, 
extra-territorially applied rules from jurisdictions like the US have demonstrated their ability to 
affect change abroad.111 Only rules which give the explicit mandate to securities law 
enforcement officials from a jurisdiction with high levels of corporate governance to work 
with foreign governments (and especially the Mainland) will likely move corporate 
governance forward in China.  
 
How Do We Know that Moving Hong Kong Regulations and Enforcement North Can Help? 
 
What does the US (and other countries’) experience with extra-territorial and aggressive cross-
border investigation/enforcement of corporate governance related rules tell us about using such 
provisions to help clean up China’s corporate governance? The US has adopted two major 
legislative instruments giving extra-territorial reach to its corporate governance – Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.112 
                                                 
106 China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2014 Annual Report, at p. 3, available online. 
107 Id at p. 30.  
108 Lin, Teng, Marion Hutchinson and Majella Percy, Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an 
investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee, Journal of 
Management & Governance 19(1), 2015, available online.  
109 We can not provide a taxonomy of the cases where such outside influence changed enforcement and compliance 
norms in a jurisdiction. US “cooperation” by sending experts to reform foreign laws represents one obvious – and 
futile – way of encouraging reform from the outside. The EU’s latest accession provides much interesting fodder for 
readers interested in seeing a historical case of a jurisdiction importing rules and enforcement from abroad. For the 
first perspective, see De Lisle, Jacques, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, 
and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law 20, 1999. For the second perspective, see Ialnazov, Dimiter, The Impact Of EU Accession on 
Corporate Governance Reform in Bulgaria, Acta Oeconomica 57(2), 2007, available online.  
110 Dai, Xin, Disclosing China’s Corruption Risks: A Securities Regulation Perspective, Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 24, available online.  
111 Anti-corruption law represents the most obvious example. See Lippitt, Anne, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Virginia Law Review 99(8), 2013, 2013, available online.  
112 To keep this paper at a reasonable length, we can not review these pieces of legislation in-depth. We refer to the 
relevant corporate governance provisions during the course of our analysis. For an excellent overview and 
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The rule of thumb in applying extra-territorial jurisdiction has traditionally consisted of whether 
the “conduct” or “effects” of a legal infraction abroad significantly affect the US.113 Hong Kong 
law clearly does not balk at the idea of adopting such a conduct-effects test – as the recent 
Competition Ordinance makes clear.114 A Department of Justice proposal to implement national 
security provisions of the Basic Law “considered that the Legislative Council has the power to 
enact laws having extra-territorial effect where those laws have a sufficient connection with the 
Hong Kong SAR.”115 We do not wish to debate whether extra-territoriality should apply to 
national security or the merits of the now defunct National Security Bill.116 Instead, we merely 
wish to note that a consensus opinion around the legality and legitimacy of extra-
territoriality in Hong Kong law allows for the possible application of such limited extra-
territoriality in Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules.    
 
The econometric evidence on US extra-territorial application shows that Mainland might well 
benefit from such rules. Figure 32 shows the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the market 
premia of various types of firms.117 The positive effects on foreign firms seem to exceed those of 
all firms analysed as a single group. Only small foreign firms only seem to gain less market 
valuation relative to large foreign firms – an effect we already saw in the case of Mainland 
listings (due to fraud risk). How did particular aspects of these firms’ corporate governance 
influence the excess returns accruing to these firms after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? 
The figure also shows that, for the whole lot of firms, factors like having an independent 
nominating committee, independent audit committee, having a CEO which does not serve as 
chairperson, low inside share ownership, high institutional share ownership, low audit fees as 
share of total assets, and low market capitalisation all lead to large post-Sarbanes Oxley effects 
on extra (abnormal) returns. Yet, among foreign firms, only the corporate governance factor of 
having an independent nominating committee seemed to boost these excess returns. These 
                                                                                                                                                              
compare/contrast of these two pieces of legislation, see Holcomb, John, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Related Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 32(2), 2004, 
available online. 
113 We put conduct and effect in quotes to signal the test US courts have traditionally used in deciding whether to 
judge a case with extra-territorial aspects. We cover specifics in more detail in the next section. Yet, for readers who 
need a quick and simple overview, see Robert Giuffra, The Territorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws After Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2011, 
available online. 
114 Article 8 of the Competition Ordinance dealing with “territorial application” “applies to an agreement, concerted 
practice or decision that has the object or effect ... even if — the [agreement, practice, party, association] is made or 
given effect to outside Hong Kong” (underlining ours, with the original text converted from list form to sentence 
form and with the text in brackets summarising four sub-points in order to make the text easier to read).   
115 Department of Justice, National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill: Application of the proposed subversion 
and secession offences outside Hong Kong, 2003, available online. 
116 For more background, see Fu, Hua-Ling, and Richard Cullen, National Security Law in Hong Kong: Quo Vadis - 
A Study of Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, Pacific Basin Law Journal, 19(2), 2002, available online. 
117 The authors obviously made some mistake in their calculations, as the standard deviations they report for the 
statistically significant results which we cite here exceed the mean values by a factor of 10. We assume the authors 
rescaled the data and forgot to report the rescaling. See Switzer, Lorne and Lin Hui, The Long-term Valuation 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S. vs. Foreign Firms, International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 4(4), 
2009, available online. 
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results thus suggest that corporate governance regulatory reform would likely help even 
foreign companies that have not embarked on their own corporate governance reforms.118  
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Figure 32: US Corporate Governance Related Legislation Fomented 
Excess Returns Among Foreign Companies?
Effect of Corporate governance variables on foreign companies
Significant: independent nominating committee*, independent audit committee, CEO doesn't serve as chairperson, 
inside share ow nership, institutuional share ow nership, audit fees as share of total assets, and market 
capitalisation*. 
Not Significant: board independence, independent compensation committee, discloses off-balance sheet 
information, discloses audit fee information, debt-to-equity ratio, EBIT-to-total assets, and revenue grow th rate.  
* marks signif icant variables for foreign-only sample. 
The f igure show s the estimated returns for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the types of f irms show n. The bars show  the 
excess return, return above the risk-free rate, differences in returns betw een small and large companies, and 
differences in returns betw een value and grow th stocks/companies. We show  the corporate governance effects the 
authors found for all companies - w ith asterisks denoting signif icant variables for foreign f irms only. 
Source: Sw itzer and Lin (2007) at Table 3 and Table 11. 
 
 
Other data seem to support the view that stronger corporate governance regulations could benefit 
Mainland (and other foreign) firms. Figure 33 shows the gain in abnormal returns and decreased 
delistings for non-US firms listed in the US as a result of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.119 In summary, the authors find that foreign companies listed in the US most benefited from 
Sarbanes-Oxley when they come from jurisdictions with moderate accounting standards and 
shareholder protection. To put their findings colloquially, foreign firms “bond” (adapt more 
stringent corporate governance policies) when coming from jurisdictions with Goldilocks 
corporate governance -- not too bad and not too good.120 Looking specifically at the way 
                                                 
118 This conclusion’s logic is as follows. Having these various corporate governance attributes does not affect the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effect on excess market returns. Yet, we see that these returns clearly increased for foreign 
firms. Thus, some combination of these reforms contributes to these excess returns (or completely outside factors 
account for these returns).  Yet, coming from different jurisdictions, industries and so forth, these firms do not have 
common factors affecting them which might point to non-corporate governance related effects.  
119 Technically, the study looked at these variables before and after the adoption of the Act. We follow the authors’ 
language trying to tie such a correlation to causality. See Smith, Geoffrey, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Foreign Issuer: A 
Test of the Bonding Hypothesis, 2005, available online. 
120 To take one example, Amoako-Adu and Baulkaran show how Canadian firms listed in the US lost market value 
de to the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Amoako-Adu, Ben and Vishaal Baulkaran, The Effects of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Canadian Equivalent, Bill 198/CSA Rules, on Canadian Cross-Listed Stocks, 2007, 
available online. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley impacted on company risks, Litvak finds that a similar Goldilocks 
phenomenon.121 High risk foreign firms’ risks fell after the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
However, their market valuations also fell. Only large companies from poorer jurisdictions 
complied with the Act – whereas all companies seemed to comply from other jurisdictions. These
result though still our own basic analysis shown in the previous section – that Mainland’s
companies’ corporate governance quality is solid enough to push through further reform
but not so good as to continue without
 
 
 
 reform.   
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Figure 33: China's Accounting and Shareholder Protection Rules Exactly in the Range Where 
Sarbanes-Oxley Style Regulation Has the Largest Effect 
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The f igure show s the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on non-US firms' abnormal returns (the left tw o bars) and delistings (on the right). We observe that
Sarbanes-Oxley "harmed" companies from "high quality" jurisdictions (the f igure describes in more detail the exact definition of these terms). Only 
companies from medium "quality" jurisdictions benefitted the most from Sarbanes-Oxley. Could similar rules in Hong Kong have the same result? 
Source: Smith (2005).    
 
Not to belabour the point, but other evidence suggests that corporate governance pressure from 
outside the Mainland would have a palliative effect on such governance on the Mainland. Figure 
34 shows the relationship between the percent of companies listing abroad in a particular Chinese 
city or region and the quality of local institutions in that area.122 Just by eye-balling the data, we 
can see that more companies from places with higher institutional quality list abroad more often. 
Thus these companies can, and do, conform with these foreign exchanges’ more stringent 
corporate governance rules. Yet, within each grouping of places (by institutional quality), we see 
that Chinese firms from places with worse lower institutions (relative to similar regions) tend to 
list abroad more often.123 Such a propensity suggests that Mainland firms use foreign listings as a 
way to import standards needed to compete with peers who work in better institutional 
environments. Both these trends suggest that maybe Mainland firms would benefit from 
having more stringent corporate governance rules foisted upon them.  
 
 
                                                 
121 Litvak, Kate, Defensive Management: Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Discourage Corporate Risk-Taking? 
University of Illinois Law Review, 2014, available online. 
122 See Hornstein, Abigail, The impact of local governance institutions on foreign market listings: The case of 
Chinese firms, China Economic Review 29, available online.  
123 In order to keep this paper readable, we do not yet again provide the definition of institutions (or institutional 
quality). Readers should see the original study for more details.  
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Figure 34: Chinese Companies Clearly Use Foreign Listings as a Way to 
Make Up for Poor Local Institutions
The figure show s the relationship betw een the proportion of companies in each Chinese province choosing to 
list in the UK, US or Hong Kong as a percent of those listing in Shanghai or Shenzhen) on the y-axis. The x-axis
show s the quality of local institutions (as World Bank's Doing Business average score at the provincal level). 
Broadly speaking, companies w ith better local institutions prefer to list in high quality regulated exchanges. Yet, 
w ithin the tw o broad groups of provinces, better local institutions can correlate w ith more local listings. 
Thus, after provinces reach a "quanta" of institutional quality, they prefer to compete w ith the big boys. 
The outliers though put this hypothesis into doubt.                  Source: Hornstein (2013) and World Bank (2016).  
 
What kinds of gains can Mainland firms expect if Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules 
increasingly bind on them? If Sarbanes-Oxley Act serves as any guide, Mainland firms could 
lower their capital costs by 0.7% to 1%.124 Piotroski and Srinivasan find that Sarbanes-Oxley did 
not distort foreigners’ incentives to list on foreign markets.125 Instead, worse governed 
companies had to delist (or face the extra compliance costs) – thereby improving market q
and shareholder protection for all listed companies.
uality 
 
ad 
 by 
126 Of course, not all companies – and 
especially small firms -- should have the same stringent corporate governance requirements.127 
Engel et al., using relatively old data whose conclusions still apply to today’s situation, find that
companies with more insider (managers’/directors’) shareholding delisted much more than those 
with more dispersed shareholding.128 They further find that the abnormal returns to insider 
controlled companies which delisted around the time of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s adoption 
exceeded those of their control group by 6%.129 Evidence from Belgium shows that the Act h
the effect of actually the improving corporate governance of US listed overseas companies –
causing decreases in earnings management (and thus likely other kinds of accounting 
                                                 
124 See Hail, Luzi and Christian Leuz Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth Expectations around U.S
Cross-Listings, Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 06-19, 2008, available 
. 
online. 
125 Economists care about relative distortions in a market more than the size of the market – as pure changes in size 
only affect marginal incentives (and do not change the distribution of resources or investment decisions). See 
Srinivasan, Suraj and Joseph Piotroski, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of 
International Listings, Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper 11, 2008, available online. 
126 Hostak and his co-authors represent one of the many other studies to confirm these findings. See Hostak, Peter, 
Emre Karaoglu, Thomas Lys and Yong Yang, An Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the
Attractiveness of US Capital Markets for Foreign Firms, Review of Accounting Studies 18(2), 2013, available 
 
online.  
 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange 127 See Wintoki, Babajide, Corporate Boards and Regulation: The Eect
Listing Requirements on Firm Value, Journal of Corporate Finance 13(2–3), 2007, available online. See also 
Grinstein, Yaniv, and Vidhi Chhaochharia, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 
Governance Rules, Journal of Finance 62(4), 2007, available online.  
128 Engel, Ellen, Rachel Hayes, and Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 44(1-2), 2007, available online.  
129 We calculated this statistic by taking the differences-in-differences of pre and post Sarbanes Oxley data and of
delisters from control group companies (as reported in Table 7).   
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manipulation).130 As such, forcibly stricter corporate governance rules improve investment
returns, even if these policies decrease the discretionary influence of insider managers 
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creases the likelihood of mutual legal assistance and cross-border cooperation.  
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Because poor corporate governance sometimes involves hard-to-prove crimes across borders, 
extra-territorial work represents the best bet to tackle the underlying cause of crime – stopping 
the crime at its source.131 Figure 35 for example shows data from a recent popular study of
companies.132 Of the 150 cases of grand corruption the authors analysed, 112 possessed a 
transnational element. The US and BVI represent the most popular jurisdictions for incorporatin
the corporate vehicles used in the subsequent crime/corruption case. Hong Kong appears rather 
prominently on this list of jurisdictions where corrupt individuals incorporate and establish ban
accounts. As we have analysed previously, badly governed Chinese firms have a much higher 
probability of engaging in cross-border corruption, bribery and money laundering than their 
governed peers.133  China will not be able to fight corruption without cleaning up corporate 
governance practices.134 Most analysts note that jurisdictions should work cross-borders, p
assistance and no more. Yet, extra-territorial work on corporate governance actuall
in
                                                 
130 See Dutillieux, Wouter and Marleen Willekens, The Impact of SOX On Earnings Quality Outside the U.S: 
Evidence from Belgian Subsidiaries of U.S. Listed Companies, Catholic University of Leuven Department of 
Accounting, Finance and Insurance Working Paper 0725, 2009, available online.  
131 As a simple illustration, several studies show decreases in earnings manipulation from Sarbanes-Oxley. See Blair, 
Emily, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Earnings Quality, 2016, available online.  
132 See Willebois, Emile, Emily Halter, Robert Harrison, Ji-Won Park and J.C. Sharman, The Puppet Masters: How 
the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It, 2011, available online.  
133 Many authors argue that guanxi relationships explain how self-serving relationships of insiders to expropriate 
outsiders simultaneously facilitates corruption/bribery and even sending money offshore. See Cai, Hong-Bin, Han-
Ming Fang, Li-Xin Xu, Eat, Drink, Firms and Government: An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment and 
Travel Costs of Chinese Firms, NBER Working Paper No. 11592, 2005, available online. See also Wu, Xun, 
Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration and Institutions, 18 (2), 151-170,  2005, available online.  
134 We do not want to discuss the link between corporate governance and corruption too much in this paper. For 
evidence on these linkages, see Wu, Xun, Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis, 
Governance 18(2), 2005, available online.  
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Figure 35: Only the Extra-Territorial Investigation and Prosecution of Harmful Corporate 
Governance Can Hope to Improve Corporate Governance at Home and Abroad
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 of 
 over-seas as a 
sult of such extra-territorial application.136 As US companies had to comply with the same rules 
 
itorial Corporate Governance Law and Rules  
 a 
Department of Justice considered more generally the question of whether the LegCo had the 
competence to enact legislation applying beyond Hong Kong’s borders.138 As a result of two 
national treaty extra-territorially.139 Citing law professor Peter Wesley-
    Number intermediaries: 72                         Corporates:                               73% 
    Total value:                  $56.4 billion           Corporate vehicles per case:        5.4           
The f igure show s information on the use of corporate vehicles (shell companies) in many of the m
cases analysed by the World Bank team.                                                            Source: Willebois and co-authors (2011).
 
 
If the US experience holds, other jurisdictions will likely not resist extra-territorial application
such corporate governance rules. Vagts, as early as 2003, noted in his discussion of Sarbanes-
Oxley (the first law to theoretically apply extra-territorial corporate governance rules), that the 
EU and other countries did not formally object to such application.135 Individual academics and 
social crusaders may grumble – but most see reasoned and moderate extra-territorial application 
in good taste. Indeed, he further notes that securities and other business increased
re
at home or abroad, they found they could exploit the benefits afforded to them by the law, 
without costly managing multiple regulations. International experience supports the assertion
that limited extra-territorial application of corporate governance law thus increases a 
country’s corporate activity outside of its borders.137  
 
Hong Kong’s Helping Hand for the Mainland’s Corporate Governance Problems  
 
The Rationale for Extra-Terr
 
The Legislative Council clearly has arguably the power to enact extra-territorial legislation. In
2003 brief looking at the extra-territorial application of national security laws, the Hong Kong 
orders, Hong Kong Order of 1986 and later 1989, under the Hong Kong Act, Hong Kong may 
apply laws agreed by inter
                                                 
135 Vagts, Detlev Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance Law, American Journal of International Law 
97(2), 2003, available online.  
136 Id at p. 293.  
137 The author further rightly notes that such rulemaking may over-burden regulators who must survey activity 
e. And in case foreign regulators or courts enter in case, they must similarly use resources in 
stice, National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill: Extraterritoriality, Paper 50, 2003, 
abroad as well as at hom
negotiating with these parties.  
138 Department of Ju
available online. 
139 Id at Annex I, p.5.  
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Smith, Wesley-Smith finds a possible rationale under existing law if the “nexus” between Hong 
Kong and the foreign act bears a “real or substantial relation” to Hong Kong.140  
 
Yet, such a rationale relies on two legal artifices. First, most arguments in support of extra-
territoriality apply to rulemaking under the British Empire. Second, citing the supposed Piggott 
Doctrine, the Queen of that time did not strike down the extra-territorial application of law -- i
historical version of silence-equal-consent.
n a 
, 
 extra-territorial application of corporate governance not only 
ossible, but necessary.142 
 
wers  
per 
 
g 
ntion 
 
es 
 
 
corporate responsibility for financial reports.  Relevant concepts from the Dodd-Frank Act 
141 For Judge Power JA, any law promoting the “peace
order and good government” of Hong Kong which applies in Hong Kong may receive extra-
territorial treatment. Arguments from lawyers like Mok clearly suggest that Hong Kong’s 
legal community considers
p
 
The Hong Kong (Legislative Powers) Order 1986 clearly intended for the LegCo to have the
competence to rule extra-territorially.143 Confusion shortly surfaced as to whether such po
extended only to civil aviation, merchant shipping and admiralty. Or whether the powers applied 
more generally. Wesley-Smith cites a tax case, which attracted extra-territorial jurisdiction as 
British imperial rulings of the time.144 The Companies Ordinance imposes several requirements
on companies not in Hong Kong.145 Yet, in the case of the extra-territorial application of Hon
Kong’s anti-corruption law, courts have pushed back against attempts to interpret the Preve
of Bribery Ordinance extra-territoriality.146 The Legislative Council needs to expressly write 
extra-territorial provisions, given the uncertainty and vagueness around the extent to which laws
can apply extra-territorially. If violations of Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules by 
Hong Kong listed companies abroad will attract extra-territorial liability only for the rul
enshrined in hard law. 147 
 
Politics should – and will – determine which corporate governance principles apply extra-
territorially. As a political decision, Legislative Council members would need to add extra-
territoriality to the Companies Ordinance and/or Securities & Futures Ordinance – 
depending on the outcome of political bargaining. Relevant provisions from the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act include corporate responsibility for financial reports, management assessment of internal 
controls, real time issuer disclosures, attempts and conspiracies to commit fraud offenses, and
148
                                                 
140 Id, citing Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, at p. 207.  
141 Id at sec. 752.   
142 Id. at sec. 5.  
143 Id at sec. 7.5.3.  
144 Id at Annex 2, 3rd to the last sentence.  
145 See Companies Ordinance, Chap. 622, available online.  
146 For the law, see Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Chap. 201, 1971, available online. For a recent discussion of 
the courts’ treatment of the extra-territorial treatment of that ordinance, see also Rohlik, Philip and Sebastian Ko, 
Hong Kong Court Rules on Extraterritorial Limits to the Territory’s Anti-Corruption Law, FCPA Professor, 2014, 
available online.   
147 As Mok as noted, “code provisions and recommended best practices are not mandatory rules.” See Mok, Thomas, 
Should The Hong Kong Code On Corporate Governance Practices Be Given Statutory Backing? Hong Kong Lawyer
Nov. 2014, at sec. 2, para. 2, available 
, 
online.  
148 See Bill To Protect Investors by Improving the Accuracy and Reliability of Corporate Disclosures Made Pursuant 
to the Securities Laws, and for Other Purposes [hereinafter Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002], at sec. 302, sec. 404, sec. 
409, sec. 902 and sec. 906 respectively. 
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include several very controversial issues which do not apply to Hong Kong. These include 
forming a board-level compensation committee, disclosure of compensation and introducing 
claw-back clauses into contracts which allow companies to take-back money paid to corporate 
executives wh 149o misstate financial results.  More relevant for our discussion, the Act allows for 
w enforcement action in cases where corporate mis-governance which adversely affects the 
and 
 
ns if 
ent. As 
s 
e 
te 
la
US.150 Hong Kong’s government will need to find its own set of extra-territorial issues.  
 
Our first recommendation centres on adding extra-territoriality of the Companies Ordinance 
the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Such a provision should note that corporate governance
obligations extend beyond Hong Kong and that companies may face extra-territorial sanctio
violated. For example, a new sec. 3(5) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance may not that the 
Ordinance does not only apply to Hong Kong, as allowed by law. A section 2(7) may make a 
similar reference. Given the novelty of extra-territoriality in Hong Kong, the provisions may 
signal the government’s intent more than actually create the basis for effective enforcem
the lawmakers and researchers gain experience with extra-territorial dimensions of Hong Kong’
companies’ foreign government practices, lawmakers may make these provisions more concret
and specific.  
 
Our second recommendation deals with the corporate governance of non-listed companies. Our 
discussion has centered around listed companies – as most of the available research on corpora
governance deals with such listed companies. Yet, as a signal of the government’s intent to 
tighten corporate governance practices, the Companies Ordinance can raise awareness about 
corporate governance by requiring the dissemination of a code during non-listed company 
formation. Similar to the other declarations that promoters/directors must make under article 68 
of the Companies Ordinance, they must declare that they have read – and will obey – the code.151 
Such a declaration involving add two specific provisions. A new section 68.1(g) would require 
that the Companies Registrar disseminate a/the code of corporate governance with the 
corporation documentation. A new section 70.1(c) would require that promoters declare they 
have read the code and intent to comply. Such a provision represents the first plank of a larger 
corporate governance reform policy.  
 
Our third recommendation deals with the deterrence effect abroad of the SFC’s work. As figure  
36 shows, the Securities and Futures Commission has conducted relatively few investigations 
over the last four quarters.152 The SFC has encouragingly investigated poor governance practices. 
Yet, with so little detection of bad corporate governance practices at home in Hong Kong – the 
Commission looks unlikely to act as a corporate governance watchdog in the wider region. The 
small number of enforcement cases reported on the SFC’s website (about 8 per month) would not 
                                                
in
 
149 Michael and Goo show that compensation does not represent a key corporate governance issue in Hong Kong. 
Banking represents the only place where these provisions might have a legitimate use (as disparities in banking 
compensation tend to follow international norms). See Kim, Hwa-Jin, Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
Corporate Governance of Banks, Journal of Corporation Law 41(3), 2016, available online. 
150 See Wu, Jennifer, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congressional Rebuttal to the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 14(1), 2011, available online.  
151 Sec. 68.1.f in particular requires a statement of compliance as part of the content of the incorporation form. 
70 describes the content of the statement.
Sec. 
 An amendment to Sec. 70 could/would mention the See Companies 
Ordinance, Chap. 622, available online.  
152 SFC, Investigations by nature, 2016, available online. 
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even appear legibly in the figure.153 Defining tougher, clearer and more credible punishments for 
violating corporate governance rules would help the SFC promote good corporate governance in 
the wider region.  
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Figure 36: Little SFC Enforcement Means Listed Companies Have 
Little Incentive to Improve Their Corporate Governance
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The figure show s the low  level of investigations carried out by Hong Kong's SFC in the last 4 quarters. Corporate
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al penalties w he SF  
Foreign companies listing in Hong Kong would be able to give all kinds of unreasonable 
s withou ch fear of en e 
a d and other  to 
 
157  
mis-gove
corporate gover
SFC (2016)
esents the 
e standards abr
gated problem --
w ell as in Hong K
Source: 
 
mpliance with the corporate governance code would clearly 
mples of the types of punishments lawmakers may opt 
seeking compl
crimin
 with the c
ould allow t
corporate governance.154 Adding fines, civil and even 
C to fix the current toothless comply-or-explain regime.155
explanation t mu forcement action taken against them.156 Further, when larg
scale or wide-spre
move corporate governance rules onto the law 
d frau corporate governance failures surface, lawmakers tend
books – making a comply-or-explain system
unstable in the long-run.  Interestingly, Hong Kong’s policymakers adopted the current system
                                                 
153 SFC, Enforcement news, 2016, available online. 
154 For a detailed discussion of the ways Hong Kong’s regulators, and especially the SFC, can implement such 
reforms, see Michael, Bryane and Say Goo, Last of the Tai-Pans: Improving the Sustainability of Long-Term 
Financial Flows by Improving Hong Kong's Corporate Governance, University of Hong Kong Faculty of L
Research Paper No. 2013/039, available 
aw 
online. 
155 Academics have generally found evidence showing the ineffectiveness of comply-or-comply regulation. In the 
UK context, see Arcot, Sridhar, Valentina Bruno, and Antoine Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the UK: 
Is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working?, International Review of Law and Economics 30, 2010, available 
online. For more recent findings, see also Hadjikyprianou, George, The Principle of 'Comply or Explain' 
Underpinning the UK Corporate Governance Regulation: Is There a Need for a Change?, Corporate Law: Corpo
Governance Law Journal 7(81), 2015, available 
rate 
online. 
156 Academics have quantified the large proportion of companies offering explanations which an independent 
ain’: 
, Centre for Business Research 
observer would consider inadequate. Dealing with explanations of foreign companies, often in foreign languages, 
further decreases the likely usefulness of these explanations. For a description of how foreign culture complicates a 
comply-or-explain system, see Seidl, David, Paul Sanderson and John Roberts, Applying ‘Comply-or-Expl
Conformance with Codes of Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany
University of Cambridge Working Paper 389, 2009, available online.  
157 As we have previously shown, the US best exemplifies the shift in corporate governance rules into the law books. 
Zadkovich, using Australia’s experience, shows how lawmakers end up legislating corporate governance r
time. See Zadkovich, John, Mandatory Requirements, Voluntary Rules and ‘Please Explain’: A Corporate 
Governa
ules over 
nce Quagmire, Deakin Law Review 12(2), 2007, available online.  
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without any empirical evidence supp
approach to
effec  
re 37: Possible SFC Rem
  
orting comply-or-explain.158 Hong Kong should abandon 
 corporate governthe comply-or-expla
as in
in 
tive.
ance which most empirical studies 
condemn 
 
Figu edies for Selected Corporate Governance Failures 
Corporate 
governance area 
Type of 
punishment 
Description  
A.1. Board Fines 
 
Lack of regular board meetings denying certain directors a place at the 
table could signal little oversight. Fines might discourage what is now a
all-gain-no-pain act.  Such fines might also discourage marginal 
conflicts of interest.  
A.2 Chairman/ 
CEO 
Facilitating If the SFC documents lack of leadership by the chairman/CEO – and 
makes shareholder redress easier – investors mprivate action ay help police markets 
for corporate control.  
A3. Board 
composition 
Fine Appointing independent non-executive directors is a mechanical task 
which no company should have an excuse for overlooking.  
A4. Appointments Fine Each point in this section is easy to monitor. Having fines may 
encourage compliance audits to catch problems before they escalate to 
the regulatory level.  
5. Nomination Fine Again, a relatively mechanical task without any clear link to harms (thus A
Committee making civil remedies untenable).  
A7. Access to 
information 
Civil  Keeping certain directors in the dark could harm minority interests (for 
example) or expose the company to risks. The SFC would play a role in 
ensuring public disclosure of any lack of access to information, so 
directors and shareholders themselves could seek redress.  
B st 
ling to 
.1 Remuneration Civil  Paying too much (or too little) for a senior executive could exhau
shareholder funds and reduce profitable investment. Directors fai
use a compensation committee put others’ interests at risk – leading to 
potential claims.  
C.1 Accounting Criminal Directors could bear US-style criminal liability for checking and 
ensuring accounting statements and discussion. The SFC would clearly 
need to police these kinds of arrangements.  
he figure shows the possible remedies to breaches of the Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules which lawmakers could 
clude in the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Besides the light, existing remedies imposed by the Exchange (su
s delisting), other punishments could improve incentives for good corporate governance. Michael and Goo (2014)
scuss at length ways of encou
s that poor corporate governa
T
in ch 
a  
di raging investors and directors to use arbitration and courts to seek redress for the 
harm nce causes.  
 
 
                                                 
158 Numerous studies look at the UK’s comply-or-explain rules. Yet, we could not find one empirical, econometric 
study looking at the effectiveness of Hong Kong’s comply-or-explain rules. Hong Kong uses consultation papers as a 
key source of “empirical” evidence. For the recent consultation results on comply-or-explain, see HKEx, 
able Consultation Conclusions Review of the Environmental, Social and Governance Reporting Guide, 2015, avail
online.  
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 he Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress the power to reject 
 
n a 
d 
 
As noted previously, Hong Kong can not adequately export stringent corporate governance rules 
s.  For example, Kim and Lu argue that differences in corporate governance 
 
What about China? Article 13 gives the central government in Beijing jurisdiction over foreign 
affairs – if extra-territoriality in itself (rather than in its effects) constitutes a “foreign affair.”159 
rticle 17 gives t
Recommendation 1:  Add extra-territoriality to the Companies Ordinance (in a new sec. 2(7))
and Securities & Futures Ordinance (in a new 3(5)), if even as signal of intent, covering key 
corporate governance provisions from the Listing Rules. 
 
 
ticle 70.1(c) of the 
orate governance code with 
 
 
Recommendation 2: Add requirements in section 68.1(g) and a new ar
Companies Ordinance to require the dissemination of a corp
incorporation documents as well as require senior company officials sign a declaration noting 
that they have read the code and agree to follow the code.  
 
Recommendation 3: Ditch comply-or-explain as well as add specific administrative, civil and
criminal sanctions to the Securities and Futures Ordinance (if the SFC does not already have 
related rulemaking power) for violations of corporate governance provisions, as suggested in
figure 37 of this paper.  
A
any law it deems unconstitutional. Articles 8 and 18 clearly keep British law in place. Annex III 
does not cancel any laws with extra-territorial effect. As for China has its own extra-territorial 
laws, the central government should not consider the extra-territorial application of Hong Kong’s 
corporate governance law as foreign to local legal jurisprudence. As one example of such an
extra-territorial rule, Shen and Watters have argued that Circular 698 applies tax policy 
extraterritoriality, as any transaction – even between foreign entities -- transferring interest i
Chinese company taking place outside of China still attracts tax.160 Therefore, the Mainlan
would be unlikely to hinder the extra-territorial application of Hong Kong’s corporate 
governance – particularly as it has its own extra-territorial application of very limited parts
of its own corporate governance law.   
 
Options for Limited Cross-Border Enforcement Cooperation 
 
to places like the Mainland through its Listing Rules. A number of authors wrongly argue that 
mergers and acquisitions represent an important vector in transmitting “better” corporate 
governance rule 161
                                                 
159 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 1997, 
available online.  
160 Shen, Wei and Casey Watters, Is China Creating A New Business Order? Rationalizing China's Extraterritorial 
Attempt to Expand the Veil-Piercing Doctrine, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 35(3), 2015, 
available online.  
161 We do not have the space to describe the problems with these studies. For readers interested in making up their 
own minds, see Martynova, Marina and Luc Renneboog, Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards in Cross-
Border Mergers and Acquisitions, Journal of Corporate Finance 14(3), 2008, available online. See also Cof
Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate 
fee, John, 
Governance, Columbia Law Review 102(7), 2002, available online. See also Chen, Yun , and Yuan-Qiong He, The 
Research on Impact of Dual Listing on Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Chinese 
Dual Listed Companies, 2008, available online. 
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actually drive M&A activity – as firms from developed countries “cherry pick” fast growing 
firms located in jurisdictions with w 162eaker corporate governance practices.  Yet, their 
rguments – and authors writing with the same world-view -- put the proverbial cart before the 
ome 
gent 
ing in the 
ce rules has no 
ppreciable effect on deterrence and enforcement, at least the Securities and Futures 
as 
s might 
t in 
Hong Kong would likely (and similarly) require respecting foreign countries’ sovereignty.167 
ilarly to our point made earlier, such an application would encourage convergence in 
a
horse. As we showed already, corporate governance drives listing and M&A decisions far more 
than such listing and M&A drive changes in corporate governance. Natural change/evolution 
will not lead to significant change in corporate governance on the Mainland without s
external force.  
 
At present, Hong Kong has very limited options for encouraging compliance with its strin
corporate governance rules abroad. Hong Kong and many of its trading/investment partners have 
signed on to an International Organization of Securities Commissions’ Memorandum of 
Understanding (IOSCO MOU) promising to expand consultation and cooperation between 
national financial regulators.163 Yet, the Memorandum of Understanding only concerns the 
sharing of information – rather than facilitating tangible help in conduct investigations and 
enforcing rules across borders. The SFC can, for example, use the MOU to possibly collect 
evidence on corporate governance violations conducted outside of Hong Kong. Yet, if Hong 
Kong wanted to refer a corporate governance violation to the Mainland authority, noth
MOU requires that the Mainland government receive, or act on, such information.164 Thus, even 
if the extra-territorial application of Hong Kong’s corporate governan
a
Commission would put online information related to the agreements the regulator h
made with foreign regulators.165  
 
Extending the US-based conduct-effect approach to international law, authors like Lanoi
logically argue that Hong Kong thus may apply corporate governance law extra-territorially if 
violation of these laws significantly affected Hong Kong.166 The US’s SEC has exercised 
discretion and good judgment when seeking to apply extra-territorial law – and any attemp
Sim
corporate governance regulations – as Mainland companies (for example) adapt to Hong Kong’s 
corporate governance rules which might apply directly to them.168 If such a view is correct, Hong 
                                                 
162 See Kim, Han and Yao Lu, Corporate Governance Reforms Around the World and Cross-border Acquisitions, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 22(1), 2013, available online.  
163 See International Organization of Securities Commissions, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, 2002 (revised 2012), available online.  
FC does not provide information on its specific adoption of the MOU. The only public evidence 
at the SFC has signed on to the multilateral MOU comes from a one line statement its website. 
 Securities and Futures Commission, IOSCO MMOU, 2016, available online
164 Like usual, the S
available proving th
See also . 
ther 
, Wei-Xing Hu, Chen Lin, Bryane Michael, 
165 See Arner et al. outline the lack of SFC’s lack of transparency and the unavailability of agreements which o
official sources cite. See Douglas Arner, Douglas, David Donald, Say Goo
Frank Song, Wilson Tong, Cheng-Gang Xu, Dariusz Wojcik, Simon Zhao, Assessing Hong Kong as an International 
Financial Centre, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper 2014/012, 2014, available online. 
166 Lanois’ arguments apply to the US. Yet, nothing in his discussion suggests that his princioples apply uniquely or 
exclusively to the US. Indeed, he notes later in the article that failing to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley abroad results in 
ce: 
, Journal of International Law and Policy 5(4), 2007, p. 4:14, 
discriminatory (advantageous) treatment of foreign companies. See Lanois, Paul, Between a Rock and a Hard Pla
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its Global Impact
available online.   
167 Id at p. 4:13.  
168 Id.  
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Kong authorities would not need to actually enforce these rules. The threat of extra-territor
enforcement of Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules would encourage firms in the Mainl
and elsewhere to adopt changes to their local law which they already comply with in any case. If
Hong Kong’s authorities helped the foreign jurisdiction with investigating and/or prosecuting 
serious corporate governance violations, such assistance would help that foreign jurisdiction 
improve its own abilities to enforce securities and corporate law.
ial 
and 
 
rial 
pplication of Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules would encourage jurisdictions like 
s 
 
l 
ests 
st of 
the governments in the region.  The lack of cross-border enforcement shows that these 
agreements do not provide an adequate basis for international cooperation.  
r, 
169 Extra-territo
a
the Mainland to adopt more stringent corporate governance rules.170  
 
What legal instruments might Hong Kong rely on in policing the conduct and effects of 
poor/harmful corporate governance practices across borders? Mann and Berry describe the ways 
regulators cooperate to enforce securities and corporate laws abroad171 They claim that request
under the Hague Convention, mutual legal assistance treaties, and bilateral/ multilateral 
memoranda of understanding among regulators serve as the basis for enforcing rules (including
corporate governance rules) across borders.172 Under the Hague Convention, the relevant 
authority in Hong Kong may send the relevant regulatory or court decision to the foreign 
equivalent of our Chief Secretary for Administration. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Ordinance – and in the Mainland’s case, the Mainland Judgments (Reciproca
Enforcement) Ordinance and especially section 21 – provide for sending Hong Kong’s requ
to foreign authorities for enforcement.173 Hong Kong already has such agreements with mo
174
 
What would Hong Kong’s limited extra-territorial application of its corporate governance rules 
ok like? Hong Kong’s proposed extra-territorial enforcement would, in pralo ctice if not in lette
not go as far as US enforcement in so-called “F-squared” and F-cubed” cases.175 Indeed, the US 
                                                 
169 For evidence, see Carvajal, Ana and Jennifer Elliott, The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: 
Mission Impossible? IMF Working Paper 09/168, 2009, available online. 
170 We have observed such convergence as “ripple effects” (in Vakkur and Herrera-Vakkur’s language) when the US 
adopted both the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank extra-territorial measures. For the econometrics behind foreign 
adoption, see Vakkur, Nicholas and Zulma Herrera-Vakkur, Ripple effects: Sarbanes Oxley's Impact Upon Investor 
Risk in a Global Economy, Review of Accounting and Finance 11(2), 2012, available online. 
171 See Mann, Michael and William Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 
International Law 39, 2005, available online. 
172 We vehemently disagree that “on a worldwide basis, securities regulators have developed a successful, multi-
faceted approach to the challenges posed by the internationalization of the world’s securities markets” (Id at p. 668). 
Our discussion provides suggestions for achieving such internationalisation.  
173 We do not provide a detailed background on these ordinances in order to focus more on future cooperative 
arrangements. See Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Chapter 319, available online. See also 
Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance. Chapter 597, available online.  
174 Indeed for the OECD, these memoranda of understanding represent the way of promoting enforcement across 
borders. For a list of these cooperative agreements, and the strategies for pursuing cross-border collaboration on the 
enforcement of corporate governance-related law, see Fianna Jurdant, Public Enforcement and Corporate 
Governance in Asia: Guidance and Good Practices, 2014, available online. 
iality 175 For a relatively recent overview, see Coupland, Jennifer, A Bright Idea: A Bright-Line Test for Extraterritor
in F-Cubed Securities Fraud Private Causes of Action, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 32, 
2012, available online. For a readable overview, see Hanusik, Thomas and Traci Rodriguez, I Don’t Live in the 
United States, So How Can the SEC Sue Me? SEC Actions against a Foreign National Living Outside the United 
States, Bloomberg, 2008, available online.  
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itself has started to back peddle on the use of conduct/effects tests – in favour of less capric
and arbitrary transactional tests. To mirror the US’s recent thinking, Hong Kong courts would 
need to litigate cases involving corporate 
ious 
governance when the “purchase or sale of the security is 
ade in the [Hong Kong] or whether the security in the transaction is listed on a [Hong Kong] m
stock exchange.”176 Yet, Hong Kong’s lawmakers would do well not to impose limits on such 
extra-territoriality. Authors like Beyea argue that the US Supreme Court’s curtailment of such 
extra-territoriality undermined investor confidence – and thus investment.177 Extraterritorial 
application of US corporate governance rules has not led to disagreements, conflict or the 
abandonment of comity between countries.178 Indeed, at least in the financial sector, many 
companies working across borders may already expect to feel the impacts extra-territorial 
administrative decisions.179 Thus, once the Legislative Council adopts extra-territorial 
corporate governance measures, political and economic pressures may encourage further 
expansion of such extra-territoriality.  
 
Our fourth recommendation stems from arguments made by various scholars that a company’s 
agreement to list on a foreign exchange makes the company – and those who direct it – bound
the foreign law of the listing exchange’s jurisdiction. Lanois makes the case poignantly – no
that the listing decision entails “implied consent” to submit to the courts of the jurisdiction where 
180
 by 
ting 
e company lists.  In his analysis, he notes that, “securities laws are entitled to be applied 
nce 
er 
 to 
th
extraterritorially when foreign issuers have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the country 
where they wish to be listed.... The extraterritorial application of a national law would he
result from a voluntary decision made by the foreign corporation.”181 Legal scholars like Besm
see the basis for effective enforcement in these implicit – or explicit – companies’ agreements
                                                 
176 We have substituted the phrase Hong Kong for the United States, to draw the obvious parallel with our paper’s 
subject. Such a formula thus preserves a presumption against extra-territoriality – particularly important in Hong 
Kong’s context, whereas Hong Kong’s Basic Law restricts the governments exercise of powers in 
international/foreign affairs.  
177 We do not wish to go into the details of US law. Suffice it to say that the US Congress, reacting to limits impo
by the Supreme Court, expressly sought the extra-territorial application of parts of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Sections
929P(b) and 929Y represent the most important parts of that law. See Beyea, Genevieve, Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, Ohio State Law Journal 72, 
sed 
 
2011, available online. See also Painter, Richard, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It 
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, Harvard Business Law Review 1, 2011, available online. See also U.S. Securities 
f and Exchange Commission, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) o
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 As Required by Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 2012, available online. 
178 We have already reviewed the evidence. But Coffee provides fodder for readers interested in assessing the 
 2004, available online
opposite view. See Shirley, Jonathan, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 27(2), . See also Coffee, John, 
ial Regulation: Why E.T. Can't Come Home, Cornell Law Review 99(1259), 2014, available Extraterritorial Financ
online. 
179 Nothing exemplifies the use of administrative remedies across borders like the SEC’s administrative subpoena. 
en a Foreign Employee of a U.S.-
10, 
See Betman, Ronald and Jonathan Law, The (Too) Long Arm of the S.E.C.: Wh
Based Multinational Financial Services Client is Threatened with a Subpoena, Berkeley Business Law Journal 
2013, available online.  
180 See Lanois, Paul, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its Global Impact, Journal of 
International Law and Policy 5(4), 2007, at II.a, available online. 
181 Id at II.a para. 3.  
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comply with listing regulations’ rules and enforcement actions.182 What happens if the 
management of a company listing in Hong Kong explicitly sign contracts to be bound to Hong 
Kong law and enforcement actions (which might be the same or differ from those applied to 
d
c es.  
 
O
begin with the Listing Rules them
E
te
Chapter 2 (under general principl
(which presents the rules).183 Given the likely harms to small companies, enforcement would 
pply on the Main Board, but not the GEM.184 If the SFC acts like the SEC, such a declaration 
 
ge 
diction. Such a move – 
ven if such contracts have no legal force in the foreign country’s home jurisdiction – at least 
 
mendations aimed at changing the Companies Ordinance and the Securities and 
utures Ordinance set the basis for these changes to Hong Kong’s Code of Corporate Governance.  
 
 
red. 
policies. Simply writing extra-territoriality into Hong Kong’s laws will require significant time 
and energy. Any more discussion of specifics would be pre-mature.  
                                     
omestic parties)? At the very least, listing companies’ could signal their acceptance to 
omply with, and face punishment for violating, Hong Kong’s corporate governance rul
ur fifth recommendation notes that implementing such extra-territoriality in practice should 
selves. Regardless of the SFC’s of Hong Kong Stock 
xchange’s currently self-perceived capacity to implement corporate governance rules extra-
rritorially, the Listing Rules should note that the rules apply extra-territorially – possibly in 
es) and again in the first section (The Code) of Appendix 14 
a
might even open the door for the SFC to provide beneficial ad hoc advice to foreign companies – 
rather than simply acting only as bad cop.185 Thus changes to the Listing Rules can implement
Lanois’ view of listing as an implicit contract to fall under the jurisdiction of the stock exchan
where the company lists. The corporate governance rules should require companies to sign 
contracts (statements) to fall under Hong Kong’s extra-territorial juris
e
gives the SFC and other authorities a more solid basis for challenging corporate malfeasance. The
previous recom
F
   
 
Why don’t we provide more details? Would Hong Kong’s extra-territoriality work like in the US?
What powers would its law enforcement have abroad? We leave these questions unanswe
Politics will determine the existence and nature of any extra-territorial corporate governance 
Recommendation 4: Make the implicit agreement to accept extra-territorial investigations 
and punishment explicit by amending the legislatively adopted Code of Corporate 
Governance to require Listed Companies to contractually agree to the terms and conditions of 
Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules.   
 
Recommendation 5: Add a phrase Chapter 2 article 2.07 and in the first section of Appendix 
14 clearly signalling the intent to apply extra-territorially corporate governance related Listing 
Rules.  
 
            
loss 182 See Besmer, Veronica, The Legal Character of Private Codes of Conduct: More than Just a Pseudo-Formal G
on Corporate Social Responsibility,  Hastings Business Law Journal 2, 2006, available online. 
183 See HKEx, Rules and Guidance on Listing Matters, 2016, available online. 
184 As noted previously, econometric studies show that Sarbanes-Oxley negatively impacted on smaller firms, 
making such regulation and enforcement distortionary. See Iliev, Peter, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, 
Earnings Quality and Stock Prices, Journal of Finance 65(3), 2010, available online. 
185 For a description of this overseas work by the SEC, see SEC, International Enforcement Assistance, 2016, 
available online. 
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Hong Kong’s Contribution to the Share-Price-Raising Transparency of China’s Corpor
Governance  
ate 
t 
tely 
 
e 
 
d 
e 
 
Reforming corporate governance indicators and assessment 
 
Assessment of corporate governance in Hong Kong and the Mainland represent more than jus
interesting data. Authors like Abbott and Snidal argue that governance systems have comple
changed in recent years.186 Calling the new system Transnational New Governance, these authors
argue that the onus of regulation and enforcement has moved from government agencies to th
wider business sector and civil society. Yet, academics and others conduct these assessments on
an ad hoc basis – jeopardizing their comprehensiveness and repeatability.187 Political concerns 
and the formality attached to official corporate governance peer reviews -- like those champione
by the Financial Stability Board – distort the data too much to use in academic or policy 
settings.188 The Financial Stability Board has no apparent mechanism or funding source in plac
to ensure regular objective evaluation (ie. not simply asking government officials what they think
about their jurisdiction’s corporate governance rules). The OECD’s review of corporate 
governance arrangements around the world represent an excellent starting point for evaluatin
189
 
g 
orporate governance rules.  Yet, these evaluations fail to gather information about the 
im
 
O
re ments 
in the region (and especially 
proposal clearly falls into the Council’s terms of reference to provide advice and formulate 
pr he conduct 
of
O
o eetings for the better part of a decade.192 No matter 
hat form that cooperation takes, such assessment will likely fail without adopting our seventh 
c
plementation and effects of these corporate governance rules.  
ur sixth recommendation encourages the Financial Services Development Council to 
commend an organisation to organise corporate governance peer reviews between govern
the Mainland) based on the OECD’s Guidelines. Making such a 
oposals for government agencies.190 One possible recommendation might involve t
 such an assessment with the OECD’s Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members.191 The 
ECD has increasingly worked with regional institutions like the Asian Development Bank on 
rporate governance-related dialogue and mc
w
recommendation. Our seventh recommendation suggests adding to the Listing Rules the 
                                                 
186 See Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation through Transmittal New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, 2009, available 
online. 
187 For one example of such an assessment, see Yan Leung-Cheung and Hasung Jang, Scorecard on Corporate 
Governance in East Asia: A Comparative Study, In Choi, Jay and Sandra Dow (ed.) Institutional Approach to Global 
Corporate Governance: Business Systems and Beyond 9, 2008, available online.  
ous 
inciples 
om Stakeholders, FSB Communication 19/2016, 2016, available 
188 The “assessment” consists of asking government officials from each jurisdiction what they think about the vari
corporate governance rules in place in their jurisdiction. For more on the Financial Stability Board’s intention to 
engage in such corporate governance peer review, see FSB, FSB launches peer review of the G20/OECD Pr
of Corporate Governance and Invites Feedback fr
online. 
189 Nozaki provides a broad overview corporate governance regulations, while the OECD deals in-depth with the 
 
15, available online
specific topics of related party transactions, takeover bids and shareholder meetings. See Nozaki, Akira, OECD
Corporate Governance Factbook, 20 . See also OECD, Supervision and Enforcement in 
Corporate Governance, 2013, available online. 
190 See Financial Services Development Council, About Us, 2016, at Terms of Reference, available online. 
191 See OECD, OECD Global Relations: Engaging with Non-Member Economies, 2016, available online. 
192 For background and information on the latest meeting, see OECD, OECD-Asian Roundtable on Corporate 
Governance, 2016, available online. 
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requirement to publish enough information in corporate governance reports to allow for third-
party assessment of corporate governance using the OECD Guidelines. Without the requirem
to provide enough information publicly to do these assessments, asse
ent 
ssment will likely stall as 
ompanies fail to share information out of concern for the public image and confidentiality. 
 
  
 
The most important tool at present for assessing corporate governance in the region consists of 
the Asian Corporate Governance Association’s and CSLA’s Corporate Governance Review.193 
Figure 38 shows a sample of its latest rankings – from 2015.194 The organisation has published 
these assessments since 2003 – providing potentially comparative data for over 13 years.195 Such 
a track records beats hands-down other institutions, like the Asian Development Bank, which 
conducts one-off ad hoc assessments according to their popularity and funding.196 Even the IMF 
has not been able to assess China’s corporate governance.197 The ACGA looks like the only 
sustainable organisation for conducting these kinds of assessments.  
 
 
c
Recommendation 6: The Financial Services Development Council should recommend an 
procedures for corporateorganisation to organise and set up  governance peer review 
between governments in the region (and especially the Mainland) based on the OECD’s 
Guidelines or possibly under the aegis of the OECD’s cooperation with non-member 
countries.  
 
Recommendation 7: Add to the Listing Rules the requirement to publish enough 
information in corporate governance reports to allow for third-party assessment of corporate 
governance using the OECD Guidelines. 
Figure 38: The CSLA-ACGA Corporate Governance Scores Provide a Possible Baseline for 
Future Assessments?  
                                                 
193 ACGA, Library - Regional Analysis - ACGA Reports, 2016, available online. 
194 See Jamie Allen, Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) CG Watch 2014 – Market Rankings,  
2015, available online. 
195 The authors note several changes in definitions which hinder attempts to compare scores across years. We have 
not assessed such comparability in-depth, so we do not talk more about it. See CG Watch, 2003, available online. 
196 At least they follow they mainly follow the OECD Principles. See Asian Development Bank, ASEAN Corpor
Governance Scorecard: Country Reports an
ate 
d Assessments 2013-2014, available online. See also Asian Development 
 
–2013, available online
Bank and ASEAN, ASEAN Capital Markets Forum, Corporate Governance Scorecard: Country Reports and
Assessments 2012 .  
rds and Codes (ROSC) Corporate Governance Program, 2016, 197 IMF, Reports on the Observance of Standa
available online. 
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The Association’s private sector funding provides a sustainable basis for these corporate 
governance assessments. The Asian Corporate Governance Ass ciao tion already has developed its 
own list of at least 111 organisational clients/members, ensuring a sustainable future.198 The 
199
l 
e 
 Kong can exert cross-
s 
ts and sharing the results publicly.  
                          
Association claims 2,500 individual members.  If true, these individuals could probably 
provide some in-kind support for assessing companies in their industries. In theory, the 
Association (ACGA) could work with companies in China and Hong Kong to implement interna
corporate governance monitoring. A number of toolkits, like the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC’s) already exist for the ACGA to inexpensively draw on and use.200 The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange’s abortive efforts at encouraging firms to evaluate their own corporat
governance illustrate the importance of third-party evaluation.201 Hong
border influence on the Mainland’s corporate governance by unilaterally marketing it
assessmen
 
                       
mbers, 2016, available online198 ACGA, Me . 
199 Id at para. 1.  
200 See IFC, Developing Corporate Governance Codes of Best Practice, available online. See also Volume 2: 
Processes, available online. See also IFC, Supplement to Toolkit 2, Developing Corporate Governance Codes of Best 
Practice Assessing and Promoting the Implementation of Codes of Corporate Governance, 2014, available online. 
201 For more information on that attempt, see Shanghai Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Self-Evaluation 
Form for Listed Companies in Shanghai, 2007, available online. See also Shanghai Stock Exchange, Assessment 
Methods for Corporate Governance Appraisal List for Listed Companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2007, 
available online. 
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Before engaging in such assessment, the CSLA and ACGA will need to change their 
e 
 and 
, 
, 
xamples illustrate the scope of the needed changes. Appendix 3 asks “does management 
tick to clearly defined core businesses?”204 Another question asks whether the company 
r the 
es to the CSLA’s and ACGA’s independence. Both organisations probably 
ave several potential companies they would assess as clients.211 Judging by its 2012 report, most 
of the assessment seems to revolve around general market trends, with one or two companies’ 
cas
of the report suggests that the sponsoring organisations do not practice favouritism vis-à-vis 
powerful companies.214 Yet, the incentives will always remain to provide assessments and 
consulting at the same time and to the same companies. Sponsorship from a market regulator 
                                                
questionnaire to focus more clearly on issues identified by the international corporate governanc
community (like the OECD).  As we previous illustrated, the OECD guidelines revolve around 
six areas -- the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, rights and equitable 
treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions, institutional investors, stock markets,
other intermediaries, role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency 
and the responsibilities of the board.202 In contrast, the ACGA, using the CSLA questionnaire
organises their evaluation according to discipline (18% weight), transparency (18% weight)
independence (18% weight), responsibility (18% weight), and fairness (18% weight).203  
 
Several e
s
“disclosed three- or five-year ROA or ROE targets?”205 The transparency part asks about 
publication in general – without discussing many specifics.206 The five questions in the 
responsibility section repeat some of the OECD Principles, with far less specificity.207 The last 
section basically asks whether “no controversy or questions [were] raised.”208 That being said, 
the ACGA provides a very good discussion of its questionnaire, and the statistical reasons for 
including or excluding certain questions.209 Yet, few organisations have discussed the data o
methodology, indicating a lack of linkage with the broader community of corporate governance 
experts. Involving more organisations’ contribution to the questionnaire outside of ACGA 
can built support and perhaps increases its scientific value.210  
 
The other issue relat
h
es described as examples.212 Discussions of the 14 or so companies the report focused on 
contained 2-3 sentences, with information seemingly taken from the news.213 A quick overview 
 
202 OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015, available online. 
203 CSLA and ACGA, CG Watch 2012 Corporate governance in Asia, 2012, at Appendix 3, available online  
204 Id at 1.  
205 Id at 7.  
206 Id at 15-21.  
207 Id at 22-26.  
208 Id 27-30.  
209 Id at Sec. 3.  
210 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index represents an obvious example of such participation. 
With the World Bank’s help, they involved leading academics and experts to revise the questions from the celebrated 
ee Kaufmann, Daniel and A. Kraay, Governance Indicators: 
 other studies 
ility of the index, showing the importance that academics and policymakers have placed in the index. 
ruption Perceptions Index: Whose 
index. The index gained legitimacy from the exercise. S
Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going? The World Bank Research Observer 23(1), 2008. Several
look at the reliab
See also Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah, Transparency International’s Cor
Perceptions Are They Anyway?, 2005, available online.  
211 CSLA unsurprisingly does not disclose its clients.  
212 CSLA and ACGA, CG Watch 2012 Corporate governance in Asia, 2012, at 69-73, available online. 
s/decliners (alphabetical order)).  
213 Id at 75-76.  
214 Id at Figure 68 (China: Biggest CG gainer
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or market maker could significantly dull CSLA and ACGA’s incentives to talk-up potential 
clients.  
 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) represents the best choice of sponsor. Other institutions 
do not have the funding, interest in promoting market quality, and institutional support that the 
Exchange has.215 The HKEx earned HK$8 billion in 2015.216 As shown in Figure 39, the HKEx 
also advertises at length its corporate social responsibility. If the HKEx supported the ACGA for 
$1 million (roughly $128,000 US) annually until the assessments became self-financing, such 
initiatives that create effective and lasting benefits to the community.”217 The HKEx should not 
e self-
money should be enough to pay for the social goods aspects of its work. The Exchange has 
Community as a core value, as “help[ing] to build a sustainable community by supporting local 
have the right to influence assessments and the funding should continue until they becom
sustainable. Certainly the Exchange could spare 1/8000th its earnings to improve market quality at 
home and abroad.   
 
 
Figure 39: The HKEx’s Commitment to Corporate Governance and Social Corporate 
Responsibility Makes it an Ideal Prospect for Funding Corporate Governance Assessments 
 
 
 
The figure shows the HKEx’s website, which we have recoloured from blue to red to reflect our paper’s colour 
scheme. Source: HKEx (2016).  
 
Our eighth and ninth recommendations thus relate to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s 
cooperation on corporate governance assessments. The Exchange should open a dialogue with the
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and CSLA (its main supporter for these 
 
                                                 
215 The Financial Services Development Council, research institutions at the local universities, and even the 
 Company Register represent less desirable alternatives. In the case of the first two, they have no sustainable revenue
source. In the latter, the conflict of interest obviously exists between register and assessor.  
216 HKEx, 2015 Annual Report, available online. 
217 Id at CSR Policy, 2016, available online. 
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assessments) about sponsorship. The Exchange has enough clout to require changes to their 
assessment methodology to bring that methodology in line with international best practice. 
Sponsorship of roughly HK$1 million per year can/should continue until these assessments 
become self-sustaining. The Exchange should also arrange for an internal audit of the assessmen
methodology and practice – to ensure that these assessments actually measure existing corpo
governance practices.  
 
t 
rate 
 
 
Increasing Financial Transparency  
 
Numerous studies extol the virtues of corporate transparency (and particularly financial 
transparency) as a way to encourage better corporate governance – and visa versa. Regulations 
requiring greater disclosure not only benefit the companies themselves, but also the business 
environment in which they work.218 Authors like Laurence find that both individual and 
stitutional investors actually do trade on the information disclosed.219 Chen et al. go further, 
e 
po
 
Recommendation 8: Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) to start talks with Asian 
Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and its funder CSLA , and allocate budgetary 
resources out of profits for, funding the publications their assessment criteria, data and work 
with business/academic community to ensure rigorous, comparable data.  
 
Recommendation 9: Hong Kong Stock Exchange should provide HK$1 million as part of 
its cooperation with the ACGA and CSLA (until financial independent) to conduct corporate 
governance monitoring contingent on modifying its assessment methodology to reflect 
OECD standards and an internal audit to ensure the integrity of its scoring process.  
in
looking at the extent to which poor disclosure and other corporate governance practices correlat
with mis-investment (namely under or over investment as assessed by past, present and future 
revenues).220 As shown in Figure 40, alone, disclosure does not have a statistically significant 
effect on over or under-investment. Yet, disclosure does affect Mainland companies’ cor rate 
governance – which in turn affects investment.221 Increased disclosure when combined with 
better corporate governance seems to reduce over-investment – if increasing under-investment. 
Looking at the effects in well-governed Chinese firms shows a total decrease in investment 
inefficiency (namely the extent to which these firms over or under-invest). Market characteristics
seem to have only microscopic effects on the extent of disclosure. Firms will disclose more 
before attracting external finance and when returns to assets rise. Disclosure decreases when 
market valuations increase and when a firm’s management has more political connections.  
 
                                                 
218 Choudhury in particular provides a balanced discussion of the legal issues involved in adopting such disclosur
rules. See Choudhury, Barnali, Social Disclosure, Berkeley Business Law Journal 13(1), 2016. 
219 Lawrence, Alastair, Individual Investors and Financial Disclosu
e 
re, Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(1), 
2013, available online.  
220 Chen, Jean, Xin-Sheng Cheng, Stephen Gong, and You-Chao Tan, Voluntary Non-Financial Disclosure, 
Corporate Governance and Investment Efficiency, 2014, available online. 
221 The joint effect (ie interaction) between disclosure and corporate governance yields positive effects on under-
investment and negative effects on over-investment. One interpretation of these data might argue that such disclosure
seems to cause boards to act more conse
 
rvatively than otherwise.  
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Figure 40: Poor Investment Decisions Go Hand in Hand with 
Poor Disclosure and Corporate Governance Practices in China
The figure show s the regression coefficients trying to explain contributions to Mainland firms' under-investment and over-investment decisions. The 
authors f ind that disclosure itself has little effect. Yet, such disclosures combine w ith corporate governance practices to explain such "mis-
investment." Tjhe left most part of the f igure show s the estimates for over-investment (in black) and under-investment (in red). The middle part show s
the effect of these variables on misinvestment (either under or over) for companies strong corporate governance. The right most part of the f igure 
show s the factors correlating w ith more disclosure. The tiny magnitude of these estimates implies very little actual effect.  
Source: Chen et al.  (2015). 
 
 
Despite these benefits, Mainland firms look unlikely to embrace greater transparency – even if 
the rules encourage them to do so.222 Figure 41 shows the improvement in various attributes of 
disclosure and corporate governance in Chinese (Mainland and Hong Kong) companies.223 On a 
five point scale, increases in corporate information barely score 2 out of 5. Disclosure 
comprehensiveness scores a bit less than 1, at a time when the Mainland’s code of corporate 
governance had already been in force for five years. Yet, even with the most progressive rules (as 
illustrated by UK and German companies), companies do not voluntarily disclose more (or more 
relevant) information. Figure 42 shows the extent to which listed firms in the UK and Germany 
(as relatively progressive markets) comply with their corporate governance rules.224 Only around 
70% of the very largest UK listed firms complied with that country’s corporate governance rules. 
Many fewer of Germany’s largest listed companies complied with their version of corporate 
governance rules. Taken together these data show that simply “improving” corporate 
governance rules will likely have little effect on Mainland information disclosure.  
 
                                                 
222 We do not have space to review these disclosure requirements. Readers interested in an in-depth discussion 
should see Fu, Jane, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Governance in China, 2010.  
223 See CFA Institute, China Corporate Governance Survey, 2007, available online. 
224 See Seidl, David, Paul Sanderson, and John Roberts, Applying ‘Comply-Or-Explain’: Conformance With Codes 
of Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany, University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working 
Paper No. 389, 2009, available online. 
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both the limits of comply-or-explain regulations and civil law  jurisdictions ability to make them w ork. 
Source: Seidl and Sanderson (2007).  
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In the Middle Kingdom, government policy can actually direct firms against making disclosures. 
First, Chow notes more disclosure and better governance could actually cost managers their lives
and freedom.
  
 
 
e 
losures rely on 
e company’s stakeholders to act on these disclosures.  The recent Sanlu case (of tainted milk) 
best illustrates how discretionary government involvement in corporate affairs on the Mainland 
make disclosure rules impossible to adopt and enforce. 227 In that case, the government actively 
discouraged corporate executives from making disclosures that could have saved lives and 
investors money.228 With stakeholders unable or unwilling to act on information (due to 
government policy), the value within the country of such information remains questionable. Even 
wide-spread fraud among Mainland firms listed abroad has not led to any kind of domestic 
response on the Mainland – either for tighter rules as promulgated by the government or criticism 
from investors and other stakeholders.229 Indeed, disclosure remains at such a basic level as to 
hinder even researchers looking the extent of disclosure among Chinese firms.230 
 
No tweak to Chinese companies’ structure or market environment seems likely to produce large 
changes in corporate disclosures. Figure 43 shows the extent to which voluntary disclosure 
among Shanghainese listed companies depends on attributes like their size, profits, leverage and 
so forth. 231 The size of the listed entity most dramatically affects such disclosure – as the firms’ 
economic importance and resources available to provide such disclosures grow. Unsurprisingly, 
the number of independent non-executive directors on a board encourages such voluntary 
isclosure. Yet surprisingly, larger government shareholdings also correlate with more voluntary 
 
225 The Communist Party uses politically motivated purges of companies and
government bodies using the information obtainable from more open corporate reporting (as 
support for anticorruption investigations and prosecutions). In such an environment, no company 
has the incentive to freely disclose information. The government uses such opacity to conceal th
real reasons for politically motivated prosecutions. Second, as Narine notes, disc
226th
d
disclosure. Highly leveraged firms naturally do not embrace the disclosures which draw attention 
to their heightened financial risks. Yet, aside from these features – which in themselves do not
have very strong influences – little affects the extent of these firms’ disclosure.  
 
                                                 
225 Chow, Daniel, How China's Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in the Enforcement of 
China's Anti-Bribery Laws, U.C. Davis Law Review 49(2), 2015, available online.  
arine, 
Human Rights Impacts, 
dal and Corporate Governance in China, Canberra Law Review 
andards Indirectly 
ting Studies, 2016, available online
226 Narine talks about the effects of disclosure on human rights. Yet, her discussion is entirely general. See N
Marcia, Disclosing Disclosure's Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 47(1), 2015.  
227 See Fu, Jenny and Geoffrey Nicoll, The Milk Scan
10(3), 2011.  
228 Id at p. 123.  
229 See McCarty, Janelle, Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure St
on Trial in the United States, Minnesota Journal of International Law 21(2), 2012.  
230 See Tucker, Jennifer and Xin-Min Zhang, Corporate disclosure and research opportunities in China, China 
Journal of Accoun . 
ble online
231 See Yuen, Desmond, Ming Liu, Xu Zhang, Chan Lu, A Case Study of Voluntary Disclosure by Chinese 
Enterprises, Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 1(2), 2009, availa .  
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Source: Yuen et al. (2009).
 
 
In such an environment, foreign oversight over Chinese firms’ disclosure can add credibility and 
legitimacy to China’s current disclosure system. In the Sanlu case mentioned above, the New 
Zealand government played an instrumental role in disclosing information about the tainted milk 
at a time when the central government tried to cover up the scandal.232 US listed Chinese 
companies’ accounting irregularities came to light mainly because of a class action lawsuit in the 
US.233 In any case, cross-border work on requiring greater corporate disclosure appears to be the 
zeitgeist of our times. Section 1504 of the US’s Dodd-Frank Act requires resource extractors 
abroad to disclose their payments abroad – a fundamentally extra-territorial rule.234 Authors like 
Lynn – echoing the language used in the legal draft -- refer to these extra-territorial rules as 
“specialized” disclosure rules.235 Firger more aptly refers to the new policy as “extraterritorial 
information-forcing.”236 Extra-territorial rules will increasingly force companies to 
disclosure information their own governments do not require disclosed.  
 
tronger Hong Kong rules on disclosure could encourage Mainland firms to engage more 
The figure show s the correlation coeff icients for the determinants of Chinese companies' voluntary disclosures. We 
show  correlations as the regression analysis says pretty much the same thing. These data likely contain serious 
problems of mixing cause-and-effect (and ignoring other variables). Nevertheless, transparency might represent a 
result-- rather than cause -- of poor corporate governance (a possibility policyma
S
profitable disclosure. Figure 43 shows the disclosure-producing effects of a foreign listing on 
                                                 
232 For discussion, see Wishnick, Elizabeth, Of Milk and Spacemen: The Paradox of Chinese Power in an Era of 
ers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards 
e Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, Journal of Business & Technology Law 6(3), 2011, 
Risk , Brown Journal of World Affairs 15(2), 2009.  
233 For more on these frauds and the way that US courts, rather than Chinese institutions, took the lead in remedying 
the situation, see McCarty, Janelle, Merg
Indirectly on Trial in the United States, Minnesota Journal of International Law 21(2), 2012.  
234 For more on its exact requirements, see Lynn, David, The Dodd-Frank Act's Specialized Corporate Disclosure: 
Using th
available online.  
235 Id at p. 328. See The Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1502 (on Specialized Corporate Disclosure), 124 Stat. at 2213–18. See 
also SEC, Specialised Corporate Compliance, 2016, available online. 
236 See Firger, Daniel, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New Extraterritorial 
nal Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, Georgetown Journal of Internatio
Law 41, 2010, available online. 
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Mainland firms.237 Market valuations rise when Mainland companies disclose abroad – 
presumably because foreign investors and stakeholders can act more effectively on these 
disclosures than those inside China. Probabilities of increased disclosure (including voluntary 
disclosure) jump very significantly when these Mainland firms list overseas. For authors l
and Yang, i
ike Li 
ncreased disclosure builds constituencies for further disclosure – as the earnings 
uality improves as well as shareholder/analyst demand for disclosures increase.238 For authors 
m in a 
q
like Myers and Steckman, increased transparency and disclosure serve to make Mainland 
corporate governance more self-enforcing.239  Thus, once such disclosure gains momentu
place like Hong Kong, further transparency looks more likely.   
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Figure 44: Foreign Listings Increase Mainland Firms' Disclosures 
The figure show s the impact of a foreign listing on Chinese f irms' disclosure indices. The f irst tw o bars represent
the regression coeff icients of such disclosure on Tobin's q. The last tw o bars represent the probabilities of increased
disclosure given a foreign listing. We converted these logistic regression coeff icients into probabilities by taking the 
exponent of the logistic equation and dividing the result by 1 plus that result. 
Source: Cheung et al. (2010).  
 
Several authors propose revolutionary legal changes which Hong Kong’s common law system 
could support better than a civil law system. Siebecker argues that increased disclosure could 
result from expanding fiduciary obligations on corporate executives.240 Under the more 
expansive principle of “encapsulated trust”, he would make corporate executive liable for 
breaches of their fiduciary duties to investors, consumers and others in failing to disclosure or 
disclosing inadequately financial and other information. Such “encapsulated” fiduciary 
pletely foreign to the Chinese legal system. Thus, only the extra-
rritorial application of such a fiduciary principle would succeed. Even Enriques and co-authors’ 
ea of letting each company decide its own optimal disclosure requires the flexibility of a system 
like Hong Kong’s.241 
responsibility would be com
te
id
 
                                                 
237 See Cheung, Yan-Leung, Yan-Leung, Ping Jiang and Wei-Qiang Tan, A Transparency Disclosure Index 
ble Measuring Disclosures: Chinese Listed Companies, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29(3), 2010, availa
online.  
238 Xi, Li and Holly Yang, Mandatory Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure: The Effect of Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption on Management Forecasts, The Accounting Review 91(3), 2016, available online.. 
239 Myers, Thomas and Lawrence Steckman, Financial Transparency and Disclosure: China Progess on Corporate 
lineGovernance, Journal of International Business Ethics 7(1), 2014, available on . 
olding 
240 See Siebecker, Michael, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure through Fiduciary-
Based Discourse, Washington University Law Review 87(1), 2009.  
241 Enriques, Luca, Matteo Gargantini, and Valerio Novembre, Mandatory and Contract-Based Shareh
Disclosure, Uniform Law Review 15(3), 2010.  
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Yet, at present, Hong Kong offers no shining example of disclosure and transparency for 
bably 
ncy 
f the 
Mainland and other companies. Figure 45 shows Hong Kong’s own scores for financial 
transparency (or lack thereof).242 As shown, Hong Kong ranks second worst among the 
jurisdictions polled for financial transparency. Hong Kong’s unwillingness to sign up to several 
key international tax and anticorruption agreements represents on the key reasons for Hong 
Kong’s poor rating.243 Hong Kong’s large-scale overhaul of its money laundering rules pro
makes part of this score too pessimistic. Yet, lack of signing up to key international transpare
agreements represents a symptom rather than cause of secrecy. Behaviours typifying good 
corporate governance, like increased tax payments, increase as financial disclosures increase.244 
 Hong Kong’s lack of a disclosure culture in its corporate governance underpins most o
reasons for Hong Kong’s bad financial secrecy scores.245   
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Figure 45: Hong Kong Is Seven Times Worse than Panama for Financial Secrecy
The f igure show s the Tax Justice Netw ork's Financial Secrecy Index for 2015. We reversed the values
(such that Sw itzerland's highest value for secrecy of 1466 became the low est value for transparency and visa-versa).  
Many have critiqued the index as unreflective of large f inancial centres (clearly as BVI and the USA score at the upper
end of the index). Yet, Hong Kong's rank as the second w orst jurisdiction for f inancial secrecy raises concerns. 
The index combines 15 scores of objective indicators. See source for methodology. 
Source: Tax Justice Netw ork (2016). 
 
 
 
How can Hong Kong introduce a disclosure and transparency-based culture in a business system 
so antithetical to transparency in the past? Hong Kong businesses and business schools can 
ndertake the changes that the UK and US have already undergone to mainstream transparency 
into management speak and perspectives. The US adjusted with its usual wave of management 
246
 
u
gurus and fads extolling the virtues of transparency.  Consultants like PwC have already 
                                                 
242 Tax Justice Network, Financial Secrecy Index - 2015 Results, 2016, available online. 
243 Signing on to international transparency commitments represents the 14th out of the 15 key financial secrecy 
indicators assessed by the Tax Justice Network. For exact scores, see methodology, see Tax Justice Network, 
Financial Secrecy Index 2015 Methodology, 2016, available online. 
244 Gupta, Sanjay, Lillian F. Mills, and Erin Towery, The Effect of Mandatory Financial Statement Disclosures of 
Tax Uncertainty on Tax Reporting and Collections: The Case of FIN 48 and Multistate Tax Avoidance,  
Journal of the American Taxation Association 36(2), 2014, available online.  
245 Qu and Leung illustrate with data the close connection between Chinese disclosure culture and how Chinese
conduct corporate governance. As disclosure norms change, so should the governance practices encouraging 
disclosure. See Qu, Wen and Philomena Leung, Cultural impact on Chinese Corporate Disclosure-A 
Corporate Governance Perspective, Managerial Auditing Journal 21(3), 2006, available 
 firms 
lineon . 
d the 
rd 
246 Transparency cheerleading took place from the self-help management books to the panegyrics in Forbes an
other mainstream business media. See Tapscott, Don and David Ticoll, The Naked Corporation: How the Age of 
Transparency Will Revolutionize Business, 2003. See also Kirby, Julia, Trust in the Age of Transparency, Harva
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profited from turning the transparency fad into sellable services.247 The UK has followed its 
consensual model – of having government coordinate the transparency effort.248 Given the 
importance of business groupings in Hong Kong, a pan-sectoral body like the Hong Kong Tra
Development Council can/should cheerlead corporate transparency. Such cheerleading
include educating businesses about the benefits of transparency and disclosure. Such work may 
also consist of making industry standards and norms encouraging transparency according to each
sector’s own particularities. Most important, the relevant body can help reverse the presumption 
in most corporations that information should be concealed unless explicitly authorised to
publicly disseminated.
de 
 may 
 
 be 
 other 
 all information they 
roduce or receive as confidential, unless explicitly instructed to publicise such information. If all 
ch 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
249  
 
This leads to our tenth recommendation. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (or
suitable body) should endorse the right to information as a core value in companies’ mission 
statements. By mainstreaming transparency in local business culture (as we showed empirically 
already), the business community will indirectly influence corporate governance practices at 
home and abroad. They should place particular emphasis on reverse the current presumption of 
confidentiality in Chinese business. Namely, managers and staff consider
p
companies agree to release information, no one company will find itself disadvantaged. And su
a presumption of transparency will help reduce the extent of insider trading which devils Hong
Kong’s exchanges.250  
 
 
Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission also has a role to play in promoting disclosure 
and transparency. As we showed, recommendations like McCarty’s to encourage the Mainland 
government to exercise more oversight and requirements for disclosure will not produce any 
results.251 The Mainland government continues to show an antipathy toward norms of 
transparency, even categorising certain commercial activities as state secrets.252 Harmonisation of 
Recommendation 10: The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (or other suitable body) 
should endorse the right to information as a core value in companies’ mission statements as
well as a “presumption of transparency.” 
 
 
 
Business Review, 2012, available online. See also Patel, Neil, Why A Transparent Culture Is Good For Business, 
Fast Company, 2014, available online. See also Knapp, Alex, In The Era Of Transparency, Trust Is The Key To 
Success, Forbes, 2012, available online.  
247 PwC, Strengthen Trust and Transparency: Enhance Trust Across Your Network, 2016, available online.  
248 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK 
Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business, 2012, available online.  
249 Such a concept will not develop quickly. Even as late as 2014, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
 Accountants was admonishing accountants and advisors to comply with even the minimums set by the Hong Kong
corporate governance code. A new paradigm of openness seems light years away from their button-up analysis. See 
HKICPA, A Guide on Better Corporate Governance Disclosure, 2014, available online. 
250 Such a presumption would reduce the headaches associated with complying with new disclosure of inside 
de information rules. For a discussion of those rules and the judgment calls involved, see CSJ, Disclosure of Insi
Information – An Update, Journal of the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries, 2015, available online. 
251 McCarty, Janelle, Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards Indirectly on 
Trial in the United States, Minnesota Journal of International Law 21(2), 2012 at sec. 3.  
252 Mark, Liza, The Impact of Chinese State Secrecy Laws’ on Foreign-Listed Companies, Securities Regulation & 
Law Report 46, 2014, available online.  
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disclosure standards – and particularly IOSCO standards for foreign offerings, provide one way
to encourage Mainland companies (and the Mainland’s regulators) to adopt more open disc
policies.
 
losure 
e 
s and 
of both the 
ch 
 
us has five roles to play in promoting Hong Kong’s 
ventual presumption-of-transparency culture. First, as noted in recommendation 11, the SFC 
c es. Such 
g al 
w
253 Yet, such a checklist contradicts Hong Kong’s increasingly principles-based 
regulation.254 One can read and adopt the standards mechanically, without thinking about th
deep, underlying reasons for these standards.255 Yet, even once those financial instititution
listed companies adopt those principles, analysts like Lu would have reforms 
International Disclosure Standards and the IOSCO itself, as well as the IOSCO’s conduct of “a 
corporate governance impact assessment.”256 Thus, the adoption of a more transparency and 
disclosure centred business environment represents a globally accepted policy to whi
Hong Kong’s policymakers could contribute substantially by encouraging such disclosure
and transparency in business transactions “touching” Hong Kong.   
 
The Securities and Futures Commission th
e
ould/should implement the spirit of the IOSCO principles, perhaps by issuing guidelin
uidelines, in conformance with Hong Kong’s principles-based system, would offer practic
ays of understanding the outcomes encouraged by such transparency. These guidelines sho
cus on the uses of more information by these companies’ stakeholders (from investors to 
ers and even competitors). Second, the 
uld 
fo
custom SFC can continue implementing the Financial 
S have 
n
“
tability Board’s and G20’s recommendations on disclosure.257 Hong Kong’s authorities 
oted numerous “planned steps” in the disclosure action plan. “Industry consultation” and 
monitoring international developments” should focus on the final users of information, instead 
of just pushing disclosure for disclosure’s sake. Third, in line with its mandate to monitor firms’ 
c ss 
a
in  of 
encourag
noted in recommendation 12, the SFC’s disclosure team could advice the users, as well as the 
roducers, of disclosable information. At present, the team answers questions from listing 
 
 
ce 
ompliance with rules, including disclosure-related ones, the SFC should more actively asse
nd critique publicly lacking disclosure practices. Private markets and civil society has no 
centive or resources to do such monitoring. Public censure also matches the objective
ing more transparency/disclosure – something in the regulator’s own interest. Fourth, as 
p
companies about what information they need to give publicly. Yet, the users of such information
far exceed the producers of such information. Their small and scattered nature reduces the 
incentives of any one information user from militating for more disclosure. By offering a 
resource to information users, the SFC could lower the costs of encouraging 
disclosure/transparency. The SFC would also receive vital feedback from the market about where
informational bottlenecks exist. Fifth, as outlined in recommendation 13, the SFC could produ
a booklet with advice for persons looking to pry information out of a company. Creating 
                                                 
253 International Organization of Securities Commissions, International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border 
Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers, 1998, available online.  
, 
254 As the SFC adroitly notes, “To address the fast changing market circumstances and practices, the Commission 
believes that, generally speaking, principles-based regulation that focuses on a higher level articulation of what the 
Commission expects intermediaries to do is more appropriate than a large volume of detailed standards.” See SFC
Regulatory Framework for Intermediaries, 2011, at point 29, available online. 
255 For example, standard IV.A.1 relates to collecting the “name, business experience, functions and areas of 
mpany. 
e Id.  
Rules for Cross-Border Securities Offerings: A Chinese 
orporate Governance Law Review 1(2), 2005, available online
experience in the company.” Such information clearly aids investors and analysts quickly understand the co
As such, the company should place the information in a prominent place with these readers/users in mind. Se
256 Lu, Bing-Bin, International Harmonization of Disclosure 
Perspective, C . 
ial Stability Board, FSB- G20 Monitoring Progress - Hong Kong, 2011, available online257 See Financ .  
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awareness about the harms and modes of redress for individuals deprived of some gain by t
lack of disclosure/transparency helps build a constituency for transparency.
he 
is 
 
 travails of 
n even larger right to information about SOEs, as the government and these SOEs work in the 
interests of the people.260 Their argument about access to information as a human right, as a way 
to lower social costs, and to reduce conflicts of interest in government might seem strange to 
western ears.261 Yet, their call for greater transparency echoes the same principles we have 
described. In a similar vein to the presumption-of-transparency we described earlier, the authors 
note only information sharing which harms the corporation and its interests should remain 
undisclosed – as “the bottom line should be defined: once information is disclosed to the public, 
the corporation will suffer substantial losses. For example, the proprietary knowledge of a 
corporation should not be disclosed because leaks in proprietary knowledge will provide the 
corporation’s competitors with an obvious advantage.”262 Such a legal doctrine seems at odds 
with past SOE management in China.263 Nevertheless, as a contributor to the OECD guidelines 
on the corporate governance of SOEs, the government “Recognis[es] that state-owned enterprises 
                           
258 Promoting 
transparency in Hong Kong can only encourage Mainland and other firms listing in th
jurisdiction to act more transparently. 
 
 
Hong Kong’s regulators and business can also encourage Mainland companies to follow on our 
exchange rules too difficult to adopt at home on the Mainland. Xu and Xu describe the
China’s Open State Owned Enterprise (SOE) Information Bill.259 They argue that the public has 
Recommendation 11: The SFC implements its ratification the IOSCO Principles of 
Disclosure perhaps through a Guidance document), continue implementing the Financial 
Stability Board’s recommendations on disclosure and report publicly about the quality of 
firms’ disclosure practices.  
  
Recommendation 12: Mandate the SFC’s Corporate Disclosure Team to advise those 
looking for information (or complaining about a lack of information) as well as companies 
looking for information on disclosure.  
 
Recommendation 13: The Securities and Futures Commission should produce a booklet 
advising persons harmed by a lack of disclosure/transparency and/or relying on such 
disclosures to recoup damages and complain about un-transparent practices.  
 
a
                      
ing the issues of disclosure and harm. A digression about the role of 
 Review 68, 
258 This is a fluid and quickly changing part of the law in developed economies. Steinman for example provides a 
fascinating glimpse into a recent US case involv
regulatorily mandated disclosure, the estimation of harms from non or incorrect disclosure and judicial remedies 
would take us too far off topic. See Steinman, Joan, Spokeo, Where Shalt Thou Stand?, Vanderbilt Law
2015, available online. 
259 We could not find any mention of the adoption of the proposed Act. We thus must rely on Xu and Xu’s 
description. See Xu, Xue-Lei Xu and Xin Xu, Information Disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises in China, 
Tsinghua China Law Review 4(1), 2011, available online. 
260 Id at p. 4.  
261 Id. III.D.  
262 Id at p. 32.  
263 Zhang, Dong and Owen Freestone, China's Unfinished State-Owned Enterprise Reforms, Australian Treasury
Economic Roundup 2, 2013, available 
 
online.  
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face some distinct governance challenges arising from the fact that their ownership is exercised 
by government officials on behalf of the general public.”264 Thus, neither SOE managers nor 
the Communist Party should object to more open corporate governance and disclosure 
rules for Mainland state-owned enterprises.   
 
Yet, the data show that the Mainland’s SOEs need special rules and enforcement practices in 
order just to catch up with private sector firms. Figure 46 shows the percent of Chinese SOEs 
providing information about various aspects of their corporate existence and operations.265 Most 
state-owned enterprises disclose information about their organisational structure (though the 
extent to which they report on the exact structure...including relations with offshore 
entities...remains unknown).266 Reports about capital investment remain popular – as a way SOE 
executives can brag to the central government.267 If heavy industry continues to release news 
about its achievements, service, agricultural and even information technology companies have far 
less political and economic clout, as reflected in their lacklustre reporting. Only 9% of companies 
provide information about their human resources. Lack of principles and purposes of 
transparency and disclosure make the SOE particularly ready for reform introduced from abroad.  
 
                                                 
26 OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2015, at p. 9 (Recommendation 
o
4 
f the Council on Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises), available online. 
5 See See Xu, Xue-Lei Xu and Xin Xu, Information Disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises in China, Tsinghua 
hina Law Review 4(1), 2011, at p. 23, available online
26
C  
6 China’s Going Out Policy26  further complicates matters – as these firms may have legitimate commercial interests 
offshore which represent more than simply incorporating shell companies in offshore fiscal paradises. See Chen, 
uan-Jie, China’s State-Owned Enterprises: How Much Do We Know? From CNOOC to its Siblings? University of
algary School of Public Policy Research Paper 6(19), 2013, available online
 D
C .    
267 The politics of investment often over-ride the economics of profit maximisation, making corporate governance far 
less necessary for these SOEs without a clear policy from the centre. See Leutert, Wendy, Challenges Ahead in 
China’s Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, Asia Policy 21, 2016, available online. 
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Figure 46: Mainland Companies Have a Long Way to Go to 
Implement the Open OE Information Act?
The figure show s the percent of companies providing information about their group, human resources, f inances, 
profits/reveues, capital investment and organisational structure -- by economic sector. We show  the data as stacked 
bars to make the f igure easier to read. For example, 11% of companies in the heavy industry sector provide information 
about their capital investment and 15% of them provide information about their organisaton structure Thus, adding these
bars has no meaning. 
Source: Xu and Xu (2012) at p. 23. 
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Our fourteenth recommendation thus concentrates on the way that Hong Kong’s regulations can 
encourage Mainland SOEs to adopt pro-transparency reforms that have stalled on the Mainland. 
SOEs listing in Hong Kong can follow the draft Open SOE Information Bill and/or the OECD 
Guidelines for State-Owned Enterprises, as relevant. Again, because all SOEs must follow the 
same rules, extra disclosure should not necessary harm particular SOEs. To help with such 
isclosure, SOEs can adopt the OECD’s advice on SOE transparency – particularly Chapter 5 
ers 
 and 
 
d
describing how to draft and adopt an SOE disclosure and transparency policy.268 SOE manag
can download such guidance for themselves. Yet, by providing them with copies of resource
supporting materials, the Hong Kong government can illustrate its dedication to improving 
market quality.   
 
 
Recommendation 14: Unilaterally require the provisions of the Open SOE Information Bill 
(or the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises as relevan
for state-owned Mainland corporates listed in Hong Kong. 
t) 
 
Recommendation 15: Include the need to have an SOE disclosure and transparency policy as 
part of the disclosure rules for SOEs, and provide best practice guidance from the OECD or 
other qualified body.  
                                                 
268 OECD, Accountability and Transparency: A Guide for State Ownership, 2010, available online.  
Creating an Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Database 
 
The Mainland looks unlikely to create the beneficiary database which will encourage proper 
corporate governance.269 Figure 47 shows China’s rating for the collection and transparency of 
beneficial ownership.270 As shown, China does not score too badly – certainly better than the 
USA. Yet, these ratings look dubious, even at first glance. According to two major surveys we 
nsulted, Mexico and Russia (two jurisdictions often in the media for money laundering and a 
large black economy) score higher. Professor Henry estimates that offshore money sent from 
China (thus sitting in accounts offshore, whether declared or not) comes to around $742 billion in 
2000 US dollars (or about $1 trillion in today’s money).271 Similarly, Hong Kong has about $173 
billion in current dollars floating around offshore. Hong Kong statistics show more than 7,000 
companies set up in Hong Kong by Chinese nationals. Thus, only listing Mainland beneficial 
owners’ interests outside of China would bring more than $1 trillion into the light.  
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Figure 47: China Scores Poorly on Beneficial Ownership Transparency 
Even in Surveys Where Russia and Mexico Score Well
The figure show s the ranking for beneficial ow nership transparency from the Tax Justice Netw ork and Transparency 
International. See sources for more information. 
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Having such data would help us (and the Mainland government) find relationships between 
ownership in corporate interests and the governance of these corporations. Fortunately, the 
European Union’s rules on the declaration of such interests allow us to glimpse the type of 
analysis we could perform if ownership declaration came to Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
Figure 48 shows an example of the kind of analysis one could perform with data about ultimate 
                       
beneficial ownership – albeit only in Europe. Companies with lower (worse) levels of corporate 
governance have Mainland owners who have accumulated relatively large blocks of these 
companies’ shares. We would not expect to see such concentrated ownership – as the EU’s 
                          
269 The Tax Justice Network provides a pleasant, graphical overview of China’s current compliance with best 
practice in the area of the reporting of beneficial ownership (and other activities intended to provide more 
transparency in its tax matters). See Tax Justice Network, Report on China, 2015, available online. 
270 See Martini, Maira and Maggie Murphy, Just for Show: Reviewing G20 promises on beneficial ownership, 2015, 
available online.   
271 Henry, James, The Price of Offshore Revisited: New Estimates for Missing Global Private Wealth, Income, 
Inequality, and Lost Taxes, Tax Justice Network Working Paper, 2012, available online.  
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corporate law reduces the agency problems found on the Mainland.272 We also observe a 
clustering of firms – with large numbers of firms either having the best (maximum) value of 
corporate governance ...or the worst (minimum) amount. These data seem to confirm our ow
findings about the Panama Papers data. Corporate governance remains poor in Mainland fir
(or firms with Mainland owners) until reform improves these companies’ corporate govern
practice enough to making more corporate governance reform desirable.
n 
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Figure 48: High Concentration of UBO Shares of Mainland Companies in Europe 
Corresponds with Lower Corporate Governance Standards 
The figure show s the relationship betw een the shareholdings of ultimate beneficial ow ners (UBOs) of Mainland 
companies in Europe and these companies' corporate governance standards. The tw o clusters of data (at the 
low est and highest levels of corporate governance) mirror our previous f indings from the Panama Papers. 
Companies need to reform up to a certain level in order to make further reform w orthw hile.   
Source: data from Amadeus (2016).  
 
The data strongly suggest that Chinese firms won’t be able to import good corporate governance 
practices from the jurisdictions they invest in. Figure 49 shows the geographical distribution of 
Mainland investment in European companies.274 Much of China’s knowledge intensive 
investment centres on Germany and France – places with relatively good corporate governance 
practices. Yet, Chinese shareholders have also invested in European areas with much worse 
corporate governance practices – like Romania. In theory, if Chinese owners would “bond” to 
corporate governance practices from any European jurisdiction, their large amount of investment 
along the Franco-Germanic border would suggest that they should pick up governance practices 
from those regions. Yet, as shown by Figure 50, corporate governance in companies owned by 
Chinese shareholders in those places ranks extremely poorly. Chinese owned companies in 
Prague and Madrid have the “best” corporate governance. Yet, the governance of companies in 
                                                 
272 Many authors have explained the concentrated ownership of Mainland firms as an attempt to reduce the problems 
and lack of oversight present in a widely dispersed shareholding structure. Yet, such concentration clearly does not 
play the pivotal role played on the Mainland – as even minority holders have relatively large influence over 
companies in Europe. For a discussion of these shareholders’ influence, see Cheung, Yan-Leung, Ping Jiang, Piman 
Limpaphayom, and Tong Lu, Corporate Governance in China: a Step Forward, European Financial Management, 
16(1), 2010, available online. See also Beatson, Samuel, Foreign Investment, Corporate Governance & Performance 
in the Chinese Listed A Share Companies, University of Nottingham China Policy Institute Working Paper 18, 2014, 
available online.  
273 Authors like Ewing might argue that Mainland firms with significantly better corporate governance implement 
policies in line with the government’s reforms. Thus, corporate governance and structural/economic reform go hand-
in-hand. See Ewing, Richard, Chinese Corporate Governance and Prospects for Reform, Journal of Contemporary 
China 14(43), 2005, available online. 
274 See Zhang, Hai-Yan, Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in the EU: Opportunities and Challenges for 
European SMEs to Link into the Global Value Chain of Chinese Multinational Enterprises, EUSME Centre Working 
Paper, 2014, available online. 
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most of the other places where Chinese owners have invested remains poor. As shown by Figure 
51, Controlling shareholders from/in Hong Kong-owned European companies with slightly better 
corporate governance than controlling shareholders from most of other Chinese cities. Yet 
companies owned by persons from Fuzhou, Changsha, Xian, Tianjin have better corporate 
governance practices than those from Hong Kong. If Hong Kong corporate governance 
rules/practices can influence Chinese shareholders, such an influence could improve such 
governance in Europe as much as on the Mainland.  
 
Figure 49: Location of Chinese Investment in Europe 
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Figure 50: Shareholders in Prague and Madrid Less Willing to Put Up 
With Poorly Governed Mainland Companies in Europe
The f igure show s the corporate governance ratings for Mainland companies in Europe held by shareholders from the cities show n 
in the figure.  Source: Amadeus (2016). 
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Figure 51: Controlling Shareholders in/from Fuzhou Control the Best of the Worst
Governed Mainland Firms in Europe
The figure show s the quality of corporate governance for c trolling shareholders of Mainland companies in Europe. 
Corporate governance among all the f irms ranks a D, basical  the w orst rank. Yet, controlling shareholders in places
bly 
re 
s 
or 
on
ly
like Xian and Changsha control slightly better governed companies. 
Source: Amadeus (2016). 
 
 
The UK’s beneficial ownership database probably represents the best model for Hong Kong. 
Figure 52 shows the registry.275 Their register of “people with significant control” will proba
cover owners of non-traded companies (as listed companies already have disclosure 
requirements).276 Companies must collect the information about their beneficial owners, and 
owners non-complying may find their assets/interests frozen.277 The law provides for the 
protection of privacy – like not publishing these owners’ residential address and other “secu
information.”278 The law also allows for reasonable explanations and appeals by the owner
concerned.279 The Department for Business Innovation and Skills has already issued guidance f
businesses to comply with the law as well as for the persons themselves.280 The government 
estimates that the policy will cost UK business around $150 each for small companies.281 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275 UK Companies House, Beneficial Ownership Database, 2016, available online.  
276 We speak tentatively about the rules, as the scheme’s rules still lie in draft form. See The Register of People with 
Significant Control Regulations, 2016, available online.  
ty Partnerships, 2016, available online
277 Id at art. 19.  
278 Id at Part VI and VII respectively.  
279 Id at art. 19 and 25-28.  
280 UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Register of People with Significant Control 
Guidance for Companies, Societates Europaeae and Limited Liabili . See also 
 
d Limited Liability Partnerships, 2016, available 
UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Register of People with Significant Control Guidance for People
with Significant Control Over Companies, Societates Europaeae an
online.  
281 See UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Consultation stage Impact Assessments to Part A of the 
Transparency and Trust proposals (December 2013), 2014, available online.  
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Figure 52: The UK Register of Beneficial Ownership 
 
The figure shows the UK’s actual persons with significant control regulation. We have searched for the surname 
Smith to demonstrate the register. The register found 109,855 matches. 
Source: UK Companies House (2016).  
 
 
China will probably not adopt a policy to collect information on beneficial owners for a long time. 
At present, Mainland rules on the subject relate to a hodgepodge of seemingly ad hoc regulations, 
arising only to clarify previously worked regulations. State Administration of Taxation Circula
601 from 2009 and its Bulletin 30 of 2012 represent the major instruments putting in place som
form of beneficiary reporting.
r 
e 
the 
nce 
 
al 
encies.286  
ong Kong’s rules do not seem more developed than the Mainland’s. In theory, by virtue of its 
ttachment to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Hong Kong has signed up to guidelines 
lated to transparency and beneficial ownership.287 Such guidance follows on from Hong 
Kong’s commitment to adopt Recommendation 24 on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of 
 legal 
ndering and combating the 
282 In the realm of securities investment, beneficial ownership 
sually refers to the rights of shareholders to be identified as having property rights in shares – u
and not the sharing of this information with third-parties like the government. For example, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a frequently-asked-questions guida
document which sought to clarify the responsibilities for reporting beneficial owners in the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
context.283 Under the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheme, the CSRC Stock Connect 
Rules require the declaration of beneficial ownership as well as provide “northbound investors”
with the rights, benefits and proprietary interests in such securities as shareholders.284 China’s 
State Administration of Taxation’s provided Notice 601 of 2009 for the purposes of determining 
tax treatment of beneficial owners from Hong Kong.285 The country’s commitment to its G20 
pledges says all the right things – with the intent to collect and share information on benefici
wners with law enforcement and government ago
 
H
a
re
Legal Persons and Recommendation 25 on the transparency and beneficial ownership of
rangements of the FATF Recommendations on anti-monar ey lau
                                                 
282 Qiu provides an excellent overview of these two instruments. Circular 165 repeats/confirms the validity of these 
two prior circulars. See Qiu, Dong-Mei, The Concept of “Beneficial Ownership” in China’ s Tax Treaties – The 
Current State of Play, Bulletin For International Taxation, 2013, available online. 
283 See CSRC, FAQs on Beneficial Ownership under QFII/RQFII Regime, 2016, available online.  
284 CSRC, FAQ on Beneficial Ownership, 2015, available online.  
285 CSRC, Opinion on Implementing the Dividends Provision under the Tax Arrangement between Mainland China
and Hong Kong in Cases involving Beneficial
 
 Ownership, 2013.  
0 286 Government of the People’s Republic of China, Measures and the Next Step China Will Take to Implement G2
High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, 2015, available online. 
287 FATF, FATF Guidance: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, 2014, available online.  
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financing of terrorism (AML-CFT).288 Hong Kong’s politicians have expressed a strong interest 
in
m ial 
o
 
H er 
e
K
re se 
fu ay 
freeze or seize these funds, making them unpredictably unavailable for investment and forcing 
th  
ordered by the relevant court 
conducted the usual risk assessment quantifying these risks, we can not know the scale of the 
roblem.291 Second, these financial institutions run reputation risks of the public identifying them 
ficantly over the years – with many other 
risdictions requiring the collection of beneficial ownership information.292 As such, foreign 
foreign investigation runs 
old because Hong Kong financial services firms did not comply with beneficial ownership rules. 
 
s 
e 
 
 
 strengthening their anti-money laundering rules, particularly in light of the FATF’s next 
utual evaluation in 2018.289 Yet, they have shown no interest in setting up a UK-style benefic
wnership database.  
ong Kong’s Financial Secretary’s Office should militate for setting up such a database, in ord
xpand Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Authors like Unger et al. put Hong 
ong’s share of illegally derived funds at $45 billion per year.290 In other words, $45 billion 
presents funds illegal derived which, in theory, can be seized and returned home. Taking the
nds imposes three costs on Hong Kong’s financial institutions. First, law enforcement m
ese financial institutions to hold enough liquid assets to wire to law enforcement bodies if
or judicial body. Because Hong Kong’s authorities have not 
p
as abetting crimes. Third, fines have increased signi
ju
judicial bodies may fine a multi-national financial services firm if a 
c
 
We thus make the three following recommendations. For recommendation 16, we urge the 
Financial Services and Treasury Bureau to conduct a study to assess the extent to which the 
declaration of beneficial ownership (and other activities) would reduce money laundering related
risks. For recommendation 17, we urge the Financial Secretary’s Office to work with the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority, the Securities and Futures Commission, and the Financial Services 
and the Treasury Bureau to adopt a regulation for collecting and sharing information about 
beneficial owners, with the UK as a model. If the legal or political basis does not exist for such a 
regulation, the Office can usefully publish road map for adopting such rules – even if it mean
proposing legislation. For recommendation 18, we recommend putting a beta version of th
eventual beneficial ownership database online.  
 
 
                                                 
288 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and 
Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations), 2012, available online. 
289 FATF, Mutual Evaluation of Hong Kong, China, 2008, available online.  
290 Unger, Brigitte, Melissa Siegel, Joras Ferwerda, Wouter de Kruijf, Madalina Busuioic, Kristen Wokke, Greg 
6, Rawlings, The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering, Utrecht School of Economics Working Paper, 200
available online. 
291 For examples of these risk assessments, see US Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk
Assessment, 2015, available 
 
online. See also UK HM Treasury and Home Office, UK National Risk Assessment o
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2015, available 
f 
online. See also Japanese National Risk Assessment of 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Working Group, National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering
Terrorist Financing, 2014, available 
 and 
online. 
292 We repeat our previous complaint, that lack of information and previous studies prevents us from quantifying 
such an effect for Hong Kong. Yet, for the US, see Brown-Hruska, Sharon, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act 
and Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement and Litigation, NERA Brief, 2016, available online. 
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Tackling Intermediaries in the Offshore Game  
 
Increased supervision and punishment of accountants and lawyers 
 
The lawyers, bankers and accountants responsible for listing Chinese corporation on foreign 
exchanges clearly have not investigated their clients sufficiently. Figure 53 shows the number of
reverse mergers organised for Chinese companies in order to list in the US.293 As shown, the 
reverse mergers orchestrated by these Chinese companies’ legal and financial advisors delisted 
after about 6 years due to fraud or other malfeasance. Figure 54 shows the Bloomberg Chinese 
reverse merger index and the number of class action lawsuits against these Mainland corporations. 
As shown, the reverse merger index fell as fraud cases piled up – showing how lax corporate 
governance can harm company valuations. Many observers blame reverse mergers themselves for 
the reduction of the quality of listed companies. Yet, as Chen and colleagues note, a “China 
effect” explains these listings’ problems much better than any “reverse merger effect.”294 
Mainland companies’ legal and financial advisors clearly failed to detect and rectify significant 
weaknesses in these companies’ accounting and corporate governance standards – leading to 
valuations which only came to half those of their IPO counterparts.295 The standard story thus 
Recommendation 16: Financial Services and Treasury Bureau conducts and publishes a 
money laundering risk assessment in line with those conducted by the US, UK and Japan in 
order to identify and quantify the risks from beneficial ownership fraud.   
 
Recommendation 17: Financial Secretary’s Office to work with the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, the Securities and Futures Commission, and the Financial Services and the 
Treasury Bureau to adopt rules for collecting and sharing beneficial ownership information, 
with the UK as a possible model (or at least a published road map for adopting such 
legislation).  
 
Recommendation 18: Put a beta version of such a beneficial ownership register online.  
 
                                                 
3 See Charles Lee, Kevin Li, and Ran Zhang, Shell Games: The Long Term Performance of Chinese Reverse 29
Merger Firms, 2014, available online.  
294 See Chen, Kun-Chih, Cheng Qiang, Ying-Chou Lin, Yu-Chen Lin and Xiao Xing, Financial Reportin
Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect or the China Effect?", Singapore Management 
University’s School of Accountancy Working Paper 12-2013, 2013, available 
g Quality of 
online.  
295 Initial public offerings (IPOs) result in the listing of companies following higher standards due the significant 
screening done before listing. In contrast, screening of companies listing via reverse mergers remains lax in the US, 
Hong Kong and other jurisdictions. Yet, not everyone agrees about these harms. Chai et al. dispute that reverse 
merger firms perform worse than IPOs or Chinese companies based in the US. Chai and Lau see nothing sinister 
about the delisting we have shown – as companies with poor corporate governance got kicked out, and those staying 
erger Companies, 
adopted even higher corporate governance standards. See also Chai, Mary and Virginia Lau, Bonding versus 
Avoiding Theory: Evidence from Accrual and Real Earnings Management of Chinese Reverse M
AFAANZ 2016 Conference, available online. For the market value statistics we cite, see PCAOB, Activity Summ
and Audit Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving Companies from the China Region: 2 January 1, 2007 throu
March 31, 2010, PCAOB Resear
ary 
gh 
ch Note 2011-P1, available online. See also Chai, Mary Virginia Lau, Kitty Xie, 
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goes that as poor corporate governance in China led to significantly more fraud in Chinese
listed companies, these companies used backdoor listings enabled by their legal and 
financial advisors to avoid scrutiny of their poor corporate governance practices
 
, and the 
ventual destruction of shareholder value concomitant with investor skittishness and 
delisting. 296 
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Figure 53: Delisted Chinese Companies Took On Average 6 Years to Blow Up 
The figure show s the number of Chinese f irms, by year, engaged in reverse mergers only to f ind themselves delisted 
due to fraud or other reasons. We show  the year both of the reverse merger and the year of delisting. We took the average 
across all companies in Lee et al.'s list to f ind the 6 year average time from merger to delisting.  
Source: Lee et al. 2014. 
 
 
 
Hong Kong’s legal and financial advisors obviously fare no better in advising their clients. Figure 
55 shows the number of cases appearing in Hong Kong’s courts due to poor corporate 
governance, fraud or disputes over mergers and so forth. Shareholder fraud represents the largest 
reason for litigation in Hong Kong’s courts among the four factors we searched for – namely 
shareholder fraud, disputes over mergers, backdoor listings, and/or corporate governance-related 
                                                                                                                                                              
The End Justifies the Means? Signalling Effect of How and Where to List, Paper#: K227, Seventh Asia Pacific 
Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference, Kobe 26-28 July, 2013, available online. 
296 Jindra et al represent one of the many, many papers to make this link. See Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann, and 
Ralph A. Walkling, Reverse Mergers: The Chinese Experience, Fischer College of Business Working Paper 2012-
03-018, 2012, available online.  
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disputes.297 Such disputes have increased, in absolute terms, over the course of the last decade. 
Many of these cases would not have proceeded into litigation if these companies’ legal and/or 
financial advisors had exercised more foresight.  
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Figure 55: Are Roughly 80 Litigated Cases of Fraud Worth Corporate Governance
Reform in Hong Kong?   
The figure show s the number of cases in w hich each of the keyw ords show n appear. We extrapolated the 2016 
data based on the number of cases up to 25 September.  
Source: Lexis Hong Kong (2016).   
 
Both the Panama Papers, and numerous other studies, show how shell companies can incentivise 
corporate managers and owners to engage in poor corporate governance practices. The recent 
World Bank study on shell companies provides numerous examples of poor corporate 
governance allowing companies using shell companies to siphon away money.
 
re 
in 
 
names include Deutsche Bank, Dah Sing Bank, HSBC, and 
ociete Generale. Hong Kong’s legal and financial advisors clearly participated in dubious and 
opaque practices not in the long-term interests of their clients.  
 
                                                
298 A Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision communiqué signed by several officials from tax havens 
such as Jersey, Bermuda, Cayman, and Guernsey -- urged the closing of shell banks and offsho
booking centres in 2003.299 Yet, over the subsequent decade, nothing happened. As shown in 
Figure 56, the Panama Papers data indicate that at least 12 offshore banks and 3 intermediaries 
Hong Kong had dealings with Mossack Fonseca. These numbers may not appear large. But 
taking into account finance and securities companies as well, over 500 companies had a touch
with Hong Kong. Some famous 
S
 
297 For the last factor, we simply searched on the key word “corporate governance” – thus we do not try to dig too 
deeply into exactly what the experts categorizing under that rubrique.  
298 See Willebois, Emily, Emily Halter, Robert Harrison, Ji Won Park, and J.C. Sharman, The Puppet Masters: How 
the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It, 2011, available online. For 
example, Anglo-Leasing  (Kenya) won a lucrative government tender to supply passport services at a cost five times 
higher than the lowest bidder. This UK mailbox-registered company subcontracted to the French firm who actually 
rld in order to engage in, and hide, bribe 
on, Shell Banks and Booking Offices, 2003, available online
put in the lowest bid to do the work. In another case, investigators found that DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia 
SAO sent improper payments to 25 bank accounts scattered around the wo
payments. Without these avenues to launder money, these firms’ corporate governance might have been better.  
299 Basel Committee on Banking Supervisi .  
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The Panama Papers illustrated the role that accountants, lawyers, corporate secretarial service 
providers and other professional firms played in distributing shell companies. Hong Kong’s 
authorities will be unlikely to fight shell company incorporations without a legal approach able to 
sanction professional service providers at home and in foreign jurisdictions. Figure 57 shows the 
percent of professional services firms accepting an approach to provide a shell company to an 
individual posing as a client engaged in illegal/unethical conduct.300 Hong Kong’s professionals 
refuse suspicious applications for shell companies far more often than other jurisdictions. Yet, as 
figure 58 shows, Hong Kong’s law firms lodge only a small fraction of suspicious transaction 
reports as financial services firms.301 Even if Hong Kong’s lawyers do not help Mainland 
businesspersons set up shell companies in order to launder money, they probably know about 
such attempts. Hong Kong’s significant investment and trade relationships with many of these 
countries – including the US and UK – mean that fraudulent companies can work with Hong 
ong “through the back door.” K
 
                                                 
300 See Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson, and Jason Sharman, Global Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers’ an
Terrorist Financiers’ Access to Shell Compan
d 
ies, 2012, available online. 
line
301 See Mulrenan, Stephen, Asia: Panama Papers – No News Is Good News, International Bar Association’s Global 
Insight June/July, 2016, available on . 
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Figure 57: Hong Kong's Dodgy Professional Service Partners Abroad 
The figure show s the percent of professional service providers w illing to set up a shell company for academics 
posing as terrorists or persons w ith questionable motives. We have subtracted the original data from 100 (as the 
original data show ed the percent refusing to provide services). The tax havens themselves are clean. Their clients
how ever, very easily facilitate the creation of shell companies.                                     Source: Findley et al. (2012).
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Figure 58: Less than 2% of Hong Kong's Suspicious Transaction 
Reports from Law Firms 
      110    .
      235    .       222    .
      894    .
The figure show s the number of suspicious transaction reports f iled w ith Hong Kong 's anti-money laundering 
agency for the period show n.  The black boxes show  the number of these reports from law  firms...roughly 2% of
them. More than 2% of Hong Kong's legal advisors must know  that their clients, using their services, are up to no 
good. Source: Hong Kong's Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (2016). 
 
rate secretarial firms. 
 Hong Kong’s Law 
 
Lawyers, accountants and other intermediaries should use the same client handling procedures 
and risk management procedures as those used in banks and the large corpo
At the most extreme, these include procedures aimed at money laundering and the finance of 
terrorism – a topic which Hong Kong has wholeheartedly embraced.302 In Hong Kong, the recent 
conviction of a lawyer for money laundering signals a willingness to engage law firms in the 
fight against money laundering and complicity with corporate crime.303
Society issued its Practice Direction P in 2008 as way to tackle money laundering by making 
lawyers better identify and verify clients, conduct more risk-focused customer due diligence, and 
                                                 
302 For some of the rules which the UK’s Solicitors Regulatory Agency has promulgated to reduce the risk that 
lawyers abet money laundering, see UK Solicitors Regulatory Agency, Cleaning Up: Law Firms and the Risk of 
Money Laundering, 2014, available online. For a more cross-jurisdictional approach, see Stephen Revell, Stephen 
and Kevin Shepherd, A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering: A Collaborative 
Publication of the International Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe, 2014, available online. 
303 See So, Peter, Solicitor Convicted of Money Laundering, Deacons Litigation & Dispute Resolution Newsletter 4
November, 2014, available 
 
online.  
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keep better records.304 The HKICPA has issued guidance for accounting firms on handling 
money laundering.305 The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries has recently promulgat
a Guideline and associated accreditation scheme for members interested in certifying their 
compliance with key money laundering provisions.
ed 
t 
 
tion 
an the 
 
ch 
ors 
to its 
                                                
306 Yet, provisions like those applied to the 
banking sector look unlikely in the medium-term due to the extra costs they would impose on 
Hong Kong’s professional services sector.307 Even if these organisations manage to implemen
these regulations, available econometric evidence shows that few clients/members would 
comply.308 Social and political pressures explain why so many jurisdictions – like Hong Kong –
have adopted money laundering regulations but have not enforced them very successfully.309 
Board members can not simply divorce money laundering rules from the broader transforma
in improving overall corporate governance.310 Lawmakers need to adopt better rules th
current anti-money laundering regulations in order to incentivise companies to improve
their corporate governance.   
 
Nothing requires Hong Kong’s professional services firms to move toward a risk-based approa
toward clients which could detect high risk clients with poor corporate governance practices (and 
at little extra cost to themselves). Nothing in the Solicitor’s Practice Ordinance requires solicit
to look at clients’ risks (or any kind of risks affecting the practice).311 Hong Kong should not 
follow the US’s “gatekeeper” approach to introducing risk-based assessment and risk 
management into the legal and other service professions.312 The UK’s Solicitors Regulatory 
Authority and the UK Law Society have best “mainstreamed” such a risk-based approach in
 
304 For the Practice Direction, and related Circular 07-726 and Circular 02-384, see Huang, Lester and Lintern-Smith, 
Michael, The New Practice Direction P and Its Implications, Law Society of Hong Kong Training Materials, 2008, 
available online.  
305 See Anti-Money Laundering Bulletin: Requirements on Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing 
and Related Matters, HKICPA Anti-Money Laundering Bulletin 1, 2015, available online.  
306 See HKICS, The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist
Financing Guideli
 
ne, 2016, available online. See also HKICS, The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Charter, 2016, available online. 
307 As usual, the government has not performed any rigorous economic study looking at the costs and benefits of its
regulations. For a journalistic account, see S
 
hih, Toh, Money Laundering Law Could Extend to Non-Financial Firms, 
 onlineSouth China Morning Post 28 May, 2014, available . 
 308 For the data, see Verdugo, Concepcion, Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from a
Cross-Country Analysis, IMF Working Paper WP/11/177, 2011, available online. 
309 See Sharman, JC., The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime and Developing Countries: Damned if t
Damned if they Don’
hey Do, 
t? U4 Working Paper, 2006, available online. 
ers. See Bruemmer, Russell and Elijah Alper, AML: A Corporate Governance Issue 
310 Bruemmer and Alper do an excellent job at explaining in details the broader change needed in board-level 
education and risk assessment. For her part, Loughrey describes adriotly the problems with simply delegating 
“compliance” to in-house lawy
The Banking Law Journal Nov/Dec, 2013, available online. See also Loughrey, Joan,  Corporate Lawyers and 
Corporate Governance, 2011.   
311 Specifically Rule 2 on general conduct does not mention the need of solicitors to identify or manage risks. See 
Solicitor Practice Rules, Chap 159H, 1997 (and updated several times subsequently), available online. 
312 Shephard describes in great length all the various documents and initiatives created as a way to encourage lawyers 
to adopt the risk-based approach to money laundering and corporate malfeasance which is quickly becoming the 
norm in the services. See Shepherd, Kevin, The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due 
Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, 2010, available online. 
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le k to 
m rly, 
n ety 
o
approach as a m
and practices by certified public accountants.”315 Even in the Companies Ordinance, nothing 
uires boards to set up risk committees or manage risks like staff complicity in money 
316 ies 
 
ns as 
 
c rage compliance with corporate governance and other 
321
gal services industry.313 Moreover, the Authority issued new rules as part of its Handboo
ove toward the wider adoption of principles-based, outcomes-based regulation.314 Simila
othing in Hong Kong’s Professional Accountants Ordinance encourages the Hong Kong Soci
f Accountants or the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants to adopt a risk-based 
eans to accomplish one its primary tasks as to “discourage dishonourable conduct 
req
laundering or other financial crime.  While the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretar
imposes based-based guidelines on its members, the Institute makes no mention of internal rules 
about its own risk management practices (if any).317  Hong Kong’s legal, accounting and 
corporate services firms – like their clients – also need to modernise their corporate 
governance practices (in one way by adopting a risk-based approach in managing their 
customers and their own corporate governance issues).  
 
Thus, in our to continue Hong Kong’s adoption of principles-based, outcome-driven law, our 
nineteenth recommendation notes that law firms, accounting firms and corporate services firms in
Hong Kong law may usefully adopt requirements on professional service firms and corporate 
boards to set up risk committees and a risk register – as well as adopt a risk-based approach to 
compliance.318 Unlike at present, such an approach would cover more than just money 
laundering.319 Such an approach would reduce the need for extensive and detailed regulatio
well as costly compliance systems – thus saving listed firms and others money.320 Such an
pproach would also probably en oua
regulations.   
 
                                                 
313 The Authority has produced a number of clearly written, easily found reference materials describing the use of 
such a risk-based approach. See UK Solicitors Regulatory Authority, SRA Risk Framework, 2008, available online. 
See also UK Law Society, The Risk-Based Approach – What Is It?, 2008, available online.  
314 Aon Risk Solutions, Professional Services Group Risk Registers – A Practical Approach for Solicitors, 2013, 
available online. 
315 See Professional Accountants Ordinance Chapter 50, 2004, at sec. 7, available online.  
316 The only related requirement concerns directors’ disclosure of risks in their report. See Companies Ordinance, 
Chap. 622, at schedule 5, available online. 
317 See HKICS, About Us, 2016, available online. 
er 
rinciples into company law and the sectoral rules governing the financial sector. See Sun, William 
ded results only for 
 
318 Recent analyses of the global financial crisis of 2007-8 have particularly stressed the need to introduce broad
risk management p
Jim Stewart, David Pollard (Eds.), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International 
Perspectives, 2011.  
319 In contrast to the UK or US, most of our searches on risk-based approaches in Hong Kong yiel
banks and financial service firms and/or only for money laundering risks. See SFC, AML/CFT Self-Assessment
Checklist, available online. 
320 The cost savings represent one of the key reasons for most professions (especially banking) to advocate such risk-
based approaches. For a fuller description, see Ford, Christie, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based 
Securities Regulation, American Business Law Journal 45(1), 2008, available online. 
321 We have already shown evidence that firms fail to comply with corporate governance and money laundering 
and regulations because of their cost and complexity. Such a results-based, risk-oriented focus might thus lower costs 
encourage compliance. See Harvey, Jackie, Compliance and reporting issues arising for financial institutions from 
money laundering regulations: a preliminary cost benefit study, Journal of Money Laundering Control 7(4), 2006, 
available online.  
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R f 
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p  adopt 
“ ilar test) when deciding on regulation and taxation?327 
ediaries’ practices which encourage opacity contribute to good corporate 
overnance of these intermediaries’ companies and their clients? The academic literature seems 
 show that, in the longer run, lawmakers tend to ban these practices exactly because of scandals 
ke the Panama Papers imbroglio.328 Stakeholders in the corporate ecosystem prefer transparency 
                                              
 
Policymakers can reform the intermediaries that enabled poor corporate governance across 
countries and industries. As the ICIJ – the group who brought the Panama Papers to light – noted 
“the offshore system relies on a sprawling global industry of bankers, lawyers, accountants and 
these go-betweens who work together to protect their clients’ secrets. These secrecy experts
anonymous companies, trusts and other paper entities to create complex structures that can be 
used to disguise the origins of dirty money.”322 Most analysts wrongly focus on legality of the 
structures and rules used by Mossack Fonseca and others to create and use offshore 
corporations.323 They also wrongly focus on the narrow, specific results of establishing offshore
companies – in avoiding taxes.324 The inability of lawmakers to change the domestic legisla
that allows intermediaries to set up offshore entities results from the wrong conclusions used by
critics of these rules. As we already showed, the real harm resulting from the rules which 
enabled Mossack Fonseca stemmed from the opacity which enabled the no corporate 
governance of the offshore entities themselves and the poor corporate governance of 
ompanies associated with them.
Recommendation 19: Eventually adjust the Solicitors Practice Ordinance, Professional 
Accountants Ordinance and the Companies Ordinance to reflect the obligation/right for 
professional services firms and company boards to adopt a risk-management perspective as 
way of dealing with compliance and risk – as well as scrutinize high-risk clients by extra 
monitoring. 
 
325  c
 
egulatory amendments should thus focus on the corporate governance consequences o
termediaries’ setting up offshore structures – and not on ethics.326 What role will intermediarie
lay in setting up and operating offshore companies when tax authorities around the world
place of effective management” (or a sim
Do rules and interm
g
to
li
   
2 ICIJ, Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, 2016, available 
nline
32
o . 
323 See Harrington, Brooke, Panama Papers: The Real Scandal Is What's Legal, Atlantic Monthly 6 April, 2016, 
available online.  
324 The Guardian represents one of the countless media outlets portraying the Panama Papers Scandal in a s
light because of the negative effects these offshore entities had on tax collection. See Garside, Juliette, Fund run by 
David Cameron’s fat
ombre 
her avoided paying tax in Britain, Guardian 4 April, 2016, available online. 
n 
325 Some rules do focus on governance in particular areas – like fund management. Yet, the rules most concern 
offshore structures as investments rather than as companies in their own right. See Chambers, Mark and Darre
Bacon, Offshore Funds: Committed to Corporate Governance, PLC Magazine April, 2012, available online.  
326 Such a focus reflects a broader push in the social sciences to judge law by its systemic consequences rather tha
by normative criteria. Fo
n 
r an excellent review, see Scheffer, David,  The Ethical Imperative of Curbing Corporate 
Tax Avoidance, Ethics & International Affairs 27(4), 2013, available online. 
327 See Gutuza, Tracy, Has Recent United Kingdom Case Law Affected the Interplay between Place of Effe
Management and Controlled Foreign Comp
ctive 
anies, South Africa Mercantile Law Journal 24, 2012, available online. 
per 297, 2004, available online
328 For an unusually lucid (even if somewhat dated) account, see Romano, Roberta, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, Yale Law & Econ Research Pa .  
 83
because of the better decisions coming from perfect-ish informational.329 Authors like Dallas 
governance to such as a degree as to 
ontribute to the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  Against this background, corporate governance 
 as 
 to 
nal 
 
ch enhanced – rather 
an hinders – transparency. The Mossack Fonseca case threw the transparency of professional 
service firms themselves into the spotlight. We do not recommend the prohibition or 
deincentivisation of professional services firms from enabling tax or regulatory avoidance. 
Instead, we note better governed firms – including professional services firms – engage in less 
avoidance, using loopholes and skirting the law.332 Thus, as professional associations and bodies 
encourage transparency and good corporate governance, such work will discourage the kind of 
activities which represent reputation risks for intermediaries and their clients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
have noted that lack of transparency distorted corporate 
330c
rules have increasingly moved away from requiring transparency for specific activities and 
toward a general “presumption of transparency” (that the company shall report and disclosure
the default option unless such disclosures cause harm).331  
 
Our twentieth recommendation thus ties together the discussion about transparency and a 
promoting risk-based approach in companies as well as the intermediaries who work with them
set up offshore structures. In line with the evolving of transparency, Hong Kong’s professio
bodies and associations (like the Law Society, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries) should encourage 
transparency – rather than confidentiality – as a corporate governance “default position.” Rules
for the professions should encourage these professions to provide advice whi
th
Recommendation 20: The Law Society, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries to adopt professional rules 
to include a presumption of transparency which discourages the supply and demand for 
legal/regulatory avoidance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
329 In theory, no information can be complete and perfect (as an economist would understand it). For an analysis of 
the incentives which drive information and corporate governance, see Bushman, Robert and Abbie Smith, 
Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance, Economic Policy Review 9(1), 2003, 
available online.  
330 While most scholars agree about the lack of transparency in securitisation, most still do not agree on the extent to 
ing about consequences more difficult. For a comprehensive analysis, see 
w 37, 
which opacity contributed to the crisis. Dallas might argue that lack of information leads to short-termism, as 
constrained information makes guess
Dallas, Lynne, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, Journal of Corporation La
2011, available online.  
331 Such a presumption fits in with the corporate governance-as-relationship view that the 2014 UK Code of 
Corporate Governance adopts. See UK Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(September 2014), 2014, available online. 
332 For more proof, see Kerr, Jon, Richard Price and Francisco Roman, The Effect of Corporate Governance on Tax 
, available onlineAvoidance: Evidence from Governance Reform, 2016 . 
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Shutting Out the Major Useless Incorporation Centres  
 
Hong Kong belongs to a network of offshore financial centres. Figure 59 shows the jurisdiction 
and number of Hong Kong’s listed companies. The British Virgin Islands plays a key role in
Hong Kong’s foreign investment and incorporation business. Hong Kong could plausibly attrac
productive companies from the US, UK, Singapore, and the Mainland. But what productive 
enterprise needs investment in the Cayman Islands, the BVI or Liberia? The Mossack F
hack revealed Hong Kong’s importance in the wider networks of offshore companies cycling
money to each other.
 
t 
onseca 
 
any jurisdictions 
owadays, one must ask what benefits do Hong Kong companies get from incorporating 
 
333 Yet, given the wide-spread adoption of anti-money laundering and 
related regulations across the financial centres, combined with low taxes in m
n
elsewhere? Given Hong Kong’s regulatory similarity with the BVI and other offshore centres,
why would companies need these other offshore centres’ services at all?334  
 
 
 
The Mainland has already started regulating away corporate structures incorporated in offshore 
ain function consists of skirting taxes and other rules.335 Like many 
 
financial centres whose m
jurisdictions, the Mainland has implemented this by adopting General Anti-Avoidance Rules in
areas like its tax law.336 Two key principles the government – and thus business – have slowly 
adopted comprises "substance over form" and "reasonable commercial purpose" tests. Circular 
                                                 
333 See Kinetz, Erika and Kelvin Chan, Hong Kong Emerges as Hub for Creating Offshore Companies, AP The Big 
Story April, 2016, available online. 
334 For more on this convergence, see Sharman, J., Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money 
Laundering in Developing States, International Studies Quarterly 52(3), 2008, available online. 
 Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR): Lessons Learned from Recent Enforcement Cases, 2010, 
335 Most of the material in this section comes from Ross and Zhou. See Ross, Lester and Kenneth Zhou, Application 
of China's General
available online. See also McDermott Will & Emery, China’s New General Anti-Avoidance Rules: An Overview, 
2015, available online.                  
336 PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law, 2008, at art. 47 
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[2009] No. 698 in particular requires the disclosure (to the government at least) of any “indirect” 
offshore transaction and requires tax payment if the rules in the jurisdiction allow the payment of 
12.5% in tax and/or no tax on foreign income.337 If the foreign entity represents a “conduit” for 
the original Chinese company, the tax authorities can charge 10% withholding tax. Order 32 from 
2014 provides more concrete guidance.338 Yang has estimated that the Chinese government 
collects RMB60 billion (roughly $9 billion) more in revenue from the requirement. Such rules 
promote good corporate governance by discouraging companies from building complex corporate 
and tax relationships in an effort to subvert the tax rules. Chinese and global law has 
increasingly adopted legitimate economic purpose tests as a way to benefit government 
(through increased revenue) and corporations themselves (by removing perverse incentives 
to use poor corporate governance practices as a way of saving money).   
 
 
t 
Kong 
y to 
                                                
Anti-avoidance tax rules in Hong Kong also lay the foundation for a wider-spread legitimate 
economic purpose test. The Hong Kong tax code in particular requires tax assessors to consider 
the “the form and substance of the transaction” (much like the Mainland rules) and the intent 
(whether for reasonable commercial purposes or simply to obtain a tax benefit).339 While Hong
Kong’s tax code has not adopted the reasonable commercial purpose language, its “dominan
purpose” test basically serves the same purpose.340 As shown in Figure 60, Yang provides a 
fascinating account of the way the “reasonable commercial purposes” test evolved in Hong 
and on the Mainland.341 On the Mainland, the tax authorities over time expanded their abilit
apply the test. In contrast, the principle itself consisted of seven sub-tests and Hong Kong’s 
courts weakened the provision by ruling against the tax authorities on numerous occasions. 
Despite Hong Kong’s hostility to applying a “reasonable commercial purposes test,” the 
principle is not foreign to Hong Kong law and practice.    
 
 
337 The rule unrealistically requires the foreign seller to make the declaration to the Chinese tax authorities – thus 
non-compliance should be the norm. Yet, the principles of anti-avoidance are slowly gaining in importance in the 
01 (all of 2009) outline the general principles 
eria for applying these principles.   
daily life of corporate China. Circular 81, Circular 124 and Circular 6
and crit
338 See Administrative Measures for General Anti-avoidance Rules (SAT Order [2014] No. 32, available online. For
an overview and analysis, see E&Y, China Released Administrative Measures for General Anti-Avoidance Rules 
(GAAR), China Tax & Investment News CTIN2014002, 2014, available 
 
online. 
339 See Inland Revenue Ordinance, CAP. 112, at art. 61a. The rule does not require or define the principles
legitimate commercial purpose test like the one we describe in this article. We thus interpret the converse of 
structuring a transaction or party to obtain a tax benefit as a legitimate commercial purpose.   
340 IRD, DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATIO
 of a 
N AND PRACTICE NOTES NO. 15(REVISED), 2006, at para 33, 
available online.  
341 Yang, Ya-Ting, China (People's Rep.)/Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of the General Anti-Avoidance Rules of 
Mainland China and Hong Kong – Legislation, Interpretation and Application, Bulletin for International Taxation 
70(7), 2016, available online. 
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ur twenty-first recommendation thus consists of introducing a legitimO ate economic purpose test 
in k 
p
ta
p b-articles basically apply a legitimate economic 
p
“
(s es 
w  logic behind the prohibitions contained in those 
articles. Similarly, any intermediary transacting with a company whose structure obviously lack
 legitimate economic purpose (like a manufacturer or service provider incorporated in the 
ted 
dealing with these problems than approaches like the US of simply outlawing certain types of 
panies.346 
                    
to Hong Kong’s tax code, listing rules and in financial service provider/intermediaries’ ris
rofiles. Section 61 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance allows the tax authorities to assess extra 
xes for “any transaction which reduces or would reduce the amount of tax payable by any 
rson [if] artificial or fictitious.”342 The three sue
urpose test by targeting “transactions designed to avoid liability for tax” (article 61a), 
utilization of losses to avoid tax” (section 61b) and “Avoidance arrangement of no effect” 
ection 61c).343 Making such a legitimate economic purpose test more explicit in those articl
uld help ensure that businesses understand theo
s 
a
Bahamas) clearly should represent a higher commercial risk.344 The listing rules should 
furthermore require a local incorporation or incorporation in the jurisdiction where the lis
company makes and/or sells its goods and services.345  
 
Hong Kong’s comply-or-explain culture of corporate governance provides a superiour way of 
behaviour. For years, progressive US lawmakers have sought to outlaw shell com
Indeed, several studies summarised by Morriss and Henson, show that many of Hong Kong’s 
offshore partner jurisdictions (like the BVI) do not have lax regulations.347 Instead, foreign 
companies would have additional comply-or-explain requirements based around its conduct in its 
                             
342 Inland Revenue Ordinance, sec. 61, 1986/2012, available online. 
343 Id.  
344 Many experts have documented the risks of transacting with offshore entities – in the lack of recourse to certain 
laws (like bankruptcy law) and anonymity which stifles accountability. See Global Witness and Global Financ
Integrity, Chancing It: How Secret Company Ownership is a Risk to Investors, 2016, av
ial 
ailable online. 
345 Even if the exchange and companies do not completely adhere to the rule, at least the jurisdictions of 
incorporation will show more variation than at present (as shown in figure 59). For a look at the US’s offshore-
incorporated listed firms, see SEC, Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2014, available online. 
346 Wayne, Leslie, Stars start to align for bill to outlaw shell corporations, ICIJ Global Muckraker 2014, available 
online.  
347 Morriss, Andrew and Clifford Henson, Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers, Virginia Jo
of International Law 53(2), 2013, av
urnal 
ailable online. 
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home market/jurisdiction of incorporation.348 Indeed, Luo and Steven E. Salterio find that 
comply-or-explain regulatory schemes boost market valuations more than other types – showing
the wider value of this approach.
 
e 
d 
s 
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d  
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s s the term 
  
349 Thus, maybe Hong Kong’s code of corporate governanc
(and its disclose-or-explain rules) provides the best framework for regulating disclosures aroun
these offshore incorporated entities.  
 
Our twenty-second recommendation deals with incorporating the legitimate economic purpose 
concept into Hong Kong’s code of corporate governance. As we have shown, complex and 
opaque offshore structures harm shareholder value and allow poor corporate governance practice
to abound.350 If such offshore structures actually produce real and substantial benefits, these
companies should explain them to the public – as required by Hong Kong’s code of corporate 
governance.351 Indeed, such disclosures may well help academics and policymakers better 
understand the benefits of allowing such offshore incorporations.352 
 
Recommendation 21: Introduce an explicit “legitimate economic purpose test” in article 
61/61a into the Inland Revenue Ordinance (during the next major legal revision), in offshore 
listing
 
ecommendation 22: Add a provision to the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance 
hes the 
s, and in risk profiling clients/partners.  
R
requiring companies to confirm that the jurisdiction they have incorporated in matc
firm’s economic purpose, or explain why not.  
 
ther innovations in tax law might help inspire changes to the broader legal framework in the
ght against corporate maladministration. Notably, Hong Kong’s adoption of anti-abuse 
octrines in its tax sphere might usefully serve to promote better corporate governance in the
sting sphere. Hong Kong is a member of an OECD group working on regulations designed
top treaty abuse that Mossack Fonseca’s clients exploited so widely.353 That forum use
                                               
34 KEx, What is "comply or explain"?, 2016, available online8 H . 
34 lterio, Governance Quality in a “Comply or Explain” Governance Disclosure Regime, 
rporate Governance: An International Review 22(6), 2014, available online
9 Yan Luo and Steven Sa
Co .  
0 Numerous academic studies find that shareholders would balk at offshore incorporations if given the chance. Such 
results confirm our own conclusions – as such incorporations can kill shareholder value. See Johnson, Holub, 
Questioning Organizational Legitimacy: The Case of U.S. Expatriates, Journal of Business Ethics 47(3), 2003, 
available online
35
.      
351 A number of academics argue in favour of leaving offshore incorporations unregulated. Yet, if disclosure and 
transparency help markets to work better, these authors should not object to full public disclosure of the benefits 
these offshore structures endow. See Fisch, Jill, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate 
Governance, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 37, 2013, available online. See also Kamar, Ehud, Beyond 
Competition for Incorporations, Georgetown Law Journal 94, 2006, available online.  
352 We understand very poorly the benefits of offshore incorporation (besides the obvious tax benefits). For a 
discussion of this lack of understanding, see Buckley, Peter, Dylan Sutherland, Hinrich Voss, Ahmad El-Gohari, The 
Economic Geography of Offshore Incorporation in Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centres: The Case of Chinese 
MNEs, Journal of Economic Geography 15(1), 2015, available online.  
353 The G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project has developed common regulations aimed at reducing 
the tax loopholes which incentivize poor corporate governance on the Mainland as elsewhere. See OECD, BEPS 
Actions, 2016, available online. For a list of members, see OECD, Inclusive Framework Composition: BEPS 
Members, 2016, available online. 
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Principal Purpose Test as a rough equivalent to the reasonable commercial purpose test we 
described previously.354 Yet, at presen ission’s authorisation 
fo n rule-
fo
S sting 
R s 
s
t, the Securities and Futures Comm
r companies incorporated abroad to list and transact in Hong Kong depends more o
llowing rather than the actual purpose and result of these rules.355 As the SFC’s Joint Policy 
tatement regarding the listing of overseas companies from September 2013 notes, the “Li
ules require an overseas company to demonstrate that its jurisdiction of incorporation ha
hareholder protection standards at least equivalent to those of Hong Kong. If this is not p
verseas companies can achieve equivalent standards by varying their constitutive documents
rovide them” (underlining ours).356 For the BVI specifically, the HKEx Country Guide find
 granting authorisation for BVI companies to list in Hong Kong, that “we do not consider 
VI’s shareholder protection standards to be materially different to our own.”357 As describ
igure 61, the HKEx (and SFC for that matter) have broad discretion over the recogniti
reign corporate governance and other standards. They do not describe the extent to
ent (rather than simple compare-and-contrast of law) plays a role 
ossible, 
o  to 
p s – 
in
B ed in 
F on of 
fo  which risk 
assessm in determining who can 
li
 
     
st.  
 
 
Figure 61: Who Empowers the Exchange to Regulate Foreign Companie
Listed in Hong Kong? 
 
Where does the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s authority to regulate foreign-listed 
companies come from? This so far academic question has practical applications if Hong 
Kong is to adopt more corporate-governance-friendly listing rules covering foreign 
companies (especially from the Mainland). The Securities and Futures Ordinance giv
the Securities and Futures Commission the power to 
s 
es 
deal with foreign regulators and 
uthorities.* A Memorandum of Understanding delegates that authority to the Hong Kong 
t, just how far 
agreements with foreign authorities represent ‘international relations?’ (a political 
question to be sure) as prohibited in Hong Kong’s Basic Law. 
a
Stock Exchange to regulate day-to-day listing matters and trading.** Ye
does that authority extend? Can the Exchange travel to these companies abroad and make 
determinations about corporate governance-related matters? Do certain types of SFC 
 
continued on next page 
                                            
n that context, lawmakers seek to regulate the holding companies whose structures muddy corporate relationsh
 reduce tran
354 I ips 
and sparency to the outside work. See Juliana Dantas, Henny Verboom and Stephan Behnes, BEPS action 
: Preventing treaty abuse - a threat to holding structures? 2016 available online6 . 
5 For a list of countries (and the extra rules needed for each), see SFC, List of Acceptable Overseas Jurisdictions, 
2016, available online
35
. 
356 See SFC and HKEx, Joint policy statement regarding the listing of overseas companies, 2013, available online. 
nline357 See HKEx, Country Guide – British Virgin Islands, 2014, available o . 
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The Panama Papers experience teaches us that the Exchange should regulate the practices of 
shareholder protectio
Figure 61 continued... 
 
Where does the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s authority to regulate foreign-listed 
companies come from? This so far academic question has practical applications if Hong 
Kong is to adopt more corporate-governance-friendly listing rules covering foreign 
companies (especially from the Mainland). The Securities and Futures Ordinance gives 
the Securities and Futures Commission the power to deal with foreign regulators and 
authorities.* A Memorandum of Understanding delegates that authority to the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange to regulate day-to-day listing matters and trading.** Yet, just how far 
does that authority extend? Can the Exchange travel to these companies abroad and make 
determinations about corporate governance-related matters? Do certain types of SFC 
agreements with foreign authorities represent ‘international relations?’ (a political 
question to be sure) as prohibited in Hong Kong’s Basic Law. 
 
We do not have the space to do a full analysis here. Tradition has clearly sided with the 
HKEx imposing these rules.*** Why does the authority to recognise other jurisdictions’ 
corporate governance standards fall to the SFC and the HKEx? hW y don’t foreign 
companies listed on the exchange have so few rights to take decisions about the Exchange 
and its policies when they constitute over 40% of listing companies? Why does listing in 
Hong Kong give the Hong Kong government the right to determine the corporate 
governance standards of foreign companies operating in foreign jurisdictions? While we 
base our recommendations on the common understanding of existing law, the legal purist 
may feel very uneasy with the authority the HKEx (and even the SFC) use to justify 
regulating foreign companies listed in Hong Kong.  
 
* Securities and Futures Ordinance at 5(1.h) available online 
** Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Listing Matters, at 2.4 available online. 
*** The Hong Kong Stock Exchange represents one of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited’s 
subsidiaries.  
n rather than simply standards. Clearly, the legitimate economic purpose test 
y to 
 
vernance and enforcement practices to provide them” (bold 
and anti-abuse provisions we discussed previously focus more on intent and action – rather than 
just written regulations and policies. The SFC and HKEx should focus more on practice in 
foreign jurisdictions and by foreign companies than on their printed policies. The easiest wa
introduce such changes into the way we relate to (and regulate) companies’ behaviour abroad
consists of amending the Joint Statement, so that the second paragraph reads: 
 
“Listing Rules require an overseas company to demonstrate that its jurisdiction of incorporation has 
shareholder protection standards and practices at least equivalent to those of Hong Kong. If this is 
not possible, overseas companies can achieve equivalent standards and practice by varying their 
constitutive documents as well as go
ours).358 
 
                                                 
358 SFC and HKEx, Joint policy statement regarding the listing of overseas companies, 2013, at para 2, available 
online. The bold words and phrases represent our suggested additions.  
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What kind of jurisdiction/company characteristics might attract limitations on foreign companies’ 
stings or rights to conduct business in Hong Kong? The Panama Papers pointed to four practices 
t, 
rs.  
d in 
s 
e 
se shelf 
iously had no legitimate economic purpose when incorporated. These rules have 
aditionally corresponded with companies having poor/little actual corporate governance – 
a , 
m
 
N  Kong 
a
re
exchange (on the m onth period ending in February 2016 consisted of 
s
e ns 
in .365 
F
  
li
in particular that undermine corporate governance in the wider business environment.359 Firs
rules that allow or encourage mailbox company colonies (or large numbers of corporations based 
out of a mail centre or building in which none of these companies’ economic activity occu 360
Second, rules requiring foreign-only operation of companies (namely companies incorporate
a particular jurisdiction are forbidden from operating in that jurisdiction).361 If these jurisdiction
consider the company unfit to operate within their borders, why would they consider them mor
fit to operate abroad? Third, domestic rules allow for directors meetings with individuals who 
have no knowledge of the companies they supposedly govern and shareholder meetings 
conducted as a formality without any important company policies or decisions being discussed. 
Fourth, rules that allowing for the sale and subsequent operation shelf companies – as the
companies obv
tr
nd provide ways for corruption and fraud to undermine corporate governance in larger
ore established companies on the Mainland and elsewhere.362  
aturally, shell and shelf companies pose significant risks to corporate governance in Hong
nd outside.363  If judged by media reports, the dire current situation begs for additional 
gulation. These reports claim that 40% of the 22 companies listed on Hong Kong’s stock 
ain board) for the three m
hell companies.364 Share price volatility of these listed shell companies make the harms to 
quity markets and corporate governance in general obvious – with 56 companies’ valuatio
creasing by more than 1,000% between 3013 and 2015, despite 39 of them losing money
ew can document the corporate governance practices of many shell companies that have other 
                                               
9 Alibaba (a Chinese technology company) illustrates35  the risks and potential harms of non-transparent governance 
o n offshore incorporation entity. See Lin, Yu-Hsin and Thomas Mehaffy, Open Sesame: The Myth of Alibaba's 
E
2
f a
xtreme Corporate Governance and Control, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 10, 
016, available online.  
0 Numerous stories and studies have shown that these mailbox company colonies aim to avoid taxation rather t
 enable more productive corporate operations. For a rece
36 han 
to nt case where authorities required changes to complicate
overnance structures, see Drucker, Jesse and Jeremy Kahn, U.K.'s Tax Deal With Google Wasn't Just About 
ffshore Havens, Bloomberg February, 2016, available online
d 
g
O .  
361 Under the International Business Companies Act, BVI companies are “ring fenced” – meaning they can not 
m, 
ns, International Tax and Public Finance 23(1), 2016, available online
conduct business domestically. Numerous studies show the harms of these provisions. See Schjelderup, Guttor
Secrecy jurisdictio .     
aper 
nal Pressure Makes Offshore Lawyers Change Tack, International Financial 
362 Williams explains why authorities like Hong Kong’s need to focus on regulatory consequences as well as 
conduct-effects. -- as offshore financial centres modify their financial services to avoid tightening regulation world-
wide. The only successful approach, in light of such market adaptation, requires moving away from looking at p
rules. See Williams, Thomas, Internatio
Law Review 21(24), 2002, available online. 
363 We do not have space to list these harms. See Global Financial Integrity and Global Witness, Chancing It: How
Secret Company O
 
wnership is a Risk to Investors, 2016, available online. 
 364 See Yam, Shirley, Hong Kong’s Red-Hot Corporate Shell Game is Cause for Concern. South China Morning Post
February, 2016, available online.   
365 Robertson, Benjamin, Jeanny Yu and Eduard Gismatullin, The Magical Transformation of Hong Kong’s Listed
Companies, Bloom
 
berg July, 2016, available online. 
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shell companies as directors and shareholders.366 Hong Kong’s disclosure regime should thus 
with them.  
nted 
s 
include shell companies, special purpose vehicles and the companies that work 
 
Hong Kong’s code of corporate governance should introduce a special section for offshore, 
shell/shelf, special purpose vehicles and conduit companies. Numerous studies have docume
both the good and bad sides of using these kinds of structures.367 Most authors argue that 
regulators should not try to “fix” these structures – but rather increase their transparency.368 
Requiring that special purpose vehicles have a unique designation (like SPV rather than Ltd. or 
Inc.) can help ensure parties understand the nature of the entity they do business with. If these 
entities truly are companies, then why do they not issue the same large corporate governance 
reports as the traded entities that use them? Numerous studies have described how to modify 
accounting and reporting procedures for these entities.369 The following four recommendation
thus keep in line with Hong Kong’s policy directives aimed at increasing disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
 
 
                                                 
366 Zarroli, Jim, Want To Set Up A Shell Corporation To Hide Your Millions? No Problem, NPR April, 20
Recommendation 23: Introduce rules in the Listing Rules companies from jurisdictions (or 
companies which transact with them) which require additional due diligence and a 
classification as a high risk entity if that company’s jurisdiction allows or encourages: a) 
mailbox company colonies, b) foreign-only operation and c) directors and shareholder 
meetings with individuals having little knowledge of the companies they affiliate with, and 
d) sale and operation of shelf companies.  
 
Recommendation 24: Introduce a provision in the Code of Corporate Governance to 
require companies conducting any transactions with a shell company, offshore company 
from the BVI, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, or other jurisdictions decided by the HKEx to 
disclose such business and the nature of that business.  
 
Recommendation 25: Require SPV at end of company name (like Limited) to designate 
that the entity is a special purpose vehicle. 
 
Recommendation 26: Require offshore, shell/shelf, special purpose vehicles, and “hollow” 
holding companies to issue corporate governance reports outlining their operations in the 
same way that normal companies do.   
16, 
available online.  
367 Ahlawat and co-authors in particular describe the pros and cons of these structures, along with their lack of 
transparency, particularly well. See Ahlawat, Sunita, Danielle Bolomo and Ky1e Ropp, Whether Sensible Business 
Tool or Deceptive Scheme to Conceal, the Special Purpose Entities Are Here to Stay, Accounting and Finance 
Research 3(2), 2014, available online. 
368 Newman in particular represents one voice in this camp. See Newman, Neal, Enron and the Special Purpose 
Entities-Use or Abuse-The Real Problem-The Real Focus, Law and Business Review of the Americas 13, 2007, 
available online.  
369 Our paper – focused on corporate governance – does not try to discuss the accounting and reporting rules around 
these entities. For more, See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, and International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Report on Special Purpose Entities, 2009, 
available online. 
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Updating China’s Code of Corporate Governance and Other Regulations 
 
Many studies we have already reviewed have argued that Chinese corporate governance would
improve only if China’s rules improved. Foreign listings of Chinese companies supposedly 
import foreign corporate governance rules.
 
e 
nese companies can import “better” corporate governance rules. Yet, no one can 
eny that some corporate governance rules help improve companies’ market valuations more 
than others. Figure 62, for example, shows the way that Chinese market valuations have changed 
in response to the valuation of their American Depository Receipts (ADRs).372 Offering access to 
Chinese companies’ shares in the US has significantly more effects on Mainland companies’ 
market values than offering such access in Hong Kong or Taiwan. Even if Mainland companies 
embraced Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules, such rules do not improve companies 
market valuations as much as US corporate governance rules.  
 
370 Many of these companies incorporate offshore – 
making offshore incorporations a key part of this import process.371 We previously dispelled th
notion that Chi
d
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Figure 62: Why Might US Corporate Governance Rules Push Up Chinese Market
Valuations More than Others? 
The figure show s the w ay that Chinese companies' ADR prices changed in response to the offering of these 
depository receipts overseas (in the jurisdictions show n) -- and after controlling for confounding variables. For 
example, market prices-to-book values increased most w hen Chinese companies offered ADRs on the US NASDAQ 
and a bit less w hen offered on the AMEX. Moving the offer to Hong Kong w ould cause market valuations to fall -- 
w ith the most fall corresponding to the offer of ADRs in Taiw an. Yet, the variance explained by the authors' models 
only comes to a relatively low ly 0.22.                                                                                Source: Pan et al. (2012). 
 
 
How have Mainland corporate governance rules adapted to changing markets and growing access 
to foreign exchanges? China’s corporate governance regulations – as well as corporate 
governance itself -- have improved by leaps and bounds since the 2002 publication of its Code of 
Corporate Governance.373 Yet, by senior officials’ own admission, China’s corporate governance 
regulations should improve far more in a wide-array of ways. Figure 63 shows the most 
                                                 
370 To take another example, Sun and Tobin argue that Bank of China’s cross-listing in Hong Kong helped promote 
e for Financial and Management Studies Discussion Paper, 2003, available 
convergence of its corporate governance. Yet, they provide no evidence – listing data on financial performance 
instead. See Sun, Lai-Xiang and Damian Tobin, Corporate Governance Reform and International Listing: Case of the 
Bank of China (Hong Kong), Centr
online.  
371 The British Virgin Islands in the Bank of China case cited in the main body of this paper. See Id at Figure 1.  
372 Pan, Lee-Hsien, Chien-Ting Lin , and K.C. Chen, ADR Characteristics and Corporate Governance in the Greater 
China Region, Review of Development Finance 2, 2012, available online.  
373 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 
Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online.  
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important areas recently identified by senior Chinese officials themselves.374 Disseminating a 
revised code of corporate governance probably represents the easiest task to accomplish. While 
not as important as some of the structural problems identified, lack of anti-fraud and 
whistleblowing programmes also represents an easy, but important, activity to promote at the 
China-Hong Kong level. Similarly, supervisors on the Mainland can call upon Hong Kong’s 
fraud and compliance community for training and support. Requiring independent directors to 
show up (easy) and vote their mind (much harder) represents another important and relatively
easy activity.  
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Poor Shareholder Legal Protection
Weak (Hostile) Takeover M arket 
Small Shareholder’s Apathy 
Related-Party Transactions Expropriation of M inority Shareholders 
Independence of Board of Directors
Group’s interests before company’s
Government Intervention in the M anagement Appointment and
Corporation Operations
Interest Conflicts between Blockholders/M anagers and M inority
Shareholders
Removing Soft Budget Constraints in former SOEs
Guidelines for Corporate Governance (SEE and new General)*
Figure 63: Introducing a Consolidated Code of Corporate Governance Probably Easiest
Out Of All Chinese Self-Admitted Corporate Governance Defects 
Encourage M ore Independent Directors 
Little independent director attendance at board meetings*
Investor relations function
Supervisors’  training*
Anti-fraud and whistleblowing schemes*
Introduce other Forms of Sizeable Outside Shareholders like
Institutional Investors&
Low dispersion of shareholdings
 
The figure shows the activities identified by Chinese officials to improve the Mainland's corporate governance. Hong 
Kong has already developed significant experience in tackling most of these issues. 
* represents an easy activity (1-3)  
black bars represent an activity which Hong Kong has yet to master itself.  
                                                 
374 For example, see Hu, Ru-Yin, Efforts to Improve Corporate Governance in China, OECD Conference on the 
Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises, 2015, available online. See also Protiviti (2013) at Tables 2 and 
3. 
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The scattering of corporate governance provisions across legislative or administrative instruments 
hinders Chinese directors and corporate stakeholders from understanding corporate governance 
obligations and best practices. The legislative acts containing corporate governance provisions 
include the 2006 Company Law (mainly about shareholder protection and board structure), the 
2006 Securities Law (mainly governing investor protection and disclosure), the 2006 Criminal 
Law Amendment Act (mainly fraud, insider trading and non-compliance with other regulations), 
the 2009 Law on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (regulating mainly how state owned 
enterprises should behave), and the 2000 Accounting Law (ensuring accurate financial reporting 
and oversight).375 Other peripheral rules include the 2007 Regulations on Listed Companies’ 
Information Disclosure, the 2006 Guidance on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association, the 
2006 Rules on Listed Companies’ Shareholders’ Meetings, the 2001 Guiding Opinions on the 
Establishment of the System of Independent Directors in Listed Companies, the 2004 Provisions 
on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders, the 2006 
Regulations on the Takeover of Listed Companies, the 2008 Regulations on Major Asset 
eorganisation of Listed Companies, the 2005 Regulations on Equity Incentives of Listed 
 
 
 
                                                
R
Companies, the 2006 Regulations on the Registration and Settlement of Securities and the 2008
Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal Control.376 We could not find the rules governing Articles
of Association of Companies Seeking a Listing outside the PRC Prerequisite Clauses at all. We 
do not discuss specific corporate governance rules focused on securities/financial firms.377 
 
What is the extent of such scattering? As shown in Figure 64, companies need to consult at least 
7 laws in order to assess the extent to which they comply with the OECD Corporate Governance 
Principles. As shown, the Company Law contains most of the relevant provisions. Yet, the 
official code of corporate governance applies to only about 15% of the relevant provisions. Such
dispersion complicates managers’ ability to draft relevant corporate governance decisions and 
internal auditors’ ability to check them. Obviously problems must exist – given the poor 
governance performance of the Mainland’s companies. As noted previously, on a 5 point scale of 
improvement, none of the areas of corporate governance tracked improved by 3 points or 
more.378 The time has come to consolidate China’s Code of Corporate Governance – using 
improvements to Hong Kong’s own corporate governance rules as an example.  
  
 
 
375 We take these laws from Yang and co-authors.  See Yang, Hua, Zehua Ouyang, Li-Xin Zhao, Jian-Chun Cai, 
Qian-Song An, Bo-Jin Yan, Yan Liu, Ming Huang, Wei-Dong Zhang, Chun-Sheng Pan, Huan Zhu, Li Gao, Xing-
Hui Jiang, Hong-Xia Sun, Xue-Yue Jiang, Zhao-Hui Chen, Jian-Shan Huang, Xu Yong, Shun-Ying Ren, Jiang-Xuan 
She, Wei Ren, and Hong-Da Zhou, Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2011, available online.  
376 We do not link to all of these – as they are mostly peripheral to our discussion. For readers interested in these 
-Xia, Political Determinants of Corporate rules, and the institutional system generating them, see Shi, Chen
Governance in China, 2012.  
377 See CSRC, Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Securities Companies, 2004, available online. 
378 CFA Institute, China Corporate Governance Survey, 2007, available online. 
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Figure 64: Mainland Corporate Governance Law Spread Across Various Instruments
The figure show s the number of times a legislative or regulatory act serves to comply w ith the 121 OECD corporate 
governance principles (as assessed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission). The other category includes 
law s ranging from the criminal code to the bankruptcy law  (depending on the applicability of each law  for the provision 
mentioned). 
Source: Yang et al. (2011). 
 
 
Hong Kong’s business sector and regulators would need to exert a fair amount of influence in 
order to encourage the drafting of a revised Mainland code of conduct. Perhaps the best import 
from Hong Kong’s corporate governance regime consists of its long history of using principles-
based regulation. Figure 65 shows the principles enshrined in the Chinese Code of Corporate 
Governance.379 Defining some terms like “damage”, “necessary means” or interference” remain 
te. 
nies. The 
ers of persons who a) own a comparatively large 
) 
 
    
uncontroversial – and indeed similar in Hong Kong’s code. Yet, three principles in particular 
look very difficult to interpret in a Mainland context. First, particularly Section 2 of Chapter 2’s 
the Independence of Listed Company stipulates that, “controlling shareholders shall respect the 
financial independence of the company and shall not interfere.”380 The obvious question arises 
about the extent to which government officials and state-owned entities serving as controlling 
shareholders can (or should) refrain from directing and interfering in these companies. We have 
already pointed to the social mandate given to China’s companies – both state-owned and priva
Second, Chapter 7(3) covers the declaration of beneficial ownership in Mainland compa
section requires the declaration to sharehold
percentage of shares of the company, b) actually control the company when acting in concert, c
change their shareholding (and/or factors causing such changes), d) pledge the company’s shares,
and/or e) transfer control of the company.381 
 
                                             
gulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, Zheng 379 China Securities Re
Jian Fa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online. 
380 Several articles in the section contain this formulaic phrase.  
381 The declaration to shareholder probably constitutes a minimum standard. When viewed in combination with 
Chapter 6 and 7.1, one could claim that such information sharing can extend beyond shareholders to the wider 
community of the firms’ stakeholders.  
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Other principles contained in the code of corporate governance also look relatively difficult to 
understand in the paradigm of Hong Kong’s corporate governance. Chapter 6 of the Code looks
suspiciously like the socialist regulation which the government has supposedly tried to roll-back 
for decades. Article 86 admonishes companies to consider the “welfare, environmental protection 
and public interests of the community in which it resides, and ... pay attention to the company’s 
social responsibilities.”
 
shore? 
s from 
China’s various legal instruments could take little time, and serve as an offering to companies at 
 
d move 
n 
382 Would these principles still apply if the company worked off
How might harmonisation with Hong Kong’s own code of corporate governance affect 
provisions like those in Article 86?  
 
We recommend three activities which Hong Kong’s Financial Services Development Council 
could easily implement.383 First, consolidating the corporate governance related provision
home, on the Mainland and elsewhere. Second, the Council could provide guidance on the 
principles enshrined in the Mainland code, as they see them. Naturally, such guidance would lack
the Mainland government’s authority or approval. Yet, the Guidance document woul
Mainland regulators toward thinking in a more principles-focused regulatory environment. Third, 
encourage the CSRC to adopt provisions from Hong Kong’s code which the Mainland versio
                                                 
382 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 
Zheng Jian Fa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online. 
Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies 
383 We encourage the Financial Services Development Council to engage in this work – as they have the mandat
organisational structure. The Council’s organisation consists of public and private sector bodies who can decide 
e and 
how 
 The mandate comes from the Council’s objectives, and specifically 
, About Us: Objectives, 2016, available online
to divide the work best among themselves.
objective 4 to “promote our financial services industry and Hong Kong as an international financial centre on the 
Mainland and overseas.” See FSDC .  
 97
lacks.384 Naturally, not all provisions need to move over – only those encouraging the “bonding” 
of better corporate governance rules on the Mainland we already discussed.385  The FSDC seems 
like the only body with the gravitas to work with the Mainland authorities in this way.  
 
 
Y n 
c s 
c ntres.386 Yet, all assessments do agree 
at Hong Kong’s companies need to improve significantly their corporate governance and 
conomic effects on Hong Kong’s own companies of increasing their corporate governance from 
on.387 Hong Kong firms which move from having 
w corporate governance scores to high scores experience an 11% increase in market value, with 
ate 
 
 
nd. 
adopt 
ernance 
 
Recommendation 27: The FSDC should consolidate the numerous CSRC, Company Law 
and other rules into unified rulebook (as a goodwill gesture).  
 
Recommendation 28: The FSDC should provide non-authoritative Guidance from the Hong 
Kong perspective for principles outlined in the Mainland’s 2002 Code of Corporate 
Governance.  
 
Recommendation 29: The FSDC should encourage the CSRC to adopt relevant provisions 
from the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance to the Mainland’s.  
 
et, Hong Kong’s government and/or businesses can hardly advise the Mainland when its ow
ode of corporate governance needs fixing. Various assessments do not agree on Hong Kong’
orporate governance ranking vis-a-vis other financial ce
th
improvement would increase these companies’ market values. Figure 66 shows the effect of 
e
the last known academic study on the questi
lo
decreasing amounts of risk (share price volatility). In their assessment of Hong Kong’s corpor
governance, Michael and Goo give 18 recommendations for improving corporate governance in
Hong Kong.388 Hong Kong’s corporate policies have the power to influence Mainland 
companies’ governance and thus market valuations.389 Better corporate governance rules and
practices in Hong Kong have the ability to influence these rules and practices on the Mainla
Yet, as noted in recommendation 30, Hong Kong’s authorities and companies should 
outstanding recommendations in order to improve Hong Kong’s own corporate gov
practices before thinking about using these rules to influence Mainland companies.  
                                                 
384 Such work would likely serve the State Council’s policy objectives defined in the 2005 Circular of the State
Council on its Approval of the CSRC’s Opinion on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies. We could not find 
an English-language version of this much-cited circular. We thus can not describe in more detail the 
government’s/Party’s long-term plans to improve corporate governance.  
385 Authors like Yu would clearly lament the wholesale adoption of Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules on t
 
he 
Mainland. See Yu, Guang-Hua, Comparative Corporate Governance in China: Political Economy and Legal 
e 
, 
nance, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 
Infrastructure, 2007.  
386 For example, Hong Kong’s corporate governance ranked second among selected financial centres according to th
World Competitiveness Report in 2012 but sixth according to Governance Metrics International. See See Michael
Bryane and Say Hak Goo, Last of the Tai-Pans: Improving the Sustainability of Long-Term Financial Flows by 
Improving Hong Kong's Corporate Gover
2013/039, 2013, at p. 8, available online.  
387 Yan-Leung Cheung, Thomas Connelly, Ping Jiang, and Piman Limpaphayom, Does Corporate Governance 
Predict Future Performance? Evidence from Hong Kong, Financial Management 40(1), 2011, available online. 
 
388 See Michael and Goo, supra at p. 4-5.  
389 Such an observation represents nothing new. See Xiao-Huang and Horace Yeung, Chinese Companies and the
Hong Kong Stock Market, 2014.  
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Figure 66: Hong Kong Corporations with High Corporate Governance Scores Earned
11% Higher Returns with Lower Risk 
The data in the chart show  the average 12-month abnormal cumulative average stock returns for three groups of Hong
Kong companies sorted by their corporate governance index scores. In comparison, w e show  the standard deviations 
of market-market residuals for each of these groups (w hich proxies the risk of investing in these companies). 
Source: Cheung et. al. (2005) at Table 5. 
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Recommendation 30: Implement the recommendations of our last assessment of Hong 
Kong’s corporate governance to tackle concentrated ownership, institutional activism, self-
dealing, and Board development in Hong Kong itself.  
C
 
Effects of Corporate Governance Changes 
 
What effect would adopting Hong Kong’s better corporate governance policies and practice
have on foreign – and particularly Mainland – firms? Hong Kong-listed Mainland companies’ 
share price changes might provide some clue. The last major revisions to Hong Kong’s code of 
corporate governance occurred in 2011.390 The easiest way of guessing what the effects the 
revision of Hong Kong’s code of corporate governance on Mainland firms had consists of 
looking at the differences-in-differences of their share prices. Namely, we looked at the 
difference in share prices for Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong from January 2011 to 
December 2012. Share prices from for Hong Kong firms listed on the Hong Kong stock ma
increased on average by 20% at a time when Mainland shares on the Hong Kong stock market
fell by 11%.391 The 11% fall in Mainland companies’ shares listed on the Hong Kong stock 
market partly explains that drop in the overall market index. Yet, such a drop pales in compari
to the 33% drop in the overall Mainland share price index.392 The difference between Hong Ko
and Mainland firms’ difference in share prices from the beginning of 2011 to th
   
 The HKICPA provides the background and content of that reform. As noted by the Hong Kong Exchange, the 
Exchange started consultations on reforming the corporate governance code in 2010, with implementation carrying 
on in 2012. See HKICPA, A Guide on Better Corporate Governance Disclosure, 2012, available online
390
. See also 
ng HKEx, Consultation Paper on the Review of the Code on Corporate Governance Practices and Associated Listi
Rules, December 2010, available online. 
391 Such an increase occurred against the backdrop of a 5.4% drop in the S&P Global Market Index tracking Hong 
Kong (as reported by the World Bank). See World Bank, S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change): Hong Kon
2016, available 
g, 
online.  
392 As we only want ball-park estimates for this paper, we do not disaggregate the Chinese markets into specifi
exchanges – like the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges.  See World Bank, S&P Global Equity Indices (annual %
change): China, 2016, available 
c 
 
online. 
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thus comes to around 31%. Such a difference comes from the company-specific and policy-
specific differences between Hong Kong and Mainland firms. Mainland firms listing in Hong 
Kong thus saved 22% in losses – an effect we might call a Hong Kong listing effect. At that same 
time, Mainland firms experienced the changing corporate governance rules at a time when other 
companies around the world did not. These other companies share prices in the global S&P index 
fell by 15%. Thus, the specific effect of the corporate governance changes on Mainland firms – 
after removing market specific effects – comes to 7%. If the differences-in-differences 
methodology removed other effects, revisions to Hong Kong’s code of corporate governance 
should have cased a 7% lift in Mainland share prices.  
 
Extending on this logic, we can derive the value of corporate governance reforms on Mainland 
companies’ market capitalisation. As we reported earlier, Mainland firms had a market 
capitalization of $8.2 trillion and better corporate governance has the potential to add another 7% 
 share value. We can not know the extent to which the Mainland government’s own efforts at 
orporate governance reform will increase share price valuations. If we assume that existing and 
planned corporate governance reform on the Mainland will translate into increases in market 
value of 3%, then the remaining 4% increase (times 8.2 trillion) equals roughly $330 billion. 
Thus, radical changes to Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules could increase market 
capitalizations on the Mainland by around $330 billion by the time their effects work 
through these companies.    
 
Changes to corporate governance rules would also affect these firms’ riskiness and the 
distribution of share price gains between Mainland firms. Figure 67 shows the spread in share 
prices for Hong Kong listed firms’ share prices in 2011 and in 2013. We have matched these 
price distributions to the closest fitting statistical distribution for these price changes (a log 
logistic curve). As shown, share prices between listed firms tightened after the code of corporate 
governance revisions. Such share price convergence should not surprise us -- as the expanded and
standardized corporate governance regulations probably had the effect of reducing the variability 
igure 68 though shows the dark side of such reforms. Compared with share price changes 
ce 
                                                
in
c
 
of firm-specific differences in the governance practices which reflected on their share prices. 
F
around the world, the share prices of many Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong dropped 
significantly. If we fit the tightest statistical distribution possible on the data, the resulting 
average price drop came out to around 20% more than world equity prices fell. Yet, when we 
take into account the larger share price gains of some companies (by fitting a normal distribution 
to the data), overall share prices rose by 7%. These data confirm a trend repeated by so many 
corporate governance researchers. Corporate governance reform may increase share pri
values in the longer-run, even if many companies lose in the short-run.393 
 
 
393 Claessens as well as Black and co-authors might explain such dynamics due to short-term resistance by the 
Indeed, commentators 
he 
entrenched owners and managers whose interests corporate governance reform may threaten. 
like Crawford note that corporate governance reform’s whole purpose consists of getting managers to focus on t
longer-term. See Claessens, Stijn, Corporate Governance and Development, World Bank Research Observer 21(1), 
2006, available online. See Black, Bernard, Woochan Kim, Hasung Jang, and Kyung-Suh Park, European Corporate 
Governance Institute Finance Working Paper 103/2005, 2008, available online. See also Crawford, Rebecca, 
Corporate Governance Reform: How to Promote the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, NYU 
Journal of Law & Business 5, 2009, available online.  
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Profitably Redirecting Hong Kong’s Incorporation Agents/Services Firms 
 
The evidence suggests that tightening incorporation rules and strengthening corporate governance 
would not radically affect the number of company registrations in Hong Kong. Figure 69 show 
the number of employees in the 1,100 incorporation, secretarial and corporate services firms 
registered by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council.394 Excluding outliers (the jumbo-
sized global incorporation firms), most of these firms employ on average 10 people.395 Data from 
panies Registry moreover suggest that the large number of small agents detracts from the Com
incorporation market quality. Figure 70 shows the number of non-Hong Kong companies 
registered (and deceased) over the past several years in Hong Kong.396 Only about 65% of these 
foreign company incorporations survive every year. We do not know which ones live and die, or 
                                                 
394 See HKTDC, Online Marketplace: Corporate Secretarial Service, 2016, available online.  
395 Our sample size of twenty five firms in no way represents enough firms to make a reliable guess of the true 
average. Yet, given this probability distribution, these firms have less than a 5% chance of having an average of 20 
or more employees.  
396 See Companies Registry, Registered Non-Hong Kong Companies in 2016, 2016, available online. See also 
Companies Registry, Number of Local Companies that has Remained Registered in the Companies Registe
2014 [Incorporated under the Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622)], 2016, available 
r since 
lineon .  
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their average lifetime.397 Only about 6,300 summons for regulatory or other violations for over 
1.3 million registered companies means that an incredibly low 0.5% of companies find 
themselves into the Company Registry’s cross-hairs in any year. Incorporation agents in Ho
Kong thus seem ripe for industry consolidation – as more regulatory requirements forc
these firms to offer extra advisory services in the areas of compliance, corporate 
governance. The simple half-day one stop-shop incorporation will probably disappear.   
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Figure 70: Only Roughly 65% of Hong Kong's Incorporation Agents' Newly Incorporated
Creations Stand the Test of Time? 
ourse,
 
 
l’s (HKTDC’s) data roughly 
The figure show s the number of new  versus ceased companies registered by Hong Kong's  Companies Registry. 
Roughly 35% of the number of each years incorporations cease to have a place of business in that year. Of c
registration agents' companies  may have better survival track records -- or w orse. But if  w e use the overall statistic, 
such turn-over is unlikely due to creative distruction and market discovery of new  and innovative ideas. 
Source: Hong Kong's Company Registry (2016). 
A cursory look at the data suggests that our proposals would cost Hong Kong’s incorporation 
industry relatively little. Figure 71 shows the employment in, and estimated revenue from, Hong 
Kong’s secretarial firms.398 Across the sector, these firms employ close to 10,000 people – a 
number which the Hong Kong Trade Development Counci
                                                 
397 If these firms follow the global norm, long-lived firms tend to live longer, and newer firms disappear more often.  
oposal to the World Trade Organization from CSIA For 
nce, Compliance and Secretarial Advisory Services, 2012, available online
398 See Corporate Secretaries International Association, A Pr
the Creation of a New Separate Heading in the Services Sectoral Classification List to be titled Corporate 
Governa . 
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confirm.399 If only 1% of incorporations deal with non-Hong Kong companies (ie offshore
can assume that new regulations would impact on the “expected value” of only 2 firms 
US$10m in revenues.
), we 
and 
 these 
400 If these new regulations choke off even 20% of this business, Hong 
Kong still only loses about $2 million – hardly a huge dent in an industry worth over US$1 
billion. Yet, the undeniable conclusion remains. As roughly 35% of all newly incorporated 
businesses drop out after some time, one must question the long-term effectiveness of
incorporation agents.  
 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
UK US Malaysia Singapore HK (named
corp. sec.)
HK Support HK (pro. co.
service)
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
$6,000m $8,600m
$400m
$630m
$500m $260m $425m
Figure 71: Tighter Offshore Incorporation/Secretarial Regulations for Hong Kong 
Jeopardizes Only 1% of the Market at Most  
gross estimated revenue
The figure show s the estimated number of employees and revenue earned by professional corporate secretarial and
services f irms in the jurisdictions show n. These f irms w ill likely increase employment and revenue as they migrate up 
the value-chain. Sources: CSIA (2012) and Hong Kong Companies Registry (2016) for 1% figure about the percent of 
non-Hong Kong domiciled f irms relative to total). 
 
 
 
f services – from advising on incorporation to 
rs like accounting, restructuring, and compliance across borders.401 
imply complying with the HKICS’s AML Charter will push equilibrium employment and 
c petitive 
fi ng 
in ormation) will pose a problem for the smaller firms in the 
incorporation market.403 A firm like the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries could help 
form incorporation agents of all sizes about the factors shaping their market – and provide 
e having to pivot (change) their service offerings or exit the market. As such our 
What would the remaining incorporation agents morph into? Figure 72 shows an example of a
large international company handling incorporations in Hong Kong. As noted in the figure, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) provide a range o
complex corporate matte
S
ompliance expenses in these companies higher – pushing out the smaller and less com
rms.402 Even paying for Thomson Reuters’ World-Check (the industry standard for checki
dividuals’ background inf
in
advice to thos
                                                 
399 Including outliers (for the very large incorporation agents), average employment sizes for these 1,100 companies 
approaches 10 employees per firm. Such an estimate roughly matches the CSIA estimate, after allowing for rounding
errors in both the CSIA and HKTDC data. Thus, if the CSIA’s employment data matches the real situation in Hong 
Kong, we can feel more confident that the revenue data does as well.  
400 Expected value relates to a statistical concept whereas estimated employment and revenue come from the 
percentage change in incorporations multiplied by employment numbers and/or revenue amounts.   
401 Regulators like the Companies Registry have only recently started to measure the more complex aspects o
Kong’s incorporation markets. See Hong Kong Companies Registry, Analysis of Statistics of Companies 
Incorporated, 2016, available online
 
f Hong 
. 
402 See HKICS, AML/CFT Charter, 2016, available online. 
3 For more information on World-Check, see Thompson Reuters, Thomson Reuters World-Check, 2015, available 
online
40
. 
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thirty-first recommendation encourages the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
specifically to offer workshops explaining how the changes to Hong Kong’s corporate 
governance rules will change the nature of competition in Hong Kong’s corporate secretarial 
services sub-sector. Firms that offer a fuller range of services – like helping Mainland an
companies adopt corporate governance reforms – will remain more competitive than the simple 
incorporation service providers handing out leaflets about their comp
d other 
any on the Wanchai 
edestrian walkway/bridge. p
 
Figure 72: The Global Big Audit/Consultants Will Likely Dominate Hong Kong’s Future 
Company Incorporation and Services Sector  
 
The figure shows the secretarial services offering of one of Hong Kong’s larger firms operating in the corporate 
incorporation and secretarial advisory sector. We have no particular reason for choosing this specific company rather 
than its competitors of the same size and service offering.   
Source: PwC website, 2016.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Hong Kong contributes to poor corporate governance on the Mainland. We show how Chinese 
companies have used Hong Kong’s stock exchange and its offshore incorporation agents to raise 
money and ship it off again offshore. We also showed that poor corporate governance standards 
often prevail in places and companies using these financial networks. The Mainland’s 
politicisation of its corporate governance as well as its lower corporate governance standards 
have provided weak incentives to improve corporate governance at home. Yet, simply adopting 
Hong Kong’s corporate governance laws on the Mainland will not improve the corporate 
governance we care about most – the governance that improves shareholder returns. So what can 
Hong Kong’s policymakers do?  
 
Recommendation 31: The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries to conduct 
workshops preparing small incorporation agents and intermediaries to move up the value 
chain or exit the market.  
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Hong Kong can adopt legal provisions already common in more advanced jurisdictions. These 
provisions help investigators and prosecutors police firms far away from the stock exchange’s 
gaze. These provisions also force all companies to provide more information – solving the usual 
collective action problems which keep listed companies’ businesses dark and its shares 
unprofitable. These reforms would also improve Hong Kong’s own corporate governance, a boon 
for its own companies as much as those across its northern border.  
 
Taking on the role as policy advisor, we discuss ways to incentivize Mainland firms to improve 
their corporate governance by adopting numerous market-value increasing reforms in Hong Kong. 
These include the limited extra-territorial application of corporate governance provisions, 
changes to the Listing Rules to ‘contract’ for better corporate governance, and incentives to 
collect better corporate governance data. Other reforms include increasing financial transparency 
(particularly about corporate ownership and control), reducing financial firms’ incentives to trade 
in shell corporations, regulating relationships with tax havens, and encouraging the redrafting of 
China’s 2002 Code of Corporate Governance. We provide 31 recommendations and estimate that 
these recommendations can increase market values on the Mainland by 7% (or in value of 
roughly $330 billion), while improving the value-added of Hong Kong’s own 
incorporation/corporate services companies.  
 
On a more academic side, we looked at patterns in two key datasets. First, we analysed the 
Panama Papers data to identify the links between Hong Kong and its likely contribution to 
corporate governance stifling offshore incorporations abroad. We looked empirically at the link 
between corporate governance quality and changes in a part of the offshore incorporation market 
served by Mossack Fonseca. Second, we looked at the way Mainland share prices responded in 
the past to Hong Kong’s own corporate governance reforms. With these data, we could predict 
how they might react to future reforms.  
 
Lastly, we assessed many of the new issues which will dominate both the academic and practical 
sides of corporate governance work in the next decade or two. We looked at the likely role of 
beneficial ownership databases in China and Hong Kong. We looked the distance covered in our 
field of corporate governance between China’s 2002 code of corporate governance and its 
analogue, as reformed in Hong Kong 2012. Probably most importantly, as jurists, we tackled the 
role of extra-territorial application of corporate governance. We remember when our colleagues 
would heckle any mention of such a thing for fighting corruption. The boring realities to 
tomorrow do really sometimes start with the wild speculations of today.  
